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Abstract 
In recent years a growing number of theoretical and empirical studies of first lan- 
guage acquisition have cast doubt on the hypothesis that acquiring language is a 
deterministic process in which the role of experience is restricted to triggering in- 
nate principles of grammatical content. The aim of this thesis is to explore areas of 
language where input -based learning demonstrably plays a role and to find learning 
mechanisms that account for the construction of observed overgeneral grammars 
and the process of their restriction. 
The thesis is a comparative study of the acquisition of argument structure 
in English and in Hungarian. The detailed analysis of spontaneous speech sam- 
ples of two -- year -old children reveals that the omission of subjects, objects and 
prepositions at the so- called telegraphic stage of English child language cannot be 
explained either by limitations in processing capacity or by postulating an incom- 
plete Universal Grammar. It is suggested that children's implicit arguments and 
oblique noun phrases lacking case or prepositional marking need not be analysed as 
syntactically ill- formed, since they conform to permissible abstract structural con- 
figurations. The errors may instead be attributed to overgeneral or indeterminate 
rules of pragmatics, which are fuzzy and variable in the mature grammar. 
It is shown that the nature of the children's intake of the primary linguistic 
data is a good predictor of the nature and extent of overgeneralisation or indeter- 
minacy and of the speed with which the rules are fine -tuned to match the target. 
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1 Language acquisition in principle 
1.1 Introduction 
The philosophical background of this study comes from the nature vs. nurture de- 
bate in the context of children's acquisition of their first language. I will start by 
reviewing arguments for and against the two sides of the debate, referring to one 
approach as nativist and the other as functionalist. On both sides, these arguments 
may be the outcome of two different research programmes. On the one hand we 
have theoretical reasoning based on what we know about the nature of human lan- 
guage and about conceivable mechanisms of knowledge acquisition in general. This 
is the topic of Section 1.2. On the other hand there is a growing pool of empirical 
data from studies of child language in particular. As we shall see in Section 1.3, 
the two kinds of evidence are not always easy to reconcile within the same school of 
thought. The nativist approach has not so far found a satisfactory explanation for 
some kinds of variation across individual language learners at predefined stages of 
development or within individual learners over developmental periods. Conversely, 
the functionalist school has at present difficulty explaining the rapid and uniform 
acquisition of certain linguistic phenomena which obey abstract principles of lan- 
guage. The solution I will propose is to combine the methods of the two approaches. 
The study will adopt an essentially nativist stance relaxed by discarding one of the 
premises, that which disallows learning from the non -occurrence of certain strings 
in the input to the child. 
The arguments for the postulation of a learning mechanism of this kind 
and the details of its operation are developed in the context of argument mapping 
in English and Hungarian child language. Following the presentation of the data 
and the research questions in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 discusses implicit and explicit 
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subjects and objects in the two languages and Chapter 4 investigates the less well - 
documented phenomenon of the omission of prepositions from oblique arguments. 
Finally, Chapter 5 summarises the findings of the study. 
1.2 The role of UG 
If we contemplate the classical problem of psychology, that of accounting 
for human knowledge, we cannot avoid being struck by the enormous 
disparity between knowledge and experience -in the case of language be- 
tween the generative grammar that expresses the linguistic competence 
of the native speaker and the meagre and degenerate data on the basis 
of which he has constructed this grammar. 
(Chomsky 1972:78) 
This puzzle of language acquisition, or "Plato's problem," forces any learning the- 
orist to search for innately specified abilities, in the widest sense of the word, that 
allow the child to go beyond the input in acquiring language. Language acquisition 
cannot be thought of as a process of imitation and habit formation but must be 
viewed as a process of organising available linguistic data in a principled way and 
abstracting away from them at some level. This much is (largely) uncontroversial. 
It is subject to debate, however, what those abilities are and how they are used to 
achieve the learner's task. The general questions that arise in this connection and 
some suggested answers to them include the following: 
1. What is the domain of genetically encoded abilities? 
(a) They mostly belong to cognition in general and they may be relevant 
for tasks not related to language, such as symbol manipulation or logical 
operations. 
(b) Most of the relevant abilities are specific to human language, independent 
of other cognitive modules. 
2. What is contained in the genetically encoded abilities? 
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(a) They guide and constrain the mechanism of learning, such as the process 
of hypothesis formation and testing, inductive reasoning, the filtering of 
the input, etc. 
(b) Not only the mechanisms, but also the elements that are manipulated are 
innate. These may include cognitive primitives, linguistic units and cat- 
egories and syntactic `rules' (principles and parameters). These objects 
constitute knowledge rather than abilities. 
3. In what way do these abilities apply and what determines change? 
(a) The constraints are best viewed as biases or predispositions. Their out- 
come greatly depends on environmental influences; the quality and quan- 
tity of the child's experiences have a significant effect on the learning 
process. In general, the learning mechanism is a mechanism of formu- 
lating and reformulating hypotheses by observing the properties of the 
linguistic and non -linguistic environment. 
(b) The working of the constraints is virtually independent of environmental 
influences. It is primarily the genetic programme that determines the 
learning process; experience has no more than a triggering role. In gen- 
eral, the learning mechanism is a deterministic mechanism of selecting 
from a pre- defined set of hypotheses on the basis of simple data. 
The approaches suggested by the two different sets of answers are embraced by two 
different schools of thought. The (a) answers are the answers of functionalists; the 
(b) answers would be given by nativists in the strict sense. Both agree that some 
aspects of language acquisition must be innate and other aspects must be learnt; 
the difference lies in where the emphasis is placed. Accordingly, the two groups 
pursue different paths to discovering what exactly is genetically given and what is 
the outcome of social -cultural learning. Functionalists start with the assumption 
that no language specific abilities are innate and study child language and the 
input to children to find out how much of language can be mastered on the basis 
of experience. As MacWhinney (1987a:250) puts it, 
[... ] we are guided by a "minimalist" approach that avoids making as- 
sumptions whenever possible. This minimalism emphasises the extent 
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to which cognitive processes needed by other areas of cognitive func- 
tioning can also be involved in language processing. To be sure, any 
attempt to place language into the Procrustean Bed of "general cogni- 
tion" must eventually fail when it runs up against aspects of language 
that are specific adaptations to the task of communicating between hu- 
man organisms. When the minimalist approach fails, there will then be 
solid reason to suspect that the skills involved are specific to language. 
At the other extreme, the strict nativist approach is to take a theory of Universal 
Grammar (UG) and search for the minimum of additional mechanisms that can ac- 
count for the selection of the target grammar from among the hypothesis grammars 
permitted by UG. 
It follows from the hunch [that the child is successful because a basic 
linguistic system and the ability to use this system are somehow en- 
shrined in the child's biology] that hypotheses about language should 
put as small a burden as possible on the child's linguistic experience and 
as great a burden as possible on the biologically given system, which we 
call Universal Grammar (UG). [...] In practical terms, this means that 
the linguist's null hypothesis should start with no role for experience. 
Those linguistic facts that can only be ascribed to experience can then 
be characterised cautiously. 
(Pesetsky 1995:1) 
The first method seems to be the default choice by Occam's razor -why postulate a 
language faculty if we can do without one? There are, however, reasons to adopt the 
second approach. One of these is the argument from the "Poverty of the Stimulus," 
Plato's problem applied to language, when the human language- capacity is viewed 
as an autonomous module of abstract structural descriptions. 
Suppose that we find a particular language has the property P... Suppose, 
furthermore, that P is sufficiently abstract and evidence bearing on it 
sufficiently sparse and contrived so that it is implausible to suppose that 
all speakers, or perhaps any speakers, might have been trained or taught 
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to observe P or might have constructed grammars satisfying P by in- 
duction from experience. Then it is plausible to postulate that P is a 
property of [the acquisition device]. 
(Chomsky 1977:65) 
Given the assumptions, Chomsky's conclusion is indisputable. But that is not suffi- 
cient to motivate a UG -first approach to all aspects of child language. An empirical 
investigation into the learnability of individual properties of language may cast 
doubts on the unavoidability of a research programme that gives absolute priority 
to the hypothesis of innate grammatical content. The objection seems all the more 
reasonable if we consider cross -linguistic variation. Rather than postulate an innate 
principle for every seemingly abstract property in every language, it may be more 
economical to search for an adequate generalised learning mechanism. There is, 
however, a nativist reply to the problem: the linguist's task is to formulate highly 
general, universally valid principles of grammar and account for at least some varia- 
tion by the parametrisation of these principles. Parameters are viewed as principles 
which can have two or more realisations across languages. The value appropriate 
for the target language is to be `set' on the basis of minimal experience via a de- 
ductive process. The role of learning could then be reduced to the acquisition of 
any remaining variable properties and irregularities of language, which are listed in 
the lexicon. The building of the lexicon, however, includes not only the acquisition 
of the semantic and morphophonological properties of lexical items and idiomatic 
expressions but also their categorisation and the labelling of categories, as well as 
the creation of argument frames for predicates. That may mean, reasons the func- 
tionalist, that a considerable portion of the language acquisition task cannot be 
determined by Universal Grammar. In that case we need two separate mechanisms: 
one for the acquisition of syntax and a different one for the acquisition of the lexicon. 
One could contend that this does not really pose a challenge for the UG -first 
approach, since the acquisition of the lexicon could be a simple case of rote learning, 
which requires no special learning mechanism. Things do not seem to be that simple, 
however. First, categories clearly cannot be learnt by imitation, since words are not 
labelled as Noun, Verb, Subject, etc. in the input. Second, it is unlikely that the 
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child hears every single predicate in every permissible argument frame a sufficient 
number of times for memorising to be an effective learning strategy. Moreover, there 
is convincing experimental evidence demonstrating children's ability (and readiness) 
to generalise argument structures to novel verbs (Gropen et al. 1991a, 1991b). 
Third, even the apparently simple case of learning the meaning of lexical items 
poses problems- something that has preoccupied philosophers like Wittgenstein 
and Quine. It seems, then, that the argument from the Poverty of the Stimulus holds 
for the lexicon as well. If the lexical component is indeed a list of "irregularities" 
and thus falls outside the principles of UG, the child needs a powerful learning 
mechanism that allows the right kind of creativity. The picture that now emerges 
favours an approach that seeks a powerful learning strategy side by side with innate 
principles of grammatical content describing those aspects of language which are 
demonstrably too abstract to be discovered on the basis of experience reasonably 
available to the learner. 
The theoretical problem of cross -linguistic variation is, however, not yet 
solved. Both theories of learning and theories of parameter setting need to ob- 
serve the requirement of logical learnability. It is a fairly well established fact that 
children of at least some, maybe all, cultures get no consistent negative feedback 
on their grammatical performance (Marcus 1993). It is also claimed, on logical 
grounds, that the non -occurrence of a string cannot be taken as evidence for its 
ungrammaticality, since there is an infinite number of correct sentences that do not 
occur in the input. These assumptions have serious implications for any theory of 
language acquisition, namely that whenever the child's grammar is analysed as an 
over -general grammar, the theorist is faced with the burden of explaining how the 
grammar can be narrowed down eventually in the absence of negative evidence. 
This problem has become known as the "logical problem of language acquisition ", 
following Baker (1979). If we characterise a grammar as the set of sentences it 
can analyse, there are four possible ways in which the child's hypothesis grammar 
may differ from the target grammar, as shown in (1.1). (I shall here present the 
standard characterisation of the problem -more will be said about it in later chap- 
ters.) The hypothesis and the target may generate disjoint languages (1.1a), the 
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two languages may have an intersection (1.1b), or the hypothesis language may be 
a subset of the target language (1.1c). In any of these cases, the target language 
contains data that have not been acquired by the child, i.e., positive evidence is 
available to the learner to signal the incompleteness or inaccuracy of the hypothesis 
grammar. These states are therefore taken not to pose problems for learnability. In 
(1.1d), however, the hypothesis language is a superset of the target language and 





Figure 1.1: Relations between Hypothesis and Target 
A further argument for the nativist approach, then, is that any conceivable 
induction -based learning mechanism is not only insufficient (which is not so much 
of a problem, since what remains can be attributed to innate principles) but also 
too powerful (which is a problem, because unlearning is impossible). Therefore, 
the theorist needs to seek ways of ensuring that the child does not hypothesise 
an over -general grammar. It follows not only that there must be something that 
constrains the acquisition process so as to avoid the situation in (1.1d), but also that 
the analysis of child language must be theory- driven. This reasoning undermines 
the utility of attempts at characterising language acquisition as a form of learning. 
Some go as far as suggesting a ban on the very word. 
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I, for one, see no advantage in the preservation of the term `learning'. 
I agree with those who maintain that we would gain in clarity if the 
scientific use of the term were simply discontinued. 
(Piattelli- Palmarini 1989:2) 
The need to minimise the role of learning has therefore led to the formulation of a 
number of universal constraints relating to the acquisition of the lexicon (the Whole 
Object assumption (Markman 1989); the Principle of Contrast (Clark 1987); rules 
of mapping from semantics to syntax (Pinker 1989)), as well as to proposals for 
the ordering of parameter values (the Subset Principle (Wexler & Manzini 1987)). 
As was noted, the reason for the postulation of various constraints is to prevent 
a situation when the language generated by the child's grammar is a superset of 
the target language. In an ideal world, then, they should ensure that the child 
does not make mistakes. It is, however, an unquestionable fact that children do 
not start speaking in fully grammatical sentences. Errors, of course, may be due 
to performance factors, in which case they are not the output of a rule at all and 
are no problem for learnability (occasional random errors, or incomplete utterances 
attributable to limitations to utterance length, for instance). The problem is when 
we find errors that appear to be the result of inductive overgeneralisation. In 
this case, adopting the strictest form of learnability theory, the only solution is the 
assumption that various constraints and principles of the language acquisition device 
become available at different stages of development and once they are available they 
will automatically replace the child's erroneous rule. The appeal to maturation is in 
fact warranted not only by overgeneralisation errors, but by any linguistic behaviour 
that violates principles of grammar and cannot be accounted for by performance 
factors. Quite apart from the problem of unlearning, what other explanation can 
there be for UG violations? What exactly matures is an open question. It may 
be the principles themselves, or some cognitive function that is necessary for the 
relevant principle to be utilisable by the cognitive system. Alternatively, it could 
be a property of the perceptual system that has the effect of "ordering" the input 
data. 
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In summary, taking some basic observations about the language acquisition 
process as premises (that there is a large qualitative gap between the input and 
what we make out of it; that language can be acquired in the absence of negative 
evidence; and that the input to the child is not ordered) we have to conclude that 
the acquisition process is heavily constrained by principles of UG and that these 
principles may become operative at different stages of development. This holds 
both for the domain of syntax proper and for the lexicon. In the next section I shall 
examine specific proposals for principles constraining the acquisition of variable 
properties of language and for maturational explanations of language development. 
My aim is to demonstrate that none of the rules or principles in these areas can 
accomplish their task without the help of sophisticated learning mechanisms. The 
question the rest of the study will then ask is what these learning mechanisms may 
be and whether they can provide a solution to the logical problem of language 
acquisition without innate structural constraints of the kind currently postulated 
by proponents of UG. 
1.3 Where UG is insufficient 
1.3.1 Category labelling 
One of the few uncontested facts about language is that lexical items group into 
categories and the rules, principles or regularities of grammar operate over these 
categories rather than over individual lexical items. Discovering which words of the 
target language belong to which category or categories is among the first tasks of the 
language learner. The problem is particularly important for the nativist approach, 
since no triggering can occur until the child has identified and appropriately labelled 
the categories to match those appearing in the mental principles of UG (Grimshaw 
1981). Three illustrative examples of strict innatist approaches, random labelling, 
bootstrapping by innate linking rules and feature -based structure building, will be 
discussed in this section. 
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RANDOM LABELLING OF CATEGORIES 
Lasnik (1989) proposes a solution that requires no learning strategy, but is based 
on a simple process of "trial and error" . The child randomly assigns category labels 
(from the set given by UG) to words or expressions in the input string. If the words 
come to be attached to the wrong terminal nodes, Lasnik observes, the structural 
analysis of subsequent input will violate some principle of UG and the child will 
have to reassign categories. For instance, if the child constructs the tree in (1.1) 
wh- movement will be blocked by a principle of UG, Subjacency in this case, which 











As soon as the child hears the sentence in (1.2), he should know that the 
category assignment was wrong. 
(1.2) What do people read? 
Lasnik further assumes that a significant amount of the phrase structure of a lan- 
guage can be acquired on the basis of simple distributional analysis constrained by 
UG. He proposes the following constraint: 
(1.3) Universally a sentence consists of a subject and a predicate phrase, NP 
VP, and the VP universally must contain exactly one V and may contain 
a NP. 
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Given this knowledge, on hearing the sentence in (1.4), once the child has established 
on the basis of distributional evidence that people and books must be of the same 
category, it follows that they must be Ns and read must be V, since UG allows only 
one V in a sentence. 
(1.4) People read books. 
What is not clear is how the child knows that the problem is with the category 
labels rather than with some other decision, such as the choice of parameter values 
or the grouping of lexical items. The task is further complicated by the fact that the 
labelling problem applies to grammatical relations as well as to syntactic categories. 
If the child's mapping of individual instances of semantic dependencies onto the 
structural expressions of syntactic functions is arbitrary, then in (1.1) the category 
labels may be right but the configuration may be wrong. Although movement of 
the wh -word to COMP is blocked, the child does not know that it has to move (until 
he has discovered that it has the feature [ +wh] and that in the target language 
[ +wh] elements must move) and nothing stops him from generating it in a position 
consistent with the surface string. The kind of restrictions on possible configurations 
that Lasnik mentions cannot be a reliable source of evidence, since they can only 
be formulated for simple sentences. For all the child knows, the sentence in (1.2) 
may contain an infinitival complement of the verb'. Using the strategy of trial and 
error the child might then reasonably settle on a right- headed structure like (1.5) 
upon hearing sentences like (1.2). 
Generally, until the learner has discovered the right category labels, he will 
not know what principles should apply to individual lexical items. The best the 
child can do is generate a permissible surface structure which is compatible with 
individual input strings. It is of course possible that the child forms categories of 
known words and observable grammatical markers on the basis of distributional 
One could appeal to maturation and propose that the components of UG initially available to 
the child can only generate simple sentences. This proposal, however, has no empirical support. 
Infinitival complements with the verb want are among the first word combinations of English child 
language. If the child's grammar does not allow more than one V category, the categorisation 
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what people read 
evidence and semantic dependencies before attempting to label or position them. 
In that case if any one member of the category appears in a construction which is 
not allowed by the child's grammar, the child will reassign category labels, provided 
that there is no alternative parameter setting, the child is satisfied that the word 
is grouped with the right category and it is not a positive exception that should be 
marked as such in the lexicon. But to satisfy the provisions one needs a powerful 
learning strategy. 
UG- DRIVEN SEMANTIC BOOTSTRAPPING 
Another approach to the categorisation problem is to find some properties of the 
linguistic or non -linguistic environment that are discoverable by a combination of 
perceptual and general cognitive mechanisms and which correlate with syntactic 
categories. The main proposals for such properties are prosody (Morgan & Demuth 
1996, Cairns et al. 1997) morphology /distribution (Maratsos & Chalkley 1981) and 
semantics (Grimshaw 1981, Pinker 1984, Levy et al. 1988). In order to dispense 
with learning, the links between the reconstructible properties and the syntactic 
notions must be part of UG and, as a consequence, they must be universal. Since 
the phonological and distributional properties of words are clearly not universal, 
the "bootstrap" that can be explored in a strict innatist framework is semantics. 
(Discussion of the other two proposals will be postponed to a later chapter.) 
The idea behind Pinker's (1984) semantic bootstrapping is that given a set of 
semantic concepts, a set of syntactic concepts and direct mapping from the former 
to the latter (although not vice versa), the child can effortlessly and accurately label 
lexical items and argument positions on the basis of the semantic representations 
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construed by the child of the input data. The links include generalisations such as 
the following: 
(1.6) a. PERSON, THING = Noun 
b. ACTION, CHANGE OF STATE = Verb 
c. AGENT, CAUSE etc. = Subject 
d. PATIENT, THEME = Object 
Since the links are at best canonical, Pinker argues, the child needs to label lexi- 
cal items and argument positions as soon as the first canonical sentence is heard. 
Thus suppose the child hears (1.7) and associates it with the correct semantic rep- 
resentation, he will then recognise the semantic categories mentioned in the linking 
rules and will be able to assign the right syntactic labels to the phonological units 
corresponding to them. 
(1.7) The boy threw rocks. 
Once a partial tree -structure has been constructed, labels for forms that do not 
have semantic correlates mentioned in the linking rules can be added on the basis 
of "structure- dependent distributional learning". This same mechanism also enables 
the child to analyse non -canonical sentences, such as (1.8). 
(1.8) The situation justified the measures. 
For instance, given the phrase structure rule NP -* Det N, the child can label the 
as Det in (1.7). When exposed to the sentence (1.8), using the same rule in the 
opposite direction, the learner can deduce that situation and measures must be Ns. 
A further rule of UG, S -+ NPSUBJ VP, tells the child that the situation must be the 
subject NP. Pinker is very careful to place the emphasis on "structure- dependent," 
that is, to view distributional learning as a process determined by rules of UG. As 
he later explains, (Pinker 1987:411): 
Note that unlike "pure" distributional analysis, this type of learning 
defines distributions in terms of (earlier- acquired) structural contexts 
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such as phrase structure positions rather than in terms of absolute serial 
positions, adjacencies to particular words, and so on. Thus the child will 
be in no danger of making incorrect generalisations from adventitious 
surface regularities, e.g., from this is a hand and this is a gift and 
hand me the phone to gift me the phone; nor will he or she miss the 
generalisation that the verb amuse takes a NP subject just because the 
set of words that can immediately precede it has no common property 
(e.g., JOHN amuses me; Babies who SING amuse me; The museum we 
went TO amuses me; Singing in the shower LOUDLY amuses me; etc.). 
As Pinker acknowledges in later work (Pinker 1987, 1989) there are problems with 
the linking rules. Most important of all, they are not universal. The clearest ex- 
ample for alternative linking patterns is some ergative languages, where THEMES 
and PATIENTS, rather than AGENTS, have the syntactic privileges associated with 
subjects. Furthermore, even if we find universally valid canonical mapping rules, 
non -basic sentences (e.g., passives) may not be reliably filtered out without addi- 
tional constraints on learning. Finally, UG of course cannot guarantee that the 
child's semantic representation is correct. 
The second component of semantic bootstrapping, structure -dependent dis- 
tributional learning, is similarly fallible. As was indicated in connection with Las - 
nik's proposal of permissible phrase structures, there are too many possible surface 
structure configurations to sufficiently constrain distributional learning. Although 
the class of underlying structures is much more restricted, that information remains 
inoperative until the learner has identified at least some labels. For instance, what 
tells the child that the NP rule above is relevant rather than, say, NP -+ Adj N? 
Every mistake made will increase the likelihood of misanalysis at subsequent stages. 
In analysing the non -canonical sentence in (1.8) the first instance of the could be 
categorised as a predicative adjective, situation as a copula, justified as a deter- 
miner and measures as a noun.' It may be that pure distributional learning, e.g., 
2While the resulting construction would be highly marked in English (e.g., Merry was the 
party), it is unmarked in other languages, such as Hungarian, as is the target construction. 
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that the precedes nouns, the word -final alveolar stop is a suffix that attaches to 
verbs and the order of constituents is SVO, is in fact less prone to error. 
In Pinker's (1987) constraint -satisfaction model some of these issues are ad- 
dressed by the replacement of linking rules and phrase- structure constraints by 
rule prototypes, referring to semantic, distributional, structural and phonological 
properties of language. These rules are weighted according to their cross -linguistic 
markedness. The child's parser at first constructs underspecified representations, 
which may include discernible features mentioned in the rule prototypes and vari- 
ables substituting for the labels. When sufficient information has been found, the 
variable is replaced by the appropriate symbol. Reliance on innate linking rules, 
however, still poses problems. If rules are weighted according to cross -linguistic 
likelihood (e.g., the AGENT is Subject rule is assigned a high value, because erga- 
tive languages are rare) then we would expect that some languages are harder to 
acquire than others. A theoretically more interesting consequence of the model, is 
that the rules that are the most adequate initially are the ones which are indepen- 
dent of other rules, since interdependence between rules can lead to circularity. For 
instance a rule like "Subject is daughter of S" is relevant both for determining the 
grammatical functions of arguments and for establishing the right phrase- structure 
configuration. In a situation when the child does not know either, however, the rule 
is helpless. Crucially, it is precisely the structural rules of syntax that belong to 
this class. The semantic, phonological and pure distributional cues avoid circularity 
because one side of the rule is discernible without any prior linguistic knowledge. 
That is, bootstrapping needs to work without innate rules of syntax, with only the 
help of predispositions (probabilistic associations between observable properties and 
symbols). Returning to the problem of cross -linguistic variation, it can be avoided 
if the rules are not constraints on valid linking patterns, but are attentional biases 
constraining the discovery procedure, as in (1.9). 
(1.9) The relative semantic roles of arguments can usually predict the relative 
syntactic behaviour of those arguments3. 
3This is a first approximation of the principle and will be revised later. 
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More will be said later about the problems with inductive learning on the basis of 
surface distribution. While it is recognised that something needs to constrain the 
process, that something, at least at the initial stages, cannot be structural rules of 
syntax that make no reference to either the phonological or the semantic interface. 
FEATURE -BASED BOOTSTRAPPING 
A somewhat different concern for category labelling is the acquisition of functional 
categories. Similar to Pinker's constraint satisfaction model, in that underspecified 
representations are allowed until more evidence has been accumulated, is Clahsen 
et al.'s (1996) proposal in the Minimalist framework. It is based on Chomsky's 
(1995) Merger theory, where functional projections are feature bundles. That is, 
the head category X of the functional projection XP has the features F1, F2, . . . F. 
Clahsen et al. argue that from the point of view of language acquisition, this ap- 
proach has the advantage that if the child only knows say F1, he will not be forced 
to guess the right label, but can posit a functional projection characterised by 
nothing but the feature F1. Phrase -structure representations can then be gradu- 
ally expanded by adding more features, which will eventually define the functional 
category in question. 
While this approach is plausible as an explanation for underspecified repre- 
sentations, it does not address the issue of how the features are acquired. Presum- 
ably, at least some 0- features can be identified from semantic content. In order to 
realise, however, that some feature has phonetic realisation in the target language 
and therefore projects into syntax, the child needs a sophisticated mechanism for 
distributional analysis. The acquisition of lexicalised functional categories may then 
give rise to the same problems as the labelling of lexical categories and grammatical 
functions. 
1.3.2 Development 
Another aspect of language acquisition where the standard assumptions about the 
workings of UG are insufficient is the development of language in the child. There 
are two reasons why additional properties of the language acquisition device are 
needed to account for development. One is the empirical observation that children's 
16 
language in some cases indicates violations of aspects of UG or overgeneralisation 
errors. The other is the logical argument that since no role is to be attributed to 
learning in the language acquisition process, the language faculty must contain a 
property that effects progression. A plausible solution to both issues is the hypoth- 
esis that the transition from one stage of child language to the next is the result 
of biological maturation. Apparent violations of principles of UG are viewed as a 
natural consequence of the relevant principles being inoperative. 
Felix (1992) argues for the necessity of a maturational schedule by citing 
experimental evidence for UG violations. A series of experiments investigating 
children's knowledge of Binding Theory show that children under the age of 7 cannot 
reliably identify coreference in various constructions with pronouns or anaphors 
(Matthei 1981, Lust 1986a, Roeper 1986). Crucially, Lust (1986a) demonstrates 
that children's interpretations are not random but are guided by a directionality 
constraint that disallows backward pronominalisation. The question is, why should 
this happen if UG specifically tells the learner that not linear precedence, but 
structural c- command is the relation to look for? 
There have been proposals in the literature to attribute apparent UG viola- 
tions to performance factors. Grimshaw & Rosen (1990), for instance, suggest that 
children may be observing a discourse -level constraint that pronouns normally have 
linguistic antecedents. Felix responds by asking what forces the child at a later 
stage to give up or modify their rule (Felix 1992:43 -44). 
[... ] stage- transition is not simply a matter of expanding the current 
grammar to cover new structures, but also a matter of changing it in 
such a way that certain old structures will no longer be generated. This, 
however, implies that a child moving to a new developmental stage has 
to realize somehow that there is something "wrong" with his or her cur- 
rent grammar in the sense that it generates structures that turn out to 
be ungrammatical in the adult language. Consequently, an adequate 
solution to the stage transition problem must provide a principled an- 
swer to the question of what exactly makes the child realize that the 
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structure he or she has regularly used in the past should be ruled out 
as ungrammatical in developmentally subsequent grammars. 
The logical problem holds, even if it is emerging pragmatic rules that override 
principles of UG such that the result is an overgeneral grammar. The solution is 
maturation, since "the theory of Universal Grammar is precisely a theory to explain 
how children discover ungrammaticalities in the absence of any relevant external 
evidence." [p44]. 
Radford (1990) dismisses the idea that some cognitive function, rather than 
the principles themselves, matures on grounds that the notion of cognitive mat- 
uration is too vague to make any predictions, since there is no reliable way of 
determining a child's cognitive capacity. The maturation of principles, on the other 
hand, has very specific predictions: the clustering of the acquisition of related lin- 
guistic phenomena and cross -linguistic uniformity in the order of acquisition of the 
relevant constructions. 
There have been two influential proposals for characterising delayed acquisi- 
tion in terms of pure maturation, neither of which have withstood empirical tests 
in their original formulation. Borer & Wexler (1987) propose that the principles 
of A -chain formation are initially absent from UG, as an explanation for the late 
appearance of verbal passive constructions and the simultaneous disappearance of 
causative over -generalisations (e.g., *Don't giggle me., Bowerman 1982). Demuth 
(1989), however, finds that verbal passives are acquired early in Sesotho, where they 
are highly frequent in the spoken language. While this finding does not exclude the 
possibility of maturation, it strongly implies that the cross -linguistic difference needs 
to be accounted for by positing an additional property of the language acquisition 
process. If we maintain that A- chains are not available to children before a certain 
stage of development, we need to find the mechanism that allows Sesotho children, 
but not English children, to generate constructions that are indistinguishable on 
the surface from structures involving A- movement. 
The other comprehensive theory of maturation is Radford's (1990) explana- 
tion for the "telegraphic" stage of child language. Radford discusses phenomena 
in early child English which, he suggests, indicate that there is a stage of English 
18 
language acquisition when functional projections are absent. He proposes that the 
functional module of UG is genetically programmed to become operative at a later 
stage of development. Cross -linguistic investigation, however, reveals disconfirm- 
ing evidence. Hyams (1994) finds that in some languages with rich inflectional 
paradigms evidence for the presence of functional categories appears very early on. 
Radford (1996) dismisses the objection by noting that the early appearance of func- 
tional projections does not mean that there was not, at some even earlier period, a 
non -functional stage. While this is true, it leaves the correlation between the type 
of the target language and the time of transition to the functional stage a mys- 
tery. If the onset of the functional stage is controlled by biologically determined 
maturation, it should be unaffected by the statistical properties of the input. An- 
other correlation of this type, but within languages, is reported in a classic study 
by Newport et al. (1977). The authors find a positive correlation between mothers' 
use of yes /no questions and the development of the verbal complex in the children's 
language. 
A further prediction of Radford's maturational account is that the various 
functional categories should appear simultaneously. My investigation of two Hun- 
garian children, however, reveals a uniform two -month delay between the develop- 
ment of the Inflectional- system and the Determiner -system, and that the acquisition 
of the functional projection of Focus is several months behind both (Babarczy 1998). 
As before, these findings are not incompatible with the maturational hypothesis, 
but they call for an explanation other than biological maturation for the observed 
differences in the schedule of the acquisition of functional categories. 
In more recent work, Radford (1996) complements maturation by a process 
of structure building, where children gradually learn to project increasingly complex 
structures incorporating functional categories. Development, Radford argues, is the 
result of the reanalysis of linguistic categories, such as realising that wh -words are 
operators after a period of analysing them as simple quantifiers. This leads us back 
to the problem of identifying categories and their defining features. 
In summary, the maturation of principles of grammar cannot in itself charac- 
terise development because (a) rule -like linguistic behaviour seems to emerge under 
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some circumstances but not under others even when other evidence suggests that 
the relevant principles of UG are inoperative; and (b) the statistical properties of the 
input influence the course of development over and above the proposed availability 
of given modules of UG. The first observation suggests that there are restrictions 
on learning, other than syntactic principles, while the second finding shows that 
one of these might be sensitivity to quantitative differences in relevant data. 
1.3.3 Variation 
PARAMETERS 
The nativist solution to cross -linguistic variation within the syntactic component is 
the formulation of parametrised principles whose values are to be set on the basis of 
experience. Considerations of learnability impose strict restrictions on the nature 
of parameters. A parameter may be such that the languages generated under any 
two different settings of the parameter are in a subset -superset relation. Since the 
child needs to be able to select the correct value for the target grammar on the 
basis of positive evidence only, the triggering mechanism needs to ensure that the 
child never hypothesises a value that generates a language which is the superset of 
the target. This requirement is termed the Subset Principle by Wexler & Manzini 
(1987) and is formulated as follows: 
(1.10) The learning function maps the input data to that value of a parameter 
which generates a language: 
(a) compatible with the input data; and 
(b) smallest among the languages compatible with the input data. 
An additional requirement is that the subset relations holding between languages 
generated by different settings of a parameter must be independent of the settings 
of any other parameter. Initially, the parameter can be unset, or set to the default 
value which generates the smallest language. While the ordering restriction solves 
the problem of learnability in principle, for most parameters the subset relation in 
fact does not hold. This does not seem to be a coincidental fact. One reason is that 
the aim of linguistic theory is to postulate as few parameters as possible, which 
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have as general an application as possible. If a parameter applies to a wide range of 
linguistic phenomena, it is not surprising if more than one of its values will generate 
structures which are not part of the language generated by any one of the other 
values. A case in point is the pro -drop parameter. Although [- pro -drop] seems to be 
a subset of [ +pro- drop], since the former only allows sentences with subjects while 
the latter also allows subjectless sentences, there is a construction which is licensed 
by [- pro -drop] only, namely expletive subjects (Hyams 1986, 1987). 
Gibson & Wexler (1994) propose an algorithm for the setting of parameters of 
this kind. Their Trigger Learning Algorithm (TLA) is based on the assumption that 
the input contains data (a trigger) that can be analysed if and only if the relevant 
parameter is set to the correct value. Thus if a learner encounters a sentence 
that he cannot analyse, he selects a parameter, changes its value and attempts 
to reprocess the sentence. The process of parameter resetting continues until the 
learner is successful in assigning a structural description to the sentence. Gibson & 
Wexler find that the algorithm is guaranteed to converge within finite time. Some 
refinements, however, are necessary. First, in order not to be misled by noise in the 
input, the learner should only consider sentence types which occur with reasonable 
frequency. Second, as the authors note, a desirable addition to the TLA would be 
some strategy that helps the child select the relevant parameter when encountering 
a trigger rather than search through the hypothesis space at random. Third, a 
parameter setting will only be changed if the change results in successful analysis of 
the problem sentence (the "Greediness Constraint "). Without this assumption the 
learner might reset parameters arbitrarily and "thus move randomly through the 
parameter space." Note that this assumption is also implicit in the logical problem 
of language acquisition. The reasoning is that an overgeneral grammar will not be 
modified by the learner, because there are no data that the current grammar cannot 
process but the modified grammar can. 
This third condition, however, poses a problem. As it turns out, there exist 
combinations of parameter values for which there is no triggering data. Gibson & 
Wexler (1994) demonstrate that if the child wrongly hypothesises that the Verb 
Second (V2) parameter is set to true then he may arrive at a grammar where there 
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is no sentence that can trigger the resetting of any of the parameters. Gibson 
& Wexler consider a number of solutions to the problem. One is that the [V2] 
parameter remains inactive for a certain period of time, during which the child can 
set other word order parameters. If the child is acquiring a [ -V2] language, he will 
never need to touch the parameter, since he will already have the correct settings 
for word order. Thus a situation where the parameter is mistakenly set to [ +V2] 
will never arise. The arguments for the maturation of [V2] are teleological. Previous 
proposals tried to account for facts of child language; Gibson & Wexler argue that 
the [V2] parameter needs to mature at a later stage of development because the 
learner would not be able to arrive at the right parameter settings otherwise. While 
such an explanation is not entirely implausible, it does not seem to be supported 
by empirical evidence. While it is true that children learning a [ -V2] grammar do 
not hypothesise a [ +V2] grammar, studies of children learning V2 languages show 
that finite verbs appear in second position very early on (Wexler 1994). 
A second way to avoid "local maxima" that the authors propose (and re- 
ject) is the removal of the Greediness Constraint. In order to avoid unrestricted 
parameter resetting, the child would need to consider "deductive triggers". 
(1.11) A deductive trigger for value y of parameter Pi, is a sentence S from the 
target grammar such that S is grammatical only if the value for Pi is v. 
For instance, a sentence where the finite verb is not in second position could act 
as a deductive trigger for the child to change the V2 parameter to the right value 
of [ -V2] even if the grammar resulting from adopting the new setting will still not 
be able to analyse the sentence in full. Thus the child needs some mechanism to 
partially analyse input sentences and recognise the relevance of this partial analysis 
for selecting hypothesis grammars. This process is of course just what a theory of 
strictly UG- driven language acquisition is meant to replace. Yet, it seems to be 
unavoidable. 
Lightfoot (1997) proposes a similar solution to the V2 problem, although 
from a different perspective. He criticises what he calls "input- matching" models 
of language acquisition, on the grounds that they cannot succeed when children 
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are exposed to a large amount of data which are not matched, as is the case with 
the development of Creole languages (Bickerton 1997) and the acquisition of sign - 
language from hearing parents (Goldin- Meadow & Mylander 1990, Newport 1997). 
He adopts instead Dresher & Kaye's (1990) cue -based model of parameter setting, 
where children are taken to scan the environment for certain cues specified by UG 
in matrix sentences. Lightfoot proposes a cue for the V2 phenomenon: an arbitrary 
XP occurring in the input followed by a finite verb in a matrix clause. (XP cannot 
be the subject or a wh- expression.) It follows from the principles of UG that 
such a pattern must have the structural description of [cp XP [c V ][...]]. If this 
pattern occurs with sufficient frequency, Lightfoot proposes, the child can set the V2 
parameter to positive. This approach is similar to Gibson and Wexler's deductive 
trigger solution in that the child needs to be able to perform a partial analysis of 
the relevant input sentences (i.e., needs to determine that the sentence -initial XP 
is not a subject or wh- expression, that the verb is finite and the construction is a 
matrix clause) while disregarding any unanalysable aspects of the data. In addition, 
the frequency of the cue is crucial, since the child may need to filter out a large 
amount of "noise" . Lightfoot illustrates this property by an instance of language 
change in English. There was a V2 grammar in Middle English in the North and a 
non -V2 grammar in the South. Lightfoot explains the sudden loss of the V2 dialect 
by assuming that as a result of migration between the two regions, the frequency 
of the cue for V2 fell below threshold level for the new generations. 
Studies on Creoles and signed languages also support the hypothesis that 
children do not construct random or default grammars in the absence of consistent 
input data. Rather, they are sensitive to the dominant properties of the input 
and generalise from them thereby creating a consistent grammar (Newport 1997). 
This process, of course, strengthens the argument from the poverty of the stimulus 
for an innate language acquisition programme. It also shows, however, that the 
construction of a mental grammar rests on an aptitude for discovering correlations 
between actual combinations of categories and sentence patterns rather than on the 
automatic triggering of values of structural principles. 
23 
ARGUMENT STRUCTURE 
There is ample evidence in child language for the overgeneralisation of some ob- 
served argument structure pattern in the domain of the lexicon (e.g., Bowerman 
1982, 1988). What is interesting for language acquisition theory is that (a) these 
patterns are not controlled by parameter values (i.e., overgeneralisation is not the 
result of a mis -set parameter, but the consequence of UG- independent inductive 
processes), since they typically involve variation in the lexicon of a single language 
rather than cross -linguistic or cross -dialect variation; and (b) the children even- 
tually abandon the overgeneralised forms in favour of the adult forms. The first 
property indicates that UG- independent overgeneralisation may occur in some areas 
of language but not in others -that is, something other than syntactic principles 
seems to constrain inductive reasoning. The second property is of course puzzling 
for the logical problem of language acquisition. How do children get from a larger 
to a smaller grammar in the absence of negative evidence? 
The nativist route to a solution is to search for constraints on the properties 
of the lexicon, which may be part of the grammar proper or a principle of the larger 
domain of the Language Acquisition Device. As Pesetsky (1995:2) points out, the 
general advice holds here as well: 
As with any aspect of language, proposals about the lexicon should 
proceed from the null hypothesis that nothing is acquired through ex- 
perience, progressing with cautious and conservative steps toward an 
understanding of exactly what is acquired through experience and how. 
With the above considerations in mind Randall (1992) argues for a rule -governed 
lexicon, where the learner is guided by a set of either /or choices, similarly to the 
process of parameter setting. For every instance of observed overgeneralisation, 
Randall proposes, there must be an innate grammatical "catapult" to dislodge the 
erroneous rule. Catapults take the form of disjunctive principles stating that if the 
primary linguistic data exhibit property A, the learner must conclude that property 
B is not the case. 
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Randall formulates a catapult for recovering from the over -extension of the 
dative and locative alternations in English. The phenomena are illustrated in (1.12) 
and (1.13) respectively. 
(1.12) a. The Duchess threw the baby to Alice. 
b. The Duchess threw Alice the baby. 
c. The Duchess pushed the baby to Alice. 
d. * The Duchess pushed Alice the baby. 
(1.13) a. The March Hare smeared butter onto the watch. 
b. The March Hare smeared the watch with butter. 
c. The March Hare poured tea onto the watch. 
d. *The March Hare poured the watch with tea. 
e. *The March Hare filled tea onto /into the watch. 
f. The March Hare filled the watch with tea. 
Randall observes that of the two internal arguments of non -alternating verbs one is 
always optional: the GOAL of push -class verbs and pour -class verbs and the THEME 
of fill -class verbs. Based on this generalisation, she proposes the Order Principle as 
a constraint on permissible argument frames: 
(1.14) Optional arguments cannot precede obligatory arguments. 
Thus property A is `argument X is optional' and property B is `argument X precedes 
an obligatory argument Y'. The process of generalisation and self -correction would 
look something like the following: 
1. On the basis of alternating verbs, the child sets up underspecified lexical 
alternation rules, e.g., pred THEME to GOALPoss < > pred GOALPoss THEME. 
2. On hearing a non -alternating verb in both one -argument and two -argument 
VP frames,4 the child constructs the appropriate lexical entry, e.g., 
push THEME (to GOALPoss), where brackets indicate optionality. 
4The term argument refers to internal arguments here and in the following discussion. 
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3. The output of the lexical rules applied to the new entry will then give the 
erroneous construction, e.g., push (GOALposs) THEME. 
4. Since the new frame, however, violates the Order Principle, it will be aban- 
doned. 
There are some caveats waiting to be explained. First, why do children fail to 
make the step from stage 3 to stage 4 instantaneously? Randall's answer is that 
the data must be reorganised as relevant to the overgeneralisation and it is possible 
that a trigger threshold needs to be reached in, say, number of tokens. How this 
would give the desired results is not clear. Free omission of the optional argument 
generally precedes in time the appearance of the creative frame, indicating that 
children are aware of the optionality of argument X by stage 3 above. That leaves 
the option that the learner needs confirmation of the obligatoriness of argument Y. 
The only reasonable source this confirmation can come from is, however, indirect 
negative evidence, that is, the non -occurrence, or negligibly infrequent occurrence, 
of utterances where argument Y of the given predicate is not overtly expressed. 
One might defend the theory by noting that this kind of indirect negative evidence 
is simpler than the kind necessary for the rejection of the creative frame as a direct 
consequence of its non -occurrence in the input, since for the latter the child needs 
some criterion to determine under what circumstances the alternative frame would 
be expected. However, not even the catapult solution allows every single utterance 
with the given predicate to be counted as evidence. This leads us to the second 
problem, that some alternating verbs too have an optional external argument. These 
include not only "idiomatic" expressions, such as tell the time, give a talk, show a 
movie but also verbs where the GOAL or THEME are freely omitted (the for- dative 
verbs, e.g., draw in the dative alternation class and several manner -of- transfer verbs, 
e.g., smear in the locative alternation class). 
Randall proposes that the lexical entries of these predicates are first over- 
corrected (at stage 4) but at a subsequent stage positive evidence enables the child 
to restore the alternative frame. This, according to Randall will result in two lexical 
entries for the verbs. The correct entries for smear are shown in (1.15). 
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(1.15) smears GOAL (with THEME) 
smear2 THEME to GOAL 
The entry for smear2 in (1.15) specifies an obligatory THEME argument, thus the 
Order Principle is not violated. The question, not discussed by Randall, is how the 
learner can arrive at the correct second entry while at the same time excluding the 
possibility of a similar second entry for non -alternating verbs. One solution is that 
the Order Principle is applied backwards (by Modus Tollens) allowing the child to 
conclude that argument X is not optional. Since there is empirical evidence for 
the optionality of X in one entry, the child is forced to create a second entry. If 
this option is available, however, the only way to restrict its application would be 
to specify that it is only a valid option for frames created on the basis of positive 
evidence but not for frames which are the output of a lexical rule. But this means 
that the child has to monitor the occurrence and non -occurrence of a particular 
argument frame with a particular predicate. That is, indirect negative evidence of 
the complex kind. 
A different way to construct a second entry such as in (1.15), is to con- 
sider indirect negative evidence which is specific to a construction rather than to a 
predicate in general. 
(1.16) An argument A is obligatory with respect to a construction C if 
a. no (or negligibly few) utterances occur which are equivalent to C 
except that A is unexpressed; and 
b. C occurs with sufficient frequency. 
If now the child hears (1.13a) but not *smear on the watch he will know that the 
THEME cannot be omitted in (1.13a). Note that condition (b) in (1.16) is necessary 
to prevent the assignment of obligatory status to the first internal argument of a 
construction created by the over -application of a lexical rule. Otherwise, if at stage 
3 the child creates an entry that licenses (1.13e), the non -occurrence of strings such 
as *fill into the watch can be erroneously taken to indicate the obligatoriness of 
THEME in (1.13e). In summary, the Order Principle presupposes knowledge of the 
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obligatory or optional status of arguments in specific constructions. This knowledge, 
however, can only be attained by monitoring the occurrence and non -occurrence of 
those constructions in the linguistic environment. If this is indeed correct, the Order 
Principle may not be necessary at all. The principles in (1.14) and (1.16) could be 
replaced by the single and more general condition on the use of indirect negative 
evidence in (1.17). 
(1.17) The output construction Co of a lexical rule R is ungrammatical if 
a. no (or negligibly few) utterances occur which are equivalent to Co; 
and 
b. the input construction Ci of R occurs with sufficient frequency. 
The preceding paragraphs argue that the postulation of innate syntactic principles 
which are to constrain the application of lexical rules is not sufficient to replace a 
theory of "unlearning" . There is, however, another approach to argument structure 
alternations. Pesetsky (1995) argues for the analysis of alternative subcategorisa- 
tion frames as instances of variable linking from semantic categories to; syntactic 
positions rather than the outcome of the application of lexical rules. He further 
proposes that to meet the requirement of learnability the concrete realisation of 
the principles of linking should follow from the predicate's semantics. If this is so, 
"children learn pairings of sound and meaning; UG does the rest" [p. 4]. 
In Pesetsky's model the Projection Principle of UG is satisfied by 9- selection. 
A selected 0-role may be marked by a preposition, which must select for the same 
0-role as the predicate; a process that Pesetsky terms "mediated 0- selection" as 
opposed to "direct 9- selection" . The two syntactic realisations of the English dative 
and locative constructions are described as the result of the predicate's ability to use 
both direct and mediated 9- selection of the THEME and GOAL arguments. Mediated 
0- selection here occurs via a zero -morpheme, which he calls G. G selects a THEME 
object, with some further restrictions, which need not concern us here. The relevant 
data from (1.12) and (1.13) are repeated here with Pesetsky's notation. Thus in 
the (b) examples G 0- selects a THEME argument and the GOAL is directly selected 
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by the predicate, while in the (a) examples to 0- selects a GOAL argument and the 
THEME is directly selected. 
(1.12') a. The Duchess threw the baby to Alice. 
b. The Duchess threw Alice G the baby. 
(1.13') a. The Hare smeared butter onto the watch. 
b. The Hare smeared the watch Gwith with butter. 
Whether both alternatives are available depends on the semantic and morphophono- 
logical properties of the predicate as defined by Pinker (1989), and Levin (1993)). 
For instance, the G- marked construction is allowed by predicates that denote "in- 
stantaneous causation of ballistic motion " , as throw in (1.12b), but may not be 
extended to verbs denoting "motion that requires continuous imparting of force ", 
as push in (1.12d). Gwith is allowed by predicates that express change of state, as 
smear in (1.13b) but not pour in (1.13d). 
Pesetsky proposes that the syntax and semantics of zero -prepositions is part 
of UG. Thus the child knows that G selects for a certain sub -type of THEME and is 
selected by predicates with certain semantic properties and Gwith selects for another 
sub -type of THEME and is selected by predicates with another set of semantic prop- 
erties. THEMES of verbs that satisfy neither condition must be directly 0- selected 
by the verb. What the child needs to learn, then, is which predicates belong to 
which class and subclass. Errors, according to Pesetsky, are not the result of over - 
generalisation but are due to the inaccurate semantic representation of predicates. 
The child who constructs a sentence like (1.13d) is claimed to have misinterpreted 
the verb pour as one that can express change of state. 
While this account offers a neat and principled description of argument struc- 
ture `alternations', it does not solve the logical problem of language acquisition. 
Whether it is the conditions for the lexical rule or the semantic representations of 
verbs that are overgeneral, the child needs a mechanism to narrow down one or the 
other. 
A procedure for acquiring lexico- semantic representations is outlined by Pinker 
(1989), whose alternation classes, termed narrow -range conflation classes, are adopted 
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by Pesetsky. In Pinker's account a narrow -range conflation class is formed by group- 
ing predicates that share a set of grammatically relevant semantic features and dif- 
fer only in predicate- specific idiosyncratic features. Conflation classes are linked 
to characteristic argument structures via a set of linking rules given in Universal 
Grammar. Pinker proposes three rules of learning predicate meanings. As a first 
step, Event Category Labelling allows the child to assign approximate event cate- 
gories to input strings based on isolated situational information. This process may 
result in ambiguous, erroneous or underspecified semantic representations, which 
will lead to argument structure errors. At the next stage of learning the child's 
semantic representations can be refined by Semantic Structure Hypothesis Testing, 
which consists in "eliminating any incorrect hypotheses as a result of observing 
how the verb is used across situations" [p. 255]. Finally, once some predicates 
have been grouped into conflation classes, the third method, Syntactic Cueing, can 
be used to deduce the grammatically relevant semantic features of newly acquired 
predicates by noting their argument structures in the input, matching these to the 
argument structures associated with established conflation classes and applying the 
semantics -to- syntax linking rules in a reverse direction. 
Let us now see how the process might work in the case of locative alternations. 
The semantic classes corresponding to the two argument structure patterns are 
defined by Pinker as follows: The THEME -object verbs "all specify the kind of 
force or direction of motion according to which the theme moves or is caused to 
move" and the GOAL- object verbs "all specify a [particular] change of state resulting 
from the addition of material" [p. 128]. The semantic specifications of verbs that 
alternate between the two argument structures must satisfy both criteria. Semantic 
Structure Hypothesis testing ensures the learnability of the lack of either of the two 
properties, given enough exemplars, the right kind of memory and an aptitude for 
fine -grain event categorisation while filtering out noise. If a verb occurs in the input 
describing events with a variety of results or carried out in a variety of manners, 
the child can conclude that the nature of the result or the manner of the motion 
are not specified by the verb. The question is how the learner can ascertain that 
the conditions indeed hold when they do. How many times does an action need to 
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be carried out in a specific manner (or with a specific result) before the child can 
contend that the verb describing the action encodes that and only that manner (or 
that and only that result)? 
There are three answers to this puzzle to consider. One may be that the 
learner uses syntactic information: if a verb of transfer is observed in the input with 
the THEME mapped onto the object function and GOAL embedded in a locative PP, 
it follows by reverse linking that it must specify the manner of the motion. By the 
same process, a GOAL- object structure with a THEME -PP implies a change of state 
predicate. On the assumption, however, that a certain argument structure will not 
be constructed by the child unless his semantic representation is consistent with 
it, this solution only allows conservative learning and fails to account for argument 
structure errors. 
A second possibility could be the operation of an inbuilt bias towards con- 
structing as narrow hypothesis meanings as is consistent with the available evi- 
dence. If this is the case, children should start with the hypothesis that all verbs of 
(non -possessional) transfer specify both the manner of the motion and the resulting 
change of state. This prediction does not appear to be correct. Pinker (1989), in a 
slightly different context, reports experimental results showing that 2 to 5 year -old 
children readily label transfer events as filling regardless of the end -state of the tar- 
get container. Of the same subjects, the oldest age -group (4;6 -5;5) had a tendency 
to associate filling with a specific manner of motion but the younger groups (2;6- 
4;5) did not. Initially, therefore, hypothesis meanings may in fact be overgeneral 
and the puzzle remains unsolved. 
The third way of discovering the relevant feature specifications is the use of 
indirect negative evidence. The child may note the lesser degree of variation in event 
types associated with the predicate relative to the degree of variation observed for 
other, similar, predicates. Additionally, the learning mechanism could be sensitive 
to the non -occurrence of the test predicate in input utterances describing events 
which are consistent with the child's semantic representation of the predicate. The 
process could be assisted by observing the occurrence of an alternative predicate 
describing the event in question and contrasting it with the one to be tested. As 
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will be discussed in the following section, it is questionable if information of the 
latter kind can be used without negative evidence. It seems then that the mech- 
anism involved in these processes is not qualitatively different from the indirect 
negative evidence principle I proposed in (1.17) above. It does, however, place 
an additional burden on the learner: the fine -grain categorisation of non -linguistic 
events. According to the theory, the child would need to recover from situational 
evidence that, for instance, hang is a change of state verb while suspend is not; and 
sew specifies the manner of the action but glue does not. It is arguable whether 
this is indeed a more efficient strategy in narrowing an overgeneral hypothesis than 
detecting the presence or absence of a well- defined category in the input string. 
More will be said about this problem in Chapter 4. I will also present evi- 
dence that an incorrect hypothesis meaning does not necessarily lead to an incorrect 
hypothesis argument structure consistent with the child's semantic representation; 
conversely, argument structure errors do not necessarily reflect inaccurate semantic 
structures; and there exist alternation phenomena (between mapping arguments as 
direct objects vs. prepositional objects) where no semantic conflation classes can be 
identified, yet overgeneralisation errors are abundant. 
WORD MEANINGS AND MORPHOLOGY 
The over -extension of word meanings and the regularisation of morphological paradigms 
are ubiquitous features of child language. These errors are taken to belong to a 
problem -class different from argument structure errors in that there tends to be 
an adult word which is equivalent in semantic content to the child's word. The 
principles proposed in the literature as substitutes for negative evidence therefore 
work with the notion of preemption, that is the replacement of a creative expression 
by a conservatively acquired expression once the equivalence of the two has been 
established. One such constraint, the Uniqueness Principle was developed in the 
transformational paradigm by Wexler & Culicover (1980) and Wexler (1981). 
(1.18) In the unmarked case, each deep structure is realized as one and only one 
surface structure. 
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The Uniqueness Principle has been applied to the acquisition of irregular morphol- 
ogy. For instance, when both went and goed are analysed as the surface struc- 
ture of GO -PAST, went preempts goed. Pinker's (1984) more detailed and non - 
transformational description of the process of acquiring morphological properties 
includes the Unique Entry principle. It states that empty cells identified by seman- 
tic and phonological features in a word -specific paradigm are tentatively filled in 
by entries generalised from the corresponding cells of other word -specific paradigms 
and are constantly checked against forms with the same features appearing in the 
input. 
Clark (1987) notes that the Uniqueness constraint presupposes semantic anal- 
ysis, since the child needs to know that goed and went have the same meaning. In 
Wexler's terms the common deep structure needs to be established and in Pinker's 
terms the learner has to realise that the two forms belong to the same paradigm 
and have the same features. Clark argues that Uniqueness is therefore a specialised 
form of a general, semantics based strategy of unlearning by preemption, which she 
formulates as the Principle of Contrast. 
(1.19) a. Every two forms contrast in meaning. 
b. If a potential innovative word -form would be precisely synonymous 
with a well -established word, the innovative word is pre -empted by 
the well -established word, and is therefore considered unacceptable. 
As before, the obvious question that comes to mind is, why does overgeneralisation 
occur at all and why does it sometimes persist for an extended period of time? We 
could assume that overgeneralisation is the result of some, presumably, discourse 
pressure to fill a gap in the child's vocabulary. It persists until the child has realised 
that there is an adult word which is synonymous with the child's entry. The first 
part of the hypothesis, however, has no empirical support, since the appearance 
of generalised forms is often preceded by a period of correct usage (e.g., Bower- 
man 1982). The second part raises new problems: what makes the child realise? 
Markman (1990) summarises experimental results demonstrating 3 and 4- year -old 
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children's tendency to interpret a novel term as referring to a part or some prop- 
erty of a familiar object rather than as an alternative label for the same object. 
While these findings support children's bias against synonymy, they also raise the 
question of what makes them resolve the conflict by abandoning the old term in 
real life when this is not the strategy they use in experimental conditions. The 
two situations are of course different in that in the former case the old term is an 
unattested form -meaning pairing created by the child while in the latter case it is 
a conservatively learnt form -meaning pairing. However, assuming an innate prefer- 
ence for witnessed form -meaning pairings over innovative form- meaning pairings is 
not a solution, since that would not allow a U- shaped learning curve. It seems likely 
then, that on the one hand the child is driven by a predisposition to go beyond the 
input by imposing order on irregular data (this time without the help of syntactic 
principles). On the other hand, he is sensitive to the statistical properties of the 
input. If the innovative forms do not get reinforced, they will eventually be aban- 
doned. Is the Principle of Contrast necessary for this process? Let me return briefly 
to the diachronic change in the setting of the V2 parameter. The change can be 
viewed as the `overgeneralisation' of the non -V2 sentence pattern. The innovative 
forms are reinforced by adult speakers of the non -V2 dialect but the primary linguis- 
tic data also include their V2 paraphrases. Children choose to ignore these. Now 
consider the over -extension of argument structure alternations. The child's creative 
constructions are not reinforced but no exact paraphrases are available. The cre- 
ative constructions are given up. Finally, in the case of regularised morphology, the 
creative words are not reinforced and there are synonymous adult forms. Thus, if 
we are willing to accept the parallel treatment of the three processes, whether an 
innovative expression will be abandoned does not seem to depend on the presence 
of an adult alternative but on whether the expected string occurs in the input or 
not. In other words, children are sensitive to indirect negative evidence. 
That still leaves the question of what exactly is an `expected string' or, more 
generally, what is the children's basis for generalisation and overgeneralisation. The 
induction problem in word learning is just as puzzling as the problem of forming 
hypotheses in the acquisition of grammar. The classic example of learning a new 
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term by ostension is Quine's (1960) linguist, who tries to establish the meaning of 
the word gavagai: 
For, consider `gavagai'. Who knows but what the objects to which this 
term applies are not rabbits after all, but mere stages, or brief temporal 
segments, of rabbits? In either event the stimulus situations that prompt 
assent to `Gavagai' would be the same as for `Rabbit'. Or perhaps the 
objects to which `gavagai' applies are all and sundry undetached parts of 
rabbits; again the stimulus meaning would register no difference. When 
from the sameness of stimulus meanings of `Gavagai' and `Rabbit' the 
linguist leaps to the conclusion that a gavagai is a whole enduring rabbit, 
he is just taking for granted that the native is enough like us to have a 
brief general term for rabbits and no brief general term for rabbit stages 
or parts. [pp51 -52] 
One approach to the problem is to posit that Quine's linguist's assumption and 
a number of similar assumptions, are universal constraints on likely word mean- 
ings. Markman and her colleagues propose the Whole Object constraint and the 
Taxonomic constraint (see Markman 1990 and references cited therein). 
(1.20) A novel label is likely to refer to the whole object and not to its parts, 
substance or other properties. 
(1.21) Labels refer to objects of the same kind rather than to objects that are 
thematically related. 
These principles, however, do not describe facts of language, since there are words 
that clearly violate them. For instance, forest and root do not refer to whole objects; 
Christopher Robin and tableware do not refer to taxonomic kinds. Assuming that 
the constraints operate at the initial stages of word learning only will not do, as 
some of these expressions, proper names and body parts, for instance, are among the 
first to be acquired. What we have then, is predispositions that facilitate learning, 
rather than constraints on possible word meanings. But biases of this kind do not 
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solve the induction problem - we still need a theory that explains why they are 
observed in some cases but overridden in others. 
1.4 Conclusion 
The preceding discussion has shown that there are aspects of child language for 
which the postulation of innate structural universals or language specific constraints 
is insufficient as an explanation even if they are supplemented with a maturational 
schedule and some triggering mechanism. To account for these properties, what we 
need is a theory that allows restricted inductive generalisation and recovery from 
overgeneralisation. I have also argued that the role of indirect negative evidence, 
i.e. whether children use the non -occurrence of certain constructions as evidence for 
the ungrammaticality of those constructions, should be reconsidered. The crucial 
question is, under what circumstances can non -occurrence be taken as a sign of 
ungrammaticality? The child must, of course, have expectations as to what he 
is going to hear. But what is included in these expectations and where do they 
come from? So far I have assumed that overgeneralisation involves the production 
of a string which is not part of the target language. There is, however, another 
class of errors that inductive learning may lead to: the assignment of an incorrect 
interpretation to a possible string, as in (1.22d) on analogy with (1.22b) (cf. C. 
Chomsky 1969). 
(1.22) a. The Cheshire Cat asked to go to the Queen's party. 
b. The Cheshire Cat asked Alicei PROi to go to the Queen's party. 
c. The Cheshire Cat promised to go to the Queen's party. 
d. * The Cheshire Cat promised Alicei PROi to go to the Queens' party. 
In this case reliance on the statistical properties of the input, as proposed in (1.17), 
is clearly not sufficient. We must contend, then, that the child's "expectation" is 
an analysed string paired with a structured meaning. It is safe to assume that there 
exists some genetically determined predisposition that helps the child "realise" that 
language has a level of form -representation and a level of meaning- representation 
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and the elements of one level can be mapped onto the elements of the other level. 
The child's genetic endowment must also include the ability to construct a struc- 
tured representation of state -of- affairs and the ability to associate this conceptual 
structure with sound strings occurring in the input. The expected string- meaning 
object must be the output of the child's incorrect hypothesis grammar. The hypoth- 
esis grammar could be the consequence of a default or mis -set parameter or, as the 
following chapters endeavour to demonstrate, of the learner's incomplete knowledge 
of lexical and /or pragmatic conventions of the target language.' If the grammar 
over -generates, implicit negative evidence can be used to mark negative exceptions 
or to restate the rule to exclude ungrammatical instances. `Restating the rule' can 
take the form of resetting the parameter, adopting the relevant principle of UG 
(which has now become operative), or formulating a new hypothesis rule. The lat- 
ter process presupposes the operation of some inductive learning mechanism, that 
is, generalisation from observed associations to unobserved associations, which re- 
quires the comparison of the form -features and /or the meaning- features and /or the 
mapping in one form- meaning pairing with those in another form -meaning pairing. 
We still do not know what the expected pair of string and meaning may be. 
To discover that, we need to ask the question how the overgeneralisation occurred 
in the first place and why it is that some other, `similar,' overgeneralisation did 
not occur. By comparing the two, we can get an idea of what can and cannot 
form the basis of inductive learning, provided that the possibility of a currently 
proposed principle of UG being at play can be excluded. There must be a learning 
mechanism or attentional bias (maybe part of the Language Faculty) that helps the 
learner decide what is similar to what when syntactic principles do not apply. Such 
a mechanism would provide an answer not only for the logical problem of language 
acquisition and the non -occurrence of some errors, but also for the problem of 
categorisation and category labelling and, in general, the acquisition of the lexicon. 
5Note that it cannot simply be the result of the unavailability of some principle of UG, because 
that in itself would not lead to any hypotheses; it is possible, though, that the unavailability of 
some principle is the reason why the wrong hypothesis could be formulated at all. 
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2 Empirical consic.erat ions 
2.1 What is relevant evidence? 
In the introduction I argued that an overview of basic, essentially uncontested 
facts about the language acquisition process leads to the theoretical conclusion 
that infants must possess the ability both to create and to "forget" hypothesis 
rules as dictated by their current intake of the primary linguistic data. The aim 
of the following chapters is to investigate empirical evidence for such mechanisms 
operating in areas of language acquisition where it would otherwise seem necessary 
to invoke disconcertingly complex ad hoc principles of parameter switching, stepwise 
maturation or lexicon building. The question to find an answer for is what might 
motivate linguistic behaviour that appears to systematically deviate from what we 
expect on the assumption of a strictly UG- driven deterministic process of language 
acquisition. The first task is to identify phenomena in child language which are 
demonstrably the output products of creative rules. The requirement of creativity 
excludes from the set of evidence bearing data 
(2.1) a. constructions which may be conservatively acquired form -meaning 
associations; 
b. linguistic behaviour which can be predicted from the (independently 
established) principles of Universal Grammar and 
c. random, idiosyncratic or inconsistent utterances. 
To observe the first criterion, the analysis will concentrate on utterances which are 
ungrammatical in the target language. The source of an error, however, may be 
other than inductive generalisation. On the assumption that the principles of UG 
are inviolable constraints, the domain of investigation is naturally restricted to lin- 
guistic phenomena which are subject to parametric variation or are considered to 
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lie beyond the genetically determined constraint system available to the child at 
any particular stage of development. Since a universally ungrammatical construc- 
tion constitutes a constraint violation, it can only be accounted for by performance 
factors or must be traced back to a lexical categorisation error. In order to meet the 
second requirement, however, relevant evidence can only be provided by those error 
patterns observed in acquisition data in a particular language which do not match 
grammatical patterns found in either acquisition data or mature data in some other 
language. Only then can we be satisfied that the error does not originate in the 
process of parameter setting. This criterion further excludes error patterns which 
logically follow from the unavailability of some module of universal grammar, i.e., 
are predictable from the principles that are currently presumed to be operational. 
It needs to be emphasised that it is patterns of linguistic behaviour rather than 
individual constructions that are to be considered, since the latter do not reveal 
anything about the source of the error. As will be discussed in detail in the follow- 
ing chapters, patterns are defined as probabilities of occurrence of form -meaning 
pairings, where each probability is calculated from the actual frequency of a certain 
form Fi associated with a certain context Ci relative to the potential frequency of 
the Fi /Ci object. The potential frequency of Fi /Ci is estimated from the frequency 
of occurrence of Fi in contexts other than Ci and /or the frequency of occurrence of 
ci expressed by forms other than Fi. 
The next step in identifying creative hypothesis rules is to find an associa- 
tion between the errors that meet the above criteria and the nature of the child's 
linguistic input /intake. As we are interested in behavioural patterns, the statistical 
properties of the data are to be considered. There are, however, too many degrees 
of freedom in attempting to find correlations between the actual frequencies of spe- 
cific constructions in the input and the properties of the learner's generalisations. 
One difficulty is the question of threshold frequency. A correlation is not predicted 
between the frequency of some construction in the primary linguistic data and the 
frequency of an error type in the child's language, since once the child's rule has 
emerged, the frequency of the data on the basis of which the rule was originally 
formulated should have no effect on the frequency of the rule's output. In fact, a 
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simple correlation between some aspect of the input /intake and the error suggests 
that the erroneous constructions are produced on line and can be dismissed as be- 
haviour determined by psycholinguistic factors. What we would need to test the 
hypothesis that the rule is induced from the learner's mental representation of some 
observed construction(s) is knowledge of the threshold frequency which is sufficient 
for the formulation of the rule. It is unlikely, however, that such a threshold can be 
independently determined. A second problem is created by the possibility of a time 
lag. Should we look for correlations between adult and child samples of the same 
period or two weeks apart or two months apart? Thirdly, an approach looking to 
the statistical properties of the input as the determinant of the child's erroneous 
hypothesis rules would either need to assume that these properties undergo changes 
as the child matures or we would be forced to postulate a separate mechanism for 
recovering from the error. A solution to these problems would be provided if we 
could determine the child's intake as opposed to his input, since the ultimate aim is 
to characterise the processes by which the language acquisition programme is able 
to exploit acquired knowledge to go beyond the available data. For these reasons 
the method of testing employed in the current study is examining to what extent 
children's target -like linguistic knowledge in two typologically distant languages ac- 
counts for variation in error patterns within and across the two linguistic systems. 
If we find that children's errors differ in the two languages and these differences can 
be related to typological variation for the mastery of which there is evidence in the 
children's production then we have evidence for the operation of inductive learning 
from previously acquired aspects of the target language. We then also have a direct 
means of collating properties that lead to generalisation with those that do not. 
As the final step, the problem of "unlearning" needs to be addressed. If it 
is found, as predicted, that an inductive rule can be characterised with reference 
to some aspect of the learner's current linguistic system, it need no longer be as- 
sumed that the language acquisition programme may only adjust the grammar if it 
otherwise fails to process the input. It is then reasonable to assume that changes 
in the relevant aspects of that system, whether through conservative learning, fur- 
ther inductive processes or biological maturation, should effect the modification of 
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the hypothesis rule by the same inductive mechanism. If we further find that the 
statistical properties of some aspect of that system correlate with the probability 
of error patterns and that changes in these statistical properties can be predicted 
from the developing grammar, the superset problem discussed in the introduction 
simply does not arise. 
The primary aim of the study then is to find regularities in children's non - 
targetlike linguistic output and attempt to derive them from independently estab- 
lished properties of the learners' grammars. The study involves the detailed analysis 
of the development of argument structure in naturalistic speech samples recorded 
over a period of 6 months from an English- speaking and two Hungarian children. 
Error patterns are compared across the learners and changes in error patterns are 
recorded within individuals. The independent variable is the environment in which 
each pattern is observed. The environment is characterised by any properties of 
the child's performance other than the erroneous construction itself. The object of 
our enquiry is to identify those properties which can predict the variations in error 
patterns. The following list gives an informal, generalised description of possible 
outcomes: 
(2.2) a. The null hypothesis: The differences between error patterns are ran- 
dom, there is no way of predicting the likelihood of the error occurring 
in one or the other environment. 
b. The differences are due to processing or maturational factors. The 
distinguishing features of the different environments are varying pho- 
netic salience, utterance length, non -linguistic cognitive maturity, 
etc. 
c. The frequency or nature of the error divides the environments into 
groups and these groups can be defined by properties of Form. That 
is, the error may be the overgeneralisation or underspecification of 
a distributional property that occurs in one environment but not in 
another environment. 
d. The frequency or nature of the error divides the environments into 
groups and these groups can be defined by properties of Context. 
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That is, the error may be the overgeneralisation of an (innate or 
acquired) association between some semantic feature and some syn- 
tactic device. This overgeneralisation may be more or less "natural" 
in different environments depending on their semantic properties. 
e. Finally, it is expected that it is the statistical properties of environ- 
ments that correlate with variations in error patterns rather than the 
simple absence or presence of a certain phenomenon. 
2.2 The Data 
The rest of this chapter is a general description of the data and the methods used 
to achieve the aims outlined above. The details of the three children whose speech 
samples the study is based on are given in Tables 2.1- 2.3 on the following page. The 
English data were taken from L. Bloom's corpus of Peter (Bloom 1970) published 
in the CHILDES database (MacWhinney 1991). The Hungarian analysis is carried 
out on Zoli's speech samples from the MacWhinney corpus (MacWhinney 1974) 
in the CHILDES database and an unpublished corpus of Balázs collected by Zita 
Réger in the Hungarian Academy of Science. All three corpora consist of recordings 
of unstructured conversations between one or more adults and the children in free 
play situations. For each of the three children, the first file selected for analysis was 
the session where evidence for creative word combinations first appeared. During 
the previous sessions, which took place three to four weeks earlier, all three children 
produced mostly single word utterances, partial repetitions of adult utterances and a 
small set of two- or three -word phrases. All subsequent sessions with the Hungarian 
children are analysed in the study. As Peter, however, was recorded at shorter time 
intervals, only selected files from his corpus are included. The original file names 
are given in the first column of Table 2.1 with the identifiers used in the current 
study in the second column. The files were selected to match the vocabulary size 
and MLU of the Hungarian children as closely as possible. 
The data in the selected files were annotated by hand taking contextual in- 
formation and the original investigators' notes into account. Only those utterances 
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Peter 
File Stage Age MLU V Types Clauses Unint 
6 1 2;0 2.4 39 310 33 
7 2a 2;1 3.0 41 377 46 
8 2b 2;2 3.0 38 420 29 
10 3a 2;3 3.2 59 601 44 
12 3b 2;4 3.2 78 630 56 
15 4 2;6 3.6 82 727 52 
Total 124 3065 260 
Table 2.1: Number of verb types, number of clauses and number of uninterpretable ut- 
terances containing verbs in the English data 
Zoli 
File Stage Age MLU V Types Clause Unint 
3 1 1;8 2.6 51 453 39 
4 2 1;10 3.0 78 453 46 
5 3 2;0 3.2 70 304 8 
6 4 2;2 3.5 74 422 27 
Total 139 1634 120 
Table 2.2: Number of verb types, number of clauses and number of uninterpretable ut- 
terances containing verbs in Zoli's data 
Balázs 
File Stage Age MLU V Types Clauses Unint 
3 1 2;3 2.5 58 165 17 
4 2 2;5 2.9 47 122 7 
5 3 2;7 3.0 41 116 6 
6 -7 4 2;9 3.4 66 170 8 
Total 127 573 38 
Table 2.3: Number of verb types, number of clauses and number of uninterpretable ut- 
terances containing verbs in Balázs's data 
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were included which contain one or more verbs other than the copula. The anno- 
tation scheme uses two layers of coding, with one layer marking argument /adjunct 
phrases for grammatical function, broad thematic role and positional information. 
The other layer specifies the morphological makeup of individual words. Some- 
what less than 10 per cent of utterances containing verbs were considered to be 
uninterpretable and were discarded. 
Wherever possible, statistical tests are used to check the validity of quanti- 
tative differences or similarities in the properties of error patterns and their envi- 
ronments. Naturalistic data, especially from a database of limited size, however, 
do not lend themselves very well to statistical analysis. For this reason, test results 
are interpreted more liberally than they should be under ideal circumstances. Such 
cases are always clearly indicated in the text. 
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3 Implicit and 1-- explicit Arguments 
3.1 Subject omission 
3.1.1 Competence or performance? 
Subject omission in child English is an interesting test case for different approaches 
to errors in language acquisition. As was discussed in the previous chapter, for an 
error to qualify as the output of an inductive rule, it first needs to be shown that 
its pattern is not predictable from the constraint system imposed on the language 
acquisition process by UG. We must further be satisfied that the error pattern is 
not merely the byproduct of cognitive limitations affecting the child's performance. 
Both of these views have been put forward to account for subject omission in child 
English and will now be briefly reviewed. 
DISCONTINUOUS STATES OF UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR 
Theories relying on discontinuity in the properties of Universal Grammar are of two 
kinds. Radford (1990) adopts a maturational view, where the omission of pronom- 
inal arguments is seen as just one aspect of the overall lexical nature of early child 
grammars, which is explained the biologically determined absence of functional cat- 
egories at the initial state of UG. As the alternative explanation, Hyams and her 
colleagues have argued for a more problem- specific parameter setting approach, 
where early null subjects are attributed to the subject parameter being set to pro - 
drop as default value (Hyams 1986 1987, 1989). In a more recent formulation of the 
parameter setting account (e.g., Hyams 1994, Hyams & Wexler 1993), the pro -drop 
parameter is associated with the morphological properties of verbs in the target 
language. Jaeggli & Safir (1989b) argue that null subjects are licensed by mor- 
phologically uniform inflectional paradigms. Morphological uniformity is satisfied 
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by paradigms where verbal morphology either unambiguously marks subject per- 
son or does not mark it at all. In the former case subject identification occurs by 
agreement- identification (as in Italian) and in the latter case by topic- identification 
(as in Chinese). The topic- identification option and object- identification by agree- 
ment also allow the omission of object complements (Huang (1984)). Under this 
view it is the default [ +uniform] setting of the morphological uniformity parameter 
that initially licenses the omission of subjects and objects. 
Since both the biological maturation of components of UG and default pa- 
rameter settings are independent of the linguistic environment, both competence 
theories predict that the initial probabilities of overt subject and object expression 
in English are comparable to the respective probabilities in pro- drop /object -drop 
languages. There is good evidence, however, that these predictions are not borne 
out. Valian (1990), for instance, finds that subjects are omitted significantly less 
frequently in English than in Italian and Wang et al.'s (1992) results show the 
same difference in object omission rate in English and Chinese. One might raise 
the objection that differences at a particular stage of development do not provide 
counter evidence for the discontinuity hypothesis as long as there is some, earlier, 
stage when the predicted similarities hold. The following paragraphs will discuss 
this objection on the basis of argument omission data in English and Hungarian 
child language. 
Hungarian verb morphology marks the person and number features of the 
subject and indicates whether the direct object is specific /definite or non -specific /indefinite. 
Both grammatical functions may be covert with no structural constraints on zero 
anaphora: 
(3.1) a. A királyfi és én meghívt -unk egy sárkányt vacsorára. 
the prince and I invited- 1PL.INDEF a dragon for.dinner 
The prince and I invited a dragon for dinner. 
b. Sokat evett és megitt -a az összes bort. 
much ate.3sG.INDEF and drank- 3sG.DEF the all wine 
He ate a lot and drank all the wine. 
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c. A palotában tartott -uk éjszakára. 
the in.palace kept- 1PL.DEP for.night 
We kept him in the palace for the night. 
As shown in Table 3.1 on page 49, while the proportion of covert subjects gradually 
decreases in the English corpus, it remains at a constant high level in Hungarian. As 
predicted by the approaches under discussion, the probability of subject omission at 
the earliest stage in the analysis is comparable to Hungarian pro -drop rate (around 
70 %). From the second stage onwards, however, overt subjects are considerably 
more frequent in English than in Hungarian, even though the traditional 90% ac- 
curacy marking the point of acquisition has still not been attained by the end of 
the studied period. The difference between the two languages in object -drop rate 
is even more striking. Peter omits objects in less than 20% of obligatory contexts 
throughout the studied period while the Hungarian children leave around half of 
object arguments unexpressed. 
Putting the results on object mapping aside for the moment, it seems that 
although the data at the earliest stage is compatible with theories proposing a 
default null- subject grammar or a grammar missing the components necessary for 
the projection of subject DPs, the observed developmental sequence cannot be fitted 
into two consecutive states of UG. We could maintain that the preprogrammed 
initial state accounts for similarities in the early language of children acquiring 
distinct targets but we still need to find out what it is that subsequently allows the 
learner's performance to diverge from the patterns predicted by that initial state 
but still not match the patterns expected from the properties of the complementary 
state. One suggestion to consider is that the language acquisition device allows a 
parameter to be temporarily unset or that the two grammars corresponding to the 
two value settings may be simultaneously active. We can then account for a period 
of chance performance between the initial pattern predictable from the default value 
and the final pattern corresponding to the target value. If this is the case, however, 
parameter setting can no longer be viewed as a simple deterministic process. Some 
additional or, possibly, alternative mechanism needs to be identified. The results of 
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the object omission data of course point to the same conclusion, since the observed 
differences do not follow from either account. 
PROCESSING CAPACITY 
The alternative in the literature to theories relying on discontinuities in the prop- 
erties of UG is to contend that subject omission in child English is a performance 
error attributable to limitations in processing capacity. Namely, there is an upper 
bound on the length of the utterance the child can produce at each developmental 
stage (Bloom 1990, Vahan 1991). In support of this claim, Bloom (1990) finds 
that at a given point in development VP length increases as a function of subject 
type (lexical, pronominal or null) in number of words. The length -effect results, 
however, are not replicated in the current study. The slight difference between the 
mean length of subjectless utterances and the mean length of VPs of utterances 
with overt subjects shown in Table 3.2 on the following page is not statistically 
significant in any of Peter's samples. 
Since there is a tendency for the VPs of null- subject utterances to be slightly 
longer, however, it seems worthwhile to further investigate the hypothesis. Bloom 
reports that the processing load is greater for lexical subjects than for pronominal 
subjects in support of the processing explanation. It is not clear, however, in what 
sense the production of lexical subjects places a heavier load on the speaker than 
the production of pronouns, since determiners are infrequent in early child language 
and several lexical nouns are monosyllabic. Bloom's results may suggest that the 
determining factor is not necessarily phonological length but may be information 
content: lexical NPs typically introduce new information, while the referents of 
pronouns tend to be given in the linguistic or nonlinguistic environment. If this is 
the case, it is of course not only the information content of the subject argument 
but also that of the VP that should increase processing effort. We would then 
expect the complexity of argument structure rather than the number of words in 
the VP to correlate with the frequency of subject omission. The simplest measure 
of the complexity of the argument structure of an utterance is the number of overt 
internal arguments. If the child's complement phrases are of roughly equal length in 

















1 203 74 443 79 150 69 102 16 241 72 84 48 
2 650 60 452 87 117 81 364 18 192 64 56 57 
3 998 33 297 77 110 81 640 6 147 60 70 44 
4 509 17 413 81 154 76 278 1 301 62 81 42 
Tot 2360 1605 531 1384 881 291 
Mean 46 81 77 10 64 48 
Table 3.1: Proportion of unexpressed subjects and objects in obligatory contexts in En- 
glish and obligatory or optional contexts in Hungarian 
Stage MEAN VP LENGTH 
Null Subj Overt Subj 
1 3.1 2.1 
2a 3.2 2.4 
2b 3.5 3.0 
3a 3.9 3.1 
3b 3.7 3.2 
4 4.2 3.9 
Table 3.2: Mean VP length in number of words of subjectless utterances and utterances 
with overt subjects in English 
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that the length effect only holds if length is defined in terms of argument phrases 
as opposed to phonological words. Table 3.3 on page 52 compares the frequencies 
of subject omission in utterances where no overt internal arguments occur and 
utterances where one or more internal arguments are expressed, as in (3.2) and 
(3.3) respectively. 
(3.2) a. finished. (2;2) 
b. baby go. (2;0) 
(3.3) a. want the bologna. (2;1) 
b. Lois go home. (2;1) 
As predicted, in the English data subjects are more likely to be omitted in com- 
plex environments (mean 51 %) than in simple environments (mean 36 %) as de- 
fined above. A x2 statistic with a two by two contingency table (subject ex- 
pressed /omitted by 0/1+ internal argument(s)) gives significant results for all but 
the last stage ( x2= 9. 34p<. 01; x2= 13 .55p <.001;x2= 9.91p <.0.1;x2 =7/5 
p < .01; x2 = 4.42 p < .05 from Stage 1 to 3b). 
Before further developing this hypothesis, one issue needs to be clarified. 
Since the omission of internal arguments is generally rare, the results reported here 
could suggest that subject omission is correlated with the semantic complexity of 
predicates. The examination of verb types, however, reveals that the subjects of 
monovalent verbs are just as likely to be unmapped as the subjects of bi- or trivalent 
verbs (see Table 3.4 on page 52). What matters is whether the internal arguments 
are overtly expressed or not in individual utterances. One could argue that verbs 
subcategorising for an optional object argument or an optional oblique argument 
have two lexical entries and therefore it is the semantic complexity of the lexical 
entry that predicts the likelihood of subject omission. Such an assumption, however, 
has undesirable psycholinguistic consequences for lexical theory, since it fails to 
show relatedness between entries which intuitively have a common core meaning 
and whose argument frame specifications are derivable from mapping principles 
acting on this core meaning. The alternative view of the lexicon, as outlined by 
Pustejovsky 1995, will be discussed in some detail in the sections on object omission. 
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For the moment I shall contend that structurally polysemous predicates have single 
lexical entries with alternative mapping options. 
The hypothesis attributing argument omission to performance factors has 
the advantage over competence -based approaches of allowing gradual progression 
from null- subject output to target -like linguistic behaviour, since it is reasonable to 
assume that processing capacity gradually increases over age. It is an open question, 
however, whether this progression indeed lies in an increase in resources available to 
the child or in a reduction in processing effort required for the mapping process. The 
distinction is important, as in the latter case the presumed performance factors may 
turn out to be dependent on the organisation of the child's grammar. It is also clear, 
that what has so far been said about the process fails to account for the observed 
differences in subject and object omission patterns. Before trying to address these 
problems, the precise nature of the processing limitation will need to be specified. 
Not only the cause but also the result of the processing deficit may be inter- 
preted as affecting the child's phonetic production system or as interefering with 
the mapping process level processing. The phonetic explanation 
means that the processing of internal arguments places a cognitive load on young 
children such that it interferes with the production of long strings, i.e., all argu- 
ments are present in the child's internal form -representation of the utterance but 
the production of some of these arguments is blocked. Something along these lines is 
an implicit assumption behind processing approaches considering the phonological 
length of the child's utterances as the measure of processing capacity. The syntac- 
tic explanation for the complexity effect states that the learner can only process a 
limited number of arguments and the error resides in his failure to map the fea- 
ture specifications of all arguments of the semantic representation onto functions in 
syntactic structure. Under this view omitted arguments are either simply missing 
from the child's form -representation or are mapped as empty categories of some 
kind lacking feature specifications. The same suggestion, albeit without empirical 
evidence, has previously been made by Pinker (1984). It is also implicit in Culicover 
(1999), who (after Hawkins 1994) argues that the larger the number of elements to 
be linked between Conceptual Structure and Syntactic Structure, the more difficult 
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Stage 
0 Int Arg 
N % 0 
SUBJECTS 
1+ Int Arg 
N % 0 Total N 
1 90 63 113 82 203 
2a 142 49 166 69 308 
2b 106 48 236 66 342 
3a 118 29 351 43 469 
3b 96 19 433 29 529 
4 101 11 .4 08 19 509 
Total 653 1707 2360 
Mean 36 51 
Table 3.3: Proportion of omitted subjects in utterances with and without overt internal 
arguments in English 
Over 60% 
MEAN SUBJECT OMISSION RATE 
30 -60% Under 30% 
close, find, finish, 
look, move, need, 
pick, push, put, 
see 
break, bring, come, 
cry, draw, fall, 
fix, get, go, 
have, hold, make, 
open, play, ride, 
roll, say, sit, 
take, try, turn, 
use, want, write 
do, show 
Table 3.4: Categories of verbs that occur in four or more files grouped by rate of subject 
omission 
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it is to acquire the construction. Although the difference between the two inter- 
pretations is subtle, they do make different predictions for subject identification in 
pro -drop languages. If the first explanation is correct, we expect the VP- length 
effect to show up in young children's subject -drop rate in agreement- identification 
languages as well. The second explanation, however, makes no such prediction, 
since the subject identification features are mapped as agreement projections and 
overt subjects do not require the processing of an additional set of features. To 
test these hypotheses pro -drop rate was calculated in the Hungarian data in utter- 
ances with no expressed internal arguments and utterances where one or more overt 
complements occur, as in (3.4) and (3.5). 
(3.4) a. nem kér -em. (Zoli 1;8) 
not want -1SG 
I don't want it. 
b. elvitt -e a néni. (Zoli 1;8) 
away.took -3sG the lady 
The lady took it away. 
(3.5) a. megy -ünk autóval. (Zoli 1;10) 
go -1PL by.car 
We are going by car. 
b. én eltett -em halacskát. (Zoli 1;8) 
I away.put -1SG fishy 
I put the fishy away. 
The results in Table 3.5 on page 55 show no consistent differences between the two 
classes of environments: the frequencies of implicit subjects are almost identical 
in all samples for both children. These findings indicate that subject -drop is in- 
dependent of VP length in Hungarian child language. Limitations in processing 
therefore do not seem to lie at the level of phonological production or lexical struc- 
ture construction, but at the level of encoding information present in the semantic 
representation. 
However, if the problem lies with a biological restriction on processing capac- 
ity, interfering with the mapping of conceptual arguments onto syntactic structure, 
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there is no reason why the mapping of arguments as subject or object DPs should be 
any more affected than the mapping of argument- identifying features as inflections. 
The present formulation of the processing account therefore predicts that it should 
be costly to process subjects no matter how they are encoded in the target language. 
Thus agreement marking in agreement- identification languages is expected to be as 
inconsistent as overt subjects in English. However, the requirement to mark subject 
features in syntax seems to be observed early in Hungarian. As shown in Table 3.6 
on the following page, both children's performance is over 70% accurate even at the 
earliest stage under analysis and a significant proportion of subject agreement errors 
consist in substituting the wrong inflection rather than in omitting the inflection or 
substituting a non -finite form of the verb. The three error types are illustrated in 
(3.6) with the targets given in brackets after each utterance. 
(3.6) a. hoz -om. (hoz -d) (Zoli 1;8) 
bring -1sG (bring- 2sG.suBJ) 
Bring it. 
b. kér. (kér -ek) (Zoli 1;10) 
want (want -1SG) 
I want one. 
c. *kiven -ni. (ve -dd ki) (Zoli 1;10) 
out.take -INF (take- 2sG.suBJ out) 
Take it out. 
The 90% threshold, however, is only reached at Stage 2 by Zoli and at Stage 4 by 
Balázs, suggesting that the system of agreement marking is initially incomplete. As 
will be discussed shortly, where inflection omission or an incorrect non -finite form 
occurs, these are restricted to a limited range of contexts and are no more frequent 
in two- or more - argument structures than in single argument structures. 
To summarise the results so far, we have seen that both the parameter set- 
ting and maturational hypotheses and any patent interpretations of the performance 
limitations approach fall short of explaining the outcome of a detailed comparison 
of argument identification patterns in the linguistic behaviour of children acquiring 
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Stage SUBJECTS 
0 Int Arg 
N % 
Zolfi 
1+ Int Arg 
N % 
Tot N 0 Int Arg 
N % 
Balázs 
1+ Int Arg 
N % 
Tot N 
1 241 79 202 79 443 70 71 80 67 150 
2 253 85 199 90 452 57 82 60 80 117 
3 158 78 139 77 297 28 82 82 79 110 
4 187 80 226 83 413 56 77 98 74 154 
Total 839 766 1605 211 320 531 
Mean 80 82 78 75 
Table 3.5: Proportion of dropped subjects in utterances with no expressed internal argu- 







% Err % 0 N % Corr % Err % 0 
1 443 79 13 8 149 73 5 22 
2 448 93 4 3 108 80 7 13 
3 288 91 4 5 102 86 1 13 
4 393 92 2 6 147 91 0 9 
Total 1572 506 
Mean 89 6 5 82 3 14 
Table 3.6: Proportion of correct and erroneous subject agreement marking and zero or 
non -finite inflections with non -zero finite targets. The `error' category includes mor- 
phophonological mistakes. Impersonal verbs are not shown. 
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pro -drop and non -pro -drop languages. The principles governing subject identifica- 
tion in English child language have been shown to be distinct from the Hungarian 
learner's rules of overt subject expression or subject identification by agreement. I 
argued that the observed differences point to the conclusion that subject expression 
in English is affected by some processing limitation that interferes with the map- 
ping of subject identification features. This effect, however, has not been observed 
in Hungarian child language. The questions that now need to be answered are (a) 
what, if neither pro, nor a phonetically null pronoun, is the categorial status of null 
subjects in English child language and (b) how can we explain that the processing 
constraint holds in English but not in Hungarian. 
3.1.2 The distribution of unidentified subjects 
Two classes of suggestions on factors determining the distribution of null subjects 
will be discussed. The first concerns the structural configurations in which they oc- 
cur to identify their syntactic categorial status. Specifically, I shall review evidence 
that the child's null subjects are assigned the category PRO found in non -finite 
clauses in the adult grammar or an antecedentless empty category occurring in 
certain elliptical registers of adult English. The second line of investigation ad- 
dresses non -structural constraints on the occurrence of implicit subjects. Proposals 
here include the hypothesis that implicit subjects are empty categories of any kind 
which are associated with specific verb lexemes and the analysis of subject omis- 
sion as instances of topic ellipsis, which occurs in certain situation -pragmatic or 
discourse -pragmatic contexts. 
NULL SUBJECTS AS PRO 
Sano & Hyams (1994) and Wexler (1998) propose that non -target -like implicit sub- 
jects are mapped in syntactic structure as the empty category PRO. PRO is licensed 
in environments lacking local tense and agreement features, as in (3.7): 
(3.7) a. The Never bird didn't give up [PRO trying [PRO to save Peter]]. 
b. [PRO to die] will be an awfully big adventure. 
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According to the authors' analysis, the error resides in early grammars licensing root 
infinitives, which is explained as the availability of truncation, the option of project- 
ing clauses at a level below agreement and /or tense projection. If this hypothesis 
is correct, we should find null subjects to be negligibly rare in finite environments, 
where PRO cannot occur. Table 3.7 on page 59 divides the subject omission data 
into finite and non -finite environments as determined by the context and the sur- 
face syntax of the child's utterances. The various categories are illustrated in (3.8) 
and (3.9). Root infinitives (3.8a) and root participle verb forms (3.8b) were classed 
as non -finite. The finite category includes verbs marked for third person singular 
agreement (3.9a) or past tense (3.9b) and IPs headed by auxiliary verbs. The latter 
category is subdivided into utterances with stressed auxiliaries (those that do not 
allow contraction) (3.9c) and unstressed auxiliairies (those that may be contracted) 
(3.9d). 
(3.8) Non- finite: 
a. mama sit down. (2;2) 
b. I writing. (2;2) 
(3.9) Finite: 
a. goes up there. (2;2) 
b. barrels fell the train. (2;2) 
c. can't do. (2;2) 
d. I'm writing tape. (2;2) 
The overall figures for the two environments show significant differences between 
the two groups: the subjects of non -finite verbs are considerably more likely to be 
omitted than the subjects of finite verbs. Up to the last stage, however, null sub- 
jects occur with non -negligible frequency in finite environments as well (51 -16 %). 
Breaking down the results to subgroups reveals that within the finite group it is 
only utterances with unstressed auxiliaries (those that allow contraction) that show 
a consistently lower proportion of subject omission than non -finite contexts. The 
subjects of stressed auxiliaries and main verbs marked for third person agreement 
or past tense are as likely to be unexpressed as the subjects of root infinitives or 
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root participles in some of the samples. These results are incompatible with the 
hypothesis that children's null subjects are restricted to the empty category PRO. 
The negligibly low rate of subject omission in utterances headed by un- 
stressed auxiliary verbs is worth further consideration. Only two utterances with 
unexpressed subjects occur in this group. One is a wh- question with the unstressed 
auxiliary attached to the preceding wh -word: 
(3.10) a. am gonna get a horsie see it. (2;1) 
b. what're doing? [the people] (2;2) 
Of the linguistic environments where subjects may be locally unidentified only co- 
ordinate IPs and perfective /progressive infinitival complements allow unstressed 
auxiliaries in the adult grammar. No such utterances occur in Peter's speech sam- 
ples. At the initial stages all non -negated auxiliaries are suffixed to the preceding 
subject or wh- phrase. Free standing auxiliaries do not appear until Stage 3b. Peter's 
early grammar seems to require unstressed auxiliaries to be phonologically attached 
to the preceding phrase and this requirement constrains subject optionality in the 
relevant environments. 
NULL SUBJECTS AS THE ANTECEDENTLESS EMPTY CATEGORY 
In defence of the PRO -subject hypothesis Wexler (1998) proposes that subject 
omission in finite and non -finite environments results from two distinct processes 
and analyses the former as instances of topic -drop. Wexler's claim concerns the 
structural properties of children's null subjects, which, he proposes, are assigned the 
syntactic category of null topic in finite environments. In adult grammar implicit 
topic arguments occur both in pro -drop and non -pro -drop languages. Reviewing 
empirical research on speech data and written diary data, Haegeman (2000) finds 
that their distribution is more restricted in the latter type of language: topic -drop 
never occurs in embedded clauses or in wh- questions, while pro -drop is licensed 
in these environments as well'. Based on these observations, Haegeman analyses 
1I use the term topic here in the non -technical sense, referring to conceptually given subject 
arguments. Haegeman labels this category adult null subject and reserves the term topic -drop for 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































implicit topic in non -pro -drop languages as an antecedentless empty category in 
the sense of Rizzi (1994), which can only occur in the specifier position of the root 
and is restricted to clauses projected at a level lower than CP. If the child's null 
subjects are assigned either the category PRO or the antecedentless empty category, 
subject omission should not occur in finite wh- questions or embedded clauses. This 
prediction seems to be correct: we find only one finite wh- question and one arguable 
example of finite subordinate clause with implicit subjects in the data: 
(3.11) a. what're doing? (2;2) 
b. I said don't know where Daddy is. (2;4) 
It must be noted at this stage that subject omission is very infrequent in non- 
finite wh- questions as well (2 in 22 in total). While this does not follow from the 
proposed analysis, neither does it constitute counter evidence, similarly to the neg- 
ligibly low subject -drop rate in utterances with unstressed auxiliaries. I will return 
to the significance of these results shortly. For now we therefore have convincing 
evidence that the syntactic category of null subjects in child English is PRO or 
the antecedentless empty category. The fact that children's null subjects do obey 
structural constraints strongly suggests that subject omission is not a performance 
error superimposed on the child's grammar. The discourse distribution of children's 
topic -drop, however, clearly does not match that of the adult language, since a large 
proportion of young children's finite null subject utterances are plainly ungrammat- 
ical at some level. There must be some principle that restricts the occurrence of 
the antecedentless empty category in the adult grammar but not in child grammar. 
Rizzi (2000) tentatively suggests the following economy principles: 
(3.12) a. Structural Economy: Use the minimum structure consistent with 
well -formedness constraints. 
b. Categorial Uniformity: Assume a unique canonical structural real- 
ization for a given semantic type. 
In Rizzi's analysis structural economy encourages clauses to be projected at the 
lowest possible level. If no element in the clause requires the projection of CP, 
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such as in a declarative main clause, the clause will be analysed as an IP and 
the antecedentless empty category may occupy the specifier position. Structural 
economy, however, may be in competition with the tendency to assign parallel 
syntactic structures to parallel semantic structures. Since a declarative clause can 
occur as a subordinate clause headed by a complementiser, the principle of categorial 
uniformity will prefer a uniform CP analysis, which excludes the antecedentless 
empty category. Rizzi proposes that the infrequent occurrence of topic -drop in adult 
language can be explained by the assumption that categorial uniformity tends to 
have priority over structural economy. The question of priority, he argues, does 
not arise for children up to the point when their grammar can analyse declarative 
clauses as CPs. That is, the frequency of null subjects in finite clauses is expected 
to significantly decrease sometime after finite embedded declarative clauses appear 
in the child's language. Looking back at Table 3.7 on page 59 we can see that the 
subject omission rate with finite inflected verbs is over 50% in the first four samples 
and is reduced to around 30% at the last two stages. There is, however, only 
one finite embedded declarative clause in the corpus (3.11b above), which occurs 
at Stage 3b and happens to lack an overt subject. The ability to produce finite 
embedded declarative clauses, therefore, does not appear to be a prerequisite for 
the reduction of subject omission rate. 
The question then remains, what, if not the principle of categorial uniformity, 
restricts subject -drop in child language? In fact, there is no reason why a clause 
should be projected at the level of CP to preclude the occurrence of null subjects. 
Although the antecedentless empty category may occupy the specifier position of 
an IP root, nothing in the structural configuration requires it to do so. Overt sub- 
jects are also licensed in the same position and children must be able to project 
them, since not all subjects are omitted in finite declarative clauses. The question 
would therefore be better formulated as what causes child grammar to overuse the 
option of the antecedentless empty category to the degree that it does at various 
developmental stages. The above discussion has identified two environments where 
PRO or the antecedentless empty category are structurally licensed, yet subject 
omission is negligibly infrequent. One is clauses with unstressed auxiliaries and the 
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other is non -finite wh- questions. Therefore whatever it is that causes child gram- 
mar to overuse subject -drop, it does not uniformly affect all structurally suitable 
configurations. 
VERB SPECIFICITY 
Tomasello (1992) argues that argument structure is acquired conservatively, on a 
verb -by -verb basis. In his study of a child's first utterances he finds that the best 
predictor of the argument structure patterns occurring with a particular verb is 
previous usage of that verb, rather than same -time usage of other verbs. We could 
hypothesise that although the child is conservative in the sense that constructions 
learnt for one verb are not generalised to other verbs, ungrammatical argument 
structure patterns may result if the learner fails to distinguish contexts which select 
from alternative frames listed for any one verb lexeme. One empirical finding in 
favour of this hypothesis is the observed variation in subject omission rate across 
individual predicates. As we have seen in Table 3.4 on page 52, some verbs consis- 
tently have their subjects omitted, others almost never do, and with a third set of 
verbs the probability of subject expression is around chance level. As was already 
mentioned, valency does not appear to be a grouping factor. We can also see from 
Table 3.4 that the semantic roles assigned to the subject arguments (agent, theme, 
experiencer, etc.) are proportionately distributed across the groups; the omission 
of subjects is not tied to any particular role(s). 
Let us then consider previously acquired distributional differences between 
individual predicates. Target -like null- subject frames occur in the data in five 
structural types: imperative constructions, VP co- ordination, non -finite VP com- 
plements, yes /no questions with state verbs and elliptical answers to wh- questions. 
Some examples for each of these constructions from Peter's samples are given below: 
(3.13) a. help please. (2;1) 
b. get out the way! (2;3) 
c. watch me! (2;4) 
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(3.14) a. I'll go get it. (2;3) 
b. I'm throwing and skating and gonna fall. (2;3) 
c. I'm holding on, don't let go of it. (2;6) 
(3.15) a. I wanna write there. (2;1) 
b. I trying get a screw. (2;2) 
(3.16) a. have a pen? (2;0) 
b. wanna little coffee? (2;2) 
c. see the light? (2;3) 
d. know what this is? (2;4) 
(3.17) a. INV: what're you doing? 
PET: ride a horsie. (2;0) 
b. INV: what're you doing? 
PET: make coffee Mommy. (2;2) 
c. INV: what's Jennifer doing? 
PET: crying. (2;3) 
Let us assume that the occurrence of an empty category (ec) is treated as a lexical 
property in the learner's grammar. The child's verb types can then be grouped into 
two hypothetical classes. For the verbs in one class, the child can be assumed to have 
constructed two frames as in (3.18) on the basis of input utterances and associated 
them with the semantic structure in (3.19) with no further feature specifications. 
The lexical entries of the verbs in the other class only include a frame of type (b). 
(3.18) a. [ecx Vi (NPy) 
b. [NPx Vi (NPy) 
(3.19) verbi'(x, (y) . . . ) 
As a single occurrence of a null- subject utterance is not necessarily evidence for 
the existence of a generalised frame in the child's lexicon, frequency information 
needs to be taken into account. The theory of verb specificity then predicts that 
those and only those predicates which are likely to occur in target -like null- subject 
utterances will also be likely to have unexpressed subjects in obligatory subject 
63 
contexts. Since we are interested in the possible effects of previously acquired 
distributional properties, the correlation is tested at Stager, by plotting for each verb 
the proportion of licensed implicit subjects up to and including Stage,,, against the 
proportion of erroneous subject omission at Stage,. In order to obtain independent 
value sets, proportions were calculated relative to the number of expressed subjects 





E licensed .impi + expi 
i=1 
err.impn 
Y = err.impn + expn 
The results for the six stages are shown in Figure 3.1 on the following page. It is 
clear from the scattergrams that there is no correlation between the two variables 
at any of the stages and no threshold value can be identified on the x axis that 
divides verbs into low subject omission verbs and high subject omission verbs. We 
find high error rates with predicates that have never or very infrequently occurred 
in target -like null- subject frames and, conversely, there are predicates whose sub- 
jects tend to be expressed in obligatory contexts, even though they have occurred 
with licensed implicit subjects. Contrary to the predictions of the verb specificity 
hypothesis, subject omission rate is independent of previous target -like usage of 
individual predicates. 
PRAGMATIC CONSTRAINTS 
A second hypothesis for a non -structural filter on subject omission is a pragmatic 
predisposition whereby children are more likely to omit the subject when its refer- 
ent is highly salient. Greenfield & Smith (1976) and more recently Bloom (1990) 
invoke the Principle of Informativeness, omit the information which is most easily 
recoverable in context, to explain why subjects rather than objects are dropped 
in English child language. Children's sensitivity to information content is demon- 
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Figure 3.1: Correlation between target -like and non - target -like subject -drop rate. 
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that in a sentence imitation task two -year -old children are more likely to omit the 
subject if its referent has previously been visually presented to them. For the pur- 
poses of the following discussion I shall define salient information as an argument 
whose referent is uniquely identifiable either (a) from the non -linguistic context, as 
for instance in the elliptical questions in (3.16) above or (b) from discourse context, 
as for instance in elliptical replies to wh- questions illustrated in (3.17) or (c) from 
agreement identification features as in non -third person contexts in Hungarian. As 
it is difficult to determine with a reasonable degree of confidence from transcripts 
of conversation whether an object is given in non -linguistic context, the discussion 
will concentrate on the other two conditions. If the pragmatic rule operates in child 
language, in Hungarian we should find a higher omission rate for non -third person 
subjects, the referents of which are predominantly uniquely identified by agreement 
(i.e. the speaker or the addressee), than for third person subjects, which may or 
may not be identified by context. As this option of subject identification is not 
available in English, no differences are expected in Peter's data. Table 3.8 on the 
next page breaks down the subject -drop statistics into first /second and third per- 
son contexts with singular and plural conflated for each. The pragmatic effect on 
subject -drop clearly manifests itself at all stages for both children in the Hungarian 
samples (p < .001; from Stage 1 to 4 for Zoli: x2 = 102.42, 99.86, 37.19, 16.64; from 
Stage 1 to 4 for Balázs: x2 = 55.52, 23.66, 21.86, 39.02). The difference also holds 
in the first of the English samples, where third person subjects are significantly 
less likely to be unexpressed than non -third person subjects (x2 = 6.55, p < .05). 
From the second stage onwards, however, there are no significant differences be- 
tween persons. The results at the first stage could tentatively be attributed to an 
early tendency to omit information `given' in the physical environment, which, as 
will be shown shortly, is later overridden by a more restrictive pragmatic principle. 
Condition (b) of the pragmatic principle predicts that those arguments are 
likely to be omitted by the child whose referents have previously been identified 
in discourse. This hypothesis is tested in the English data on utterances with 
third person actor referents. Adapting Rispoli's (1995) methodology, the actor was 




























































































































































































































































































utterances preceding the test utterance within the same episode. It was classed as 
new otherwise. The four conditions, expressed new subject, omitted new subject, 
expressed given subject and omitted given subject, are illustrated below: 
(3.21) PET: open [radiator cover door]. 
INV: hm? 
PET: warm. 
INV: is it warm? 
PET: baby go. (2;0) 
(3.22) PET: I said thank you. 
MOT: good boy. 
PET: ok? 
MOT: good boy. 
PET: goes down there. (2;3) 
(3.23) PET: Mommy's not here. 
INV: Mommy's not here? 
PET: right. 
INV: she's gone shopping. 
PET: Mommy's gone shopping. (2;4) 
(3.24) PET: tape, tape huh. 
INV: tape huh, yeah, that's tape. 
PET: goes around. (2;1) 
As the results in Table 3.9 on page 74 show, subject omission rate is considerably 
higher in given contexts than in new contexts. The difference between the two 
conditions is statistically significant at all stages (x2 = 9.36 p < .01, X2 = 15.02 
p < .001, X2 = 6.72 p < .01, X2 = 10.51 p < .01, X2 = 9.28 p < .01, X2 = 20.12 
p < .001). The child is therefore sensitive to discourse environment in that 
subject arguments that have previously been identified are more likely to be un- 
expressed than unidentified arguments. As we have seen, the tendency to omit 
uniquely identified arguments holds in Hungarian as well. It therefore seems plausi- 
ble that a pragmatic predisposition is responsible for the fact that English children 
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overuse the option of mapping subjects as empty categories. We can speculate that 
the gradual reduction in subject omission rate is related to successive revisions of 
what is considered given or identified by the grammar. Our definition of discourse 
salience may approximate Peter's initial hypothesis, which is later refined. If this is 
correct, we should find that the child differentiates more and more contexts within 
the structural domain of optional topic -drop. As was mentioned before, two such 
contexts, wh- questions and IPs headed by unstressed auxiliary verbs seem to have 
been isolated by the first stage under analysis. Positive differentiation seems to 
occur at various stages in the four well- defined semantic /discourse contexts that 
allow null subjects in the adult grammar: in commands; in coordinate structures; 
with a group of state denoting predicates in yes /no questions with addressee actor 
referents; and a heterogeneous class of predicates in replies to wh- questions (see 
Figure 3.2 on the next page). For all four contexts, after the initial high proportion 
of implicit subjects, a period of decline in the probability of subject ellipsis follows 
in parallel with the subject omission curve in given contexts. After this period 
subject ellipsis becomes more frequent again, while subject omission in given con- 
texts continues to decrease. It is at this point when the evidence suggests specific 
elliptical contexts are differentiated from the generic given context. 
Note that although differences exist between environments, we rarely find 
100% or 0% null subjects. The discourse effect in general is only a tendency rather 
than an absolute rule. Looking back at Table 3.9 on page 74, it can be seen that 
up to the last stage, subject omission occurs with non -negligible frequency in new 
contexts as well (mean 23 %). Some of these utterances may be accounted for 
by assuming that the subject is salient in the nonlinguistic environment; such an 
explanation, however, must remain speculative. Further, a significant proportion 
of identifiable subjects are expressed even at the earliest stage (28 -70 %). If we 
compare these figures with pro -drop rate in non -third person in the Hungarian 
data (3 -15 %, see Table 3.8), we see that the tendency to leave identified subjects 
unexpressed is considerably weaker in English. Subject -drop in given contexts is 
therefore an option, not a requirement. It may then be the case that, rather than 
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Given --o- Command -- Reply -* State Y/N - 0- Coord 
Figure 3.2: Null subjects in given contexts, commands, co- ordination and question and 
reply elliptical contexts. 
to the membership of individual conceptual structures in the `discourse- identified 
subject' and `non- discourse identified subject' sets and (b) to the occurrence of 
empty subjects in the two pragmatic contexts and their subcontexts. It is then 
these probabilities which are revised at successive stages of development until they 
approximate the properties of the mature grammar. 
If this is correct, the VP- length effect can now be explained. Let us assume 
that the processing restriction is to be viewed not as a biological limit that gradually 
relaxes with age but as an age- independent tendency to put as little cognitive effort 
as possible in encoding the information given in conceptual structure. Whether 
the cognitive load can be reduced by not mapping conceptual subjects onto an 
overt syntactic function would then depend on the learner's hypothesis grammar of 
the target language. If two mapping options are in free variation according to the 
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grammar, the simpler of the two will be preferred. The greater the processing load, 
the greater the tendency to select the simpler option. This seems to be the case 
in English child language: within the structural constraints of Universal Grammar, 
implicit subjects are assigned non -marginal probabilities both in contexts where 
the subject is not uniquely identified in discourse and in contexts where it is (with 
the exception of two formal environments). If on the other hand only one option is 
specified by the grammar, or alternative options are assigned marginal probabilities, 
the economy principle cannot take effect. This is what we find in Hungarian, where 
the learner assigns a very high probability of subject identification by agreement. 
On this interpretation the processing hypothesis is no longer seen as an explanation 
for subject omission in English child language. The VP- length effect is not the 
cause but the consequence of subject optionality. 
3.1.3 Frequency effects in subject identification 
TARGET -LIKE NULL SUBJECT CLAUSES 
In the previous section I argued that subject omission is explained by a predispo- 
sition to omit arguments whose referents are in some way identified. I have also 
shown that this tendency is not imposed on performance by processing factors but 
must be part of the child's competence. The evidence suggests that children acquir- 
ing English initially divide semantic representations into those where the subject 
argument is given in discourse (or, possibly, by the non -linguistic environment) 
and those where the subject is new information. At various stages in develop- 
ment contexts are further differentiated according to their syntactic, lexical and 
discourse -semantic properties and assigned distinct probabilities of occurring with 
implicit subjects. As a result, the child's patterns of subject identification gradually 
come to match those of the adult grammar. While the initial predisposition may 
be a manifestation of a more general universal principle of economy of syntactic 
representation, the developmental process clearly must indicate language- specific 
learning. This conclusion is supported not only by the child's isolation of specific 
linguistic structures but also by the general probabilistic nature of the pragmatic 
principle - it seems unlikely that actual probabilities are built into the cognitive 
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system. The answer to the question what causes child grammar to assign the prob- 
abilities that it does to the occurrence of implicit subjects in various contexts must 
therefore lie in the surface properties of the child's linguistic environment or, more 
precisely, in the previously acquired aspects of the child's linguistic environment. 
One objection to an input -based account is that in some languages, French 
for instance, topic -ellipsis is virtually non -existent in the spoken language. Yet, 
French children go through a stage when subjects are frequently dropped and early 
French null- subjects too obey the structural constraints of PRO and the antecedent - 
less empty category (Rasetti 2000). This fact clearly falsifies the hypothesis that 
children's subject omission is the result of the overgeneralisation of subject ellipsis. 
But we need not assume that it is specifically subject ellipsis that is overgeneralised. 
It could be the case that the learner notes an overt -subject clause structure and an 
ambiguous null- subject clause structure on the basis of input utterances. The latter 
includes imperative constructions, VP- coordination, non -finite complement clauses 
and, in some languages, elliptical utterances. The categorial status of null sub- 
jects is different in each of the above construction types. The subject of imperative 
constructions is a phonetically null pronoun, coordinate V -bars have no structural 
subject position, the subjects of non -finite complements are assigned to the empty 
category PRO and elliptical subjects are analysed as instances of the antecedentless 
empty category. Of these categories the distribution and interpretation of PRO is 
under current assumptions specified by principles of UG. On the assumption that 
the child's grammar allows unrestricted truncation, however, it is not clear how the 
interpretation of PRO is analysed. The occurrence of the remaining construction 
types is determined by a combination of structural, semantic, pragmatic and dis- 
course principles. The various categories of null subject are not in complementary 
distribution in syntactic structure: finite declarative clauses truncated to a projec- 
tion level below CP license the phonetically null pronoun, the antecedentless empty 
category and a co- ordinate structure analysis. Root infinitives license the latter 
two structures and PRO. When the child parses a null- subject input utterance, the 
principles of universal grammar do not determine which empty category occupies 
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the subject position. The clause in (3.25), for instance, may be analysed as any of 
the structures in (3.26), where AEC stands for the antecedentless empty category. 








back in a minute 
The learner's problem is one of category labelling. Initially, therefore, the child 
may only distinguish two clause- structures: null subject and overt subject. The 
two clause structures may be associated with overlapping, fuzzy sets of conceptual 
structures and pragmatic contexts. The probabilistic nature of subject expression 
can be explained on the assumption that the child's grammar initially registers prob- 
abilities of occurrence of the two underspecified clause types. These probabilities 
may then be distorted in the child's production depending on the type and to- 
ken frequencies of semantic representations associated with one or the other clause 
type. If the null -subject form -meaning pairings are varied and frequent enough, 
the child's grammar will formulate a generalised rule of subject expression as dic- 
tated by his predispositions. The rule, however, will be probabilistic since at this 
stage no categorial distinctions can be observed in the input. Empirical support 
for this explanation is given by the observation that target -like null- subject clauses 
are frequent and productive in the child's language, as shown in Table 3.10 on the 
next page. The different types of null- subject constructions in the table were 
categorised on the basis of the context of the utterance. In most cases it is im- 
possible to determine what the underlying structural properties of the utterances 
are. Although imperatives are the most frequent context type, nothing in the data 









1 62 61 21 28 83 
2a 81 72 38 34 119 
2b 71 68 26 38 97 
3a 64 58 34 23 98 
3b 81 36 51 12 132 
4 99 30 70 3 169 
Total 458 240 698 
Mean 54 23 
Table 3.9: Subject omission in utterances with third person actor referents in given and 
new contexts. Contexts where subject ellipsis is licensed in adult English are excluded. 
Stage 
N % Imp % Coord 
TARGET -LIKE SUBJECTS 
Tokens 
% Compl % Ell % Total N 
V Types 
% Null Subj 
1 160 62 0 1 4 67 39 36 
2a 191 28 1 2 5 36 52 40 
2b 213 26 2 2 7 37 78 41 
3a 415 18 3 5 5 31 79 45 
3b 485 13 1 3 5 22 104 41 
4 639 8 2 12 11 33 12,E 43 
Total2103 19 2 6 7 34 124 
Table 3.10: Proportion of target -like null- subject clauses to all correct clauses and cumu- 
lative proportion of verb types occurring in target -like null- subject frames in English 
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The claim made here is therefore not that the child overgeneralises topic -ellipsis 
or imperative constructions, but that he assigns a probability to the occurrence of 
null- subjects in general on the basis of the salience of conceptual structures associ- 
ated with null- subject clauses. The total token frequency of target -like null- subject 
frames is 67% of all target -like clauses at the first stage of the analysis. Token 
frequencies, however, may give a distorted picture of the child's competence, since 
a construction may turn out to be specific to a small set of frequently repeated 
rote -learnt expressions. An indication of type frequency is therefore given in the 
last column of Table 3.10. The figures in each row show the proportion of verb 
types that occur in target -like null- subject frames at the current or any of the pre- 
vious stages to the total number of verb types occurring at the current or any of 
the previous stages. There are two assumptions behind this method. Firstly verb 
type is taken to give a conservative measure of utterance type, merging potentially 
`slotted' semi -productive phrases such as open this and open that. The other as- 
sumption is that if at some stage in development a verb Vi is used by the child with 
a certain frame Fi, that Vi [Fi] construction remains part of the child's linguistic 
knowledge -base at subsequent stages. While this assumption is not uncontroversial, 
the method has the advantage of showing whether the frame tends to be applied 
to newly acquired predicates and of reducing the effect of accidental fluctuations 
due to the small sample sizes. Type and token frequency together then give an in- 
dication of how productive a pattern is relative to the rest of the child's grammar. 
Looking at Table 3.10, we can now see that at Stage 1 the high token frequency of 
the target -like null- subject frame is accompanied by a fairly high type frequency: 
over a third of Peter's verbs appear in this frame. At the next stage, even though 
token frequency is significantly reduced, the increase in type frequency indicates 
that the frame is applied to newly acquired verbs. These results suggest that the 
null- subject frame is highly salient in the child's grammar. 
The distribution of erroneous null subjects is, as we have seen, influenced 
by a pragmatic predisposition and economy principles throughout the null- subject 
period. Development partly consists in the identification of specific environments 
which meet both the default structural and pragmatic conditions of subject -drop 
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but mostly occur with overt subjects in the adult language. There is no reason, 
however, why this in itself should affect the probabilities of implicit subjects in 
other environments. A second process reducing error rates may then be the full 
specification of target -like null- subject clauses. When the child's grammar can 
disambiguate null- subject utterances, the probabilities of overt vs. implicit subjects 
will apply to distinct sets of conceptual structures. The general mechanism of this 
process will be outlined in the last section of this chapter and I now turn to the 
acquisition of subject agreement in Hungarian. 
TARGET -LIKE NULL AGREEMENT 
As was discussed in the previous section, null subjects are structurally licensed in 
child language because the option of projecting clauses at a level lower than CP, be 
it IP or VP, is available. The same option makes it possible to project clauses lack- 
ing agreement identification and is taken to account for what Wexler (1994) terms 
the optional infinitive stage. The analysis of children's uninflected verb forms as 
infinitives is justified by the observation that in languages where finite lexical verbs 
show different word order patterns depending on the finiteness of the verb, children's 
uninflected verbs conform to the non -finite pattern. The clause truncation hypoth- 
esis makes no predictions about subject -drop in pro -drop languages, since finite 
declarative root clauses may equally be analysed as IPs with antecedentless empty 
category specifiers or CPs with pro subjects. It does, however, predict that root 
infinitives should occur in both types of language. Interestingly, the optional infini- 
tive stage is not a universal characteristic of child language. It has been attested in 
overt subject languages, e.g., English, German, Swedish, Norwegian, Dutch (Wexler 
1994), French (Rasetti 2000) and Danish (Hamann & Plunkett 1998) but not in pro - 
drop languages, e.g., Turkish (Aksu -Koc & Slobin 1985), Italian (Hyams 1986) or 
Brazilian Portuguese (Rubino & Pine 1998). As we have seen, root infinitives are 
infrequent in Hungarian as well. The syntactic properties of agreement features 
do not distinguish the two types of language, as we find both weak and strong 
agreement features in the sense of Chomsky (1995) in both groups. The languages 
only contrast in the relative functional role of agreement in subject identification. 
The pragmatic effect in subject omission indicates that children are programmed to 
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assume that subjects must in some way be identified. I argued that the salience of 
null- subject clauses may lead to a grammar where overt subjects are optional and 
identification occurs by discourse antecedents. By the same process, the salience 
of finite verb forms homophonous with the infinitive may lead to the hypothesis 
that subjects are not identified by agreement. In this case, if the grammar obeys 
the least effort principle, agreement features with no phonetic content will not be 
projected and the clause structure will correspond to the structure of non -finite VPs 
in adult grammar. 
The situation is different in languages with rich agreement paradigms. Let 
us look at the surface properties of Hungarian subject agreement. In contrast 
to English, subject identification in Hungarian involves little surface ambiguity 
or optionality. The verb stem marks 3rd person singular indicative only. The 
only pragmatic function expressed by deviation in agreement is formal register, for 
the awareness of which there is no evidence in the children's language. Subject 
agreement marking is essentially noise free with no overlap of verb forms within 
individual tenses and moods'. There are, however, three modal -like verbs that 
inflect for tense but not for subject agreement, all of which occur in the Hungarian 
corpora. These verbs take infinitival complements, as shown in (3.27) below3. Their 
implicit subjects are ambiguous between having arbitrary or specific referents. 
(3.27) a. Alud -ni kell. 
sleep -INF must 
It's necessary to sleep. 
b. Szabad játsza -ni. 
be.allowed play -INF 
Playing is allowed. 
c. Lehet fóz -ni. 
may cook -INF 
Cooking is possible. 
2There is some overlap of verb forms but these cut across tenses (2pl.pres /3pl.past), or involve 
neutralisation of object agreement or of the indicative /subjunctive distinction in certain persons 
of certain morphological classes of verbs. This, in fact, seems to be the source of a significant 
proportion of inflection errors. 
3The examples show "neutral" constituent order, which is determined by 
the higher predicate. 
The details of ordering principles need not concern us here. 
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The sentences in (3.27) also illustrate a further class of locally unidentified sub- 
jects, non -finite verb forms, of which only infinitives occur in the data. Infinitival 
complements and adjuncts are also licensed by certain regular finite main verbs, as 
shown in (3.28): 
(3.28) a. Alud -ni akar -ok. 
sleep -INF want -1SG 
I want to sleep. 
b. Segít -ek f6z-ni. 
help -1SG cook -INF 
I'll help to cook. 
If, as I have claimed, children assume minimal clause structure for which they have 
evidence, why don't impersonal predicates and non -finite clauses lead the Hungarian 
learner to believe that subject marking is optional? The answer to this question may 
be a simple statistical fact: target -like non -finite verb forms are far less frequent 
and far more restricted in their use in Hungarian child language than target -like 
null- subject utterances in English child language. As can be seen in Table 3.11 
on page 80, the proportion of target -like infinitives and impersonal predicates is 
around 15% of all correct clauses in Balázs' samples and even smaller in Zoli's data. 
This figure seems negligible compared to the fact that the subject is implicit in two 
thirds of Peter's target -like clauses in his first sample and in around a third of his 
grammatical clauses at later stages (see Table 3.10 on page 74). The comparison 
of type frequencies gives similar results. While around 40% of Peter's verb lexemes 
appear in target -like null- subject clauses, the corresponding proportions are 15 -18% 
for Balázs and 5 -24% for Zoli. 
The comparison of target -like subject identification patterns in the two lan- 
guages is then compatible with the suggestion that the Hungarian learner does not 
overgeneralise null- agreement across the board because it is tied to a small set of 
contexts in his grammar. It is of course difficult to independently determine how 
small is small enough for overgeneralisation not to occur. What can provide some 
support for the claim is evidence that differences in the frequencies of target -like 
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constructions correlate with variations in error patterns. We would further expect 
that the nature or magnitude of differences in probabilities affects the nature or 
magnitude of the errors. In support of this hypothesis, the following paragraphs 
will discuss the two Hungarian children's subject agreement errors. We will see that 
although the children do not formulate a general rule of agreement optionality, they 
do overapply null- agreement in a restricted domain. It will further be shown that 
the two error patterns differ in ways which are predictable in part from the token 
and type frequencies of the target -like null- agreement constructions presented in 
Table 3.11. 
Tables 3.12 and 3.13 on the following page show the details of morphosyn- 
tactic subject agreement errors that make up at least 3% of all errors for Zoli and 
Balázs respectively. Sporadic and morphophonological errors are not shown. The 
first column lists the person- denotation of the agreement suffix erroneously used 
by the child and the second column indicates the target person for each of the 
morphemes in the first column as determined by contextual information. The fre- 
quencies express the proportion of cases where the erroneous form is substituted for 
the target at each stage. The first data row of Table 3.12, for instance, reads as: the 
verb stem is used for 1st or 2nd person agreement in 11% of all 1st or 2nd person 
targets at stage 1, in 3% of all 1st or 2nd person targets at stage 2, etc. The 
first data rows of the tables show that inflection omission is an infrequent error for 
both children. A large proportion of these verb forms are phonological fragments 
with not only the agreement suffix but also the final consonant of the stem omitted, 
which indicates a production error: 
(3.29) a. ebú. (elbúj -ok) (Zoli 1;8) 
hide (hide -lsG) 
I'll hide. 
b. ké. (kér -em) (Zoli 1;8) 
want (want -1sG) 
I want it. 
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N % Unid N 
Balázs 
Tokens V Types 
% Unid N % Unid 
1 361 3 51 8 125 13 58 15 
2 422 1 87 5 100 14 74 16 
3 279 6 103 15 102 14 92 17 
4 392 8 139 24 157 15 127 18 
Total 145.E 139 48.E 127 
Table 3.11: Proportion of target -like clauses with no subject identification to all target - 
like clauses and cumulative proportion of verb types that correctly occur uninflected for 
subject agreement 
Zoli Target % of target at each stage 
1 2 3 4 Total 
stem lst/2nd 11 (27) 3 (11) 3 (7) 4 (13) 5 (58) 
1st 2nd 29 (23) 1 (1) 2 (1) 3 (2) 8 (27) 
2nd 1st 11 (18) 2 (4) 2 (3) 0 (1) 3 (26) 
inf imp /subj 2 (2) 2 (3) 6 (5) 15 (10) 5 (20) 
Table 3.12: Frequency of types of Zoli's subject agreement errors expressed as percentage 
of each target verb form. The number of error tokens is given in brackets. 
Balázs Target 
1 
% of target at each stage 
2 3 4 Total 
stem lst/2nd 1 (1) 2 (2) 10 (7) 1 (1) 3 (11) 
1st 2nd 12 (2) 0 (0) 7 (1) 0 (0) 3 (3) 
2nd 1st 6 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (4) 
inf imp /subj 88 (23) 42 (10) 22 (12) 43 (12) 51 (49) 
Table 3.13: Frequency of types of Balázs' subject agreement errors expressed as percentage 
of each target verb form. The number of error tokens is given in brackets. 
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From Stage 3 onwards in Zoli's data inflection omission mostly affects the verb kér 
(want), which is similar both in its phonology and in its argument- semantics to the 
impersonal modal verb kell (need). The data show clear evidence for the child's 
association of the two verbs - but discussion of this will be deferred till the next 
chapter. 
The second and third data rows show person reversal errors, where the child 
marks the verb for first person agreement in utterances whose conceptual subject 
is the addressee or for second person agreement in utterances intended to refer to 
the speaker as actor: 
(3.30) a. hoz -om a malacot, jo? (hoz -d) (Balázs 2;3) 
bring -1sG the pig good (bring- 2sG.suBJ) 
Bring the pig, will you? 
b. szeret -ed. (szeret -ern) (Balázs 2;3) 
like -2sG (like -lsG) 
I like it. 
This error type is relatively common at the first stage for both children. Person 
reversal errors are generally attributed to young children's conceptual difficulty with 
the reference shifting properties of deictic items and will not be discussed here (see 
Werner et al. 2001 for a recent discussion of the effects of the nature of the input 
on the development of person deixis). 
The last rows of Tables 3.12 and 3.13 show errors where we find root infini- 
tives in contexts where imperative forms or 1st person plural subjunctive would be 
appropriate: 
(3.31) a. fölmen -ni, jo? (men -junk föl) ( Balázs 2;3) 
up.go -INF good (go- 1PL.sUBJ up) 
Let's go up, shall we? 
b. fog -ni, jo? (fog -d) (Balázs 2;3) 
hold -INF good (hold- 2sG.suBJ) 
Hold it, will you? 
81 
The frequency patterns of this error type differ greatly between the two children. 
In Zoli's data root infinitives are negligibly rare at the first two stages (2% of im- 
perative /subjunctive contexts) and become somewhat more frequent at subsequent 
stages (6% and 15% of imperative /subjunctive contexts). In other contexts root 
infinitives do not occur. For Balázs, this is the most common error type throughout 
the corpus, with an error rate of 88% of imperative /subjunctive contexts at the 
first stage and 22 to 43% at later stages. Initially root infinitives sporadically occur 
in descriptive contexts as well (2 %) but from the second stage onwards their use 
is restricted to command /request contexts. Examining the children's target -like 
infinitival constructions, we find that root infinitives become frequent at the same 
time as infinitival verb forms start to be productively used as complements of verbs 
of wanting and the modal verb kell (need). In the first two of Zoli's samples both 
the token and type frequencies of target -like infinitives are low (see Table 3.11 on 
page 80) and their contexts are largely restricted to adjuncts of the verb megy (go). 
At the third stage, however, we see a a sudden increase in verb type frequency, 
suggesting that infinitival complements now form part of the child's grammar. In 
Balázs's data infinitives frequently appear as complements of verbs of wanting and 
kell from the beginning of the studied period and a fairly large proportion of verb 
types are used in infinitival form in target -like constructions. When infinitival com- 
plement structures become productive, the children have two ways of expressing 
requests /obligation: by using a verb of wanting or obligation with an infinitival 
complement and by inflected subjunctive /imperative verb forms. They formulate 
a third option, root infinitives. Table 3.14 on page 86 shows the distribution of the 
three types of construction and indicative or indeterminate verb forms uttered to 
express requests /obligation by the two children. As we can see, of the two target - 
like options Zoli's preference is imperative /subjunctive verb forms, while Balázs 
prefers infinitival complement constructions and this bias is strongly reflected in 
the probabilities of root infinitives being produced. It seems then that if the in- 
finitive is generated in a large enough set of subcontexts, it may be generalised 
and associated with the pragmatic function of request, which, in some cases, allows 
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unidentified subject arguments. The increased probability of target -like infinitives 
at the early stages of acquisition seems to encourage this process. 
3.1.4 Summary 
The above discussion has shown that subject identification may be optional both 
in English and in Hungarian child language. The domain of optionality is to some 
extent restricted in both languages: to contexts where subjects are identified in 
discourse in English and to certain modal contexts in Hungarian. Within these en- 
vironments subjects are unidentified with different degrees of probability at various 
developmental stages. I have suggested that this variation is not accidental but can 
be attributed to differences in the relevant properties of the target languages and 
their representations in the children's grammars. Target -like null- subject clauses in 
English are frequent and productive and their analysis is indeterminate. Hungarian 
infinitives, on the other hand, are restricted in their use and are structurally unam- 
biguous. Root infinitives in Hungarian further demonstrate that error patterns may 
be derived from the properties of individual learners' grammars. It was shown that 
the size of a context set with which a target -like construction is associated and the 
frequency of that construction within that context set are important parameters in 
predicting the domain and the extent of the error based on that construction. 
3.2 Object omission 
3.2.1 Pragmatic and processing explanations 
As was shown in Table 3.1 at the beginning of this chapter, object omission is signif- 
icantly less frequent than subject omission both in English and in Hungarian child 
language. These findings are typical of object -drop and non -object -drop languages 
(Vahan 1991, Bloom 1990, Wang et al. 1992). Greenfield & Smith's (1976) Princi- 
ple of Informativeness seems to account for differences in object and subject -drop 
rates in languages where implicit arguments are freely allowed. The data from the 
two Hungarian children support this hypothesis. Subject -drop rate is only higher 
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in non -third person contexts (around 90 %), where identification occurs by agree- 
ment, while pro -drop rate in third person contexts, where identification occurs by 
discourse, is not consistently different from object -drop rate (both around 40 -60 %, 
see Table 3.1 on page 49 and Table 3.8 on page 67). We have also seen that the 
pragmatic principle is to some extent observed in the acquisition of English. Pro- 
vided that object omission is not simply a random performance error, it is expected 
to be affected by pragmatic context similarly to the subject -drop phenomenon. If 
this is the case and argument omission is independent of other factors, we should 
further find that the frequency of object omission in contexts where the referent of 
the THEME argument is identified in discourse is comparable to the frequency of 
subject omission. 
The discourse pragmatic analysis of referent identification described previ- 
ously was carried out on Peter's clauses with verbs that subcategorise for an oblig- 
atory NP object complement. Examples for expressed given objects, omitted given 
.objects, expressed new objects and omitted new objects are given below: 
(3.32) PET: more tape. 
INV: what are you gonna do with it? 
PET: put it on there. (2;1) 
(3.33) PET: want that barrette. 
INV: what? 
PET: that barrette, that barrette. 
INV: what about that barrette? 
PET: put in my hair. (2;4) 
(3.34) PET: sit down, sit down here, down. 
INV: sit down? uhu, sit down. 
PET: all finished. put this down. (2;1) 
(3.35) INV: you tired? 
PET: there. 
INV: there, what do you do? 
PET: put in there. (2;1) 
INV: what did you put in there? 
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The difference between the likelihood of object omission in given and new contexts 
shown in Table 3.15 on the next page is statistically significant for all but the 
last stage (X2 =12.75 p < .001; X2 =4.88 p < .05; X2 =12.38 p < .001; x2 =10.85 
p < .001; X2 =13.18 p < .001 from Stage 1 to 3b). In given contexts object omission 
occurs with non -negligible frequency (26 -1 %), suggesting that the mapping of the 
object arguments of obligatory transitive verbs is to some extent optional in the 
child's grammar. The probability of implicit discourse -identified objects, however, 
is still considerably lower than the frequency of dropped subjects (72 -30 %). 
Bloom (1990) suggests a processing explanation for the subject- object asym- 
metry. The processing load, he argues, is heaviest at the beginning of the utterance 
and gradually decreases thereafter. When the child plans the production of the 
utterance, the most effective strategy in reducing processing effort is to omit utter- 
ance initial elements. This hypothesis predicts that if for some reason, say because 
the subject argument is new information, the subject is overt, the heavy process- 
ing load will be alleviated by omitting internal arguments. Object omission should 
then be more frequent in utterances with overt subjects than in null- subject ut- 
terances. In Table 3.16 on page 89 obligatory transitive contexts are divided into 
four conditions: (a) utterances with no non -object argument; (b) utterances where 
the subject is expressed and no oblique arguments occur; (c) utterances with unex- 
pressed subjects and one or more oblique arguments; and (d) utterances with overt 
subjects and one or more oblique arguments: 
(3.36) a. make a car. (2;2) 
b. I writing circles. (2;2) 
c. put this in there. (2;3) 
d. I'm writing my name on bag. (2;3) 
Contrary to predictions, the likelihood of object omission is independent of 
the presence of overt subjects. It is also evident, however, that not only utterance 
initial elements are affected by the processing pressure. While null objects are 
negligibly rare both in null subject and overt subject clauses where no oblique 
arguments occur (under 10 %), the likelihood of object omission does increase with 
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Stage REQUEST /OBLIGATION CONTEXTS 
N %Imp 
Zolfi 
%V +inf %Inf %Ind N %Imp 
Balázs 
%V +inf %Inf %Ind 
1 115 66 2 2 30 43 7 32 53 7 
2 186 91 2 2 6 39 36 26 26 13 
3 96 77 10 5 8 32 44 31 12 12 
4 89 64 21 11 3 45 35 35 27 2 
Table 3.14: Frequency of subjunctive /imperative verb forms, verb + infinitive con- 









1 61 26 41 0 102 
2a 93 22 58 9 151 
213 127 26 86 7 213 
3a 143 17 134 4 277 
31D 176 7 187 0 363 
4 142 1 136 1 278 
Total 742 642 1384 
Mean 16 3 
Table 3.15: Rate of object omission in given and new contexts with obligatory transitive 
verbs in English 
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the projection of oblique arguments regardless of subject expression (up to 53 %). 
The difference in object omission rate between the `no non -object arguments' and 
the `oblique arguments' contexts is highly significant (p< .001) at the first three 
stages (X2 = 13.64; x2 = 13.34; X2 = 10.95); and significant at the 5% level at Stage 
3b (X2 = 6.07). It does not reach statistical significance at Stages 3a or 4. 
An alternative processing explanation is proposed by Gerken (1991). Gerken 
provides experimental evidence that two -year -old children are more likely to omit 
the unstressed syllable of an iambic foot (e.g., he RUNS) than the unstressed syllable 
of a trochaic foot (e.g, EAT it). This difference provides a convincing account of 
the subject- object asymmetry in argument omission, as well as of the omission 
of determiners and the unstressed first syllable of words (e.g., baNAna) in child 
language. The tendency to omit unstressed first syllables seems to be independent 
of the position of the iambic foot in the utterance. In a sentence imitation task, 
subject pronouns were as likely to be omitted (32 %) as the articles of object NPs 
(28 %) in iambic feet (e.g., he KISSED + the LAMB) and both were more likely to 
be omitted than object pronouns (PETE + KISSED her) (1 %) or object articles 
(PETE + KISSED the + LAMB) (12 %) in trochaic feet. Based on these results 
Gerken argues that the effect of metrical structure is independent of the syntactic 
organisation of the sentence. If this is the case, we should find that the omission of 
object pronouns in iambic feet is as frequent as the omission of subject pronouns. 
The relevant utterances are those with overt unstressed subject pronouns and overt 
stressed adverbs or particles as in (3.37): 
(3.37) a. she PUT + it THERE 
b. you TURNED + it DOWN 
As the number of test utterances is small in Peter's samples, the results in Ta- 
ble 3.17 on page 89 are combined for Stages 2a and 2b and for Stages 3a and 3b. 
The utterances are classed into four categories: (a) where both the subject and 
object pronouns are overt (she put it there); (b) where the subject is omitted (put 
it there); (c) where the object is omitted (she put there); and (d) where both argu- 
ments are omitted (put there). If the omission of unstressed pronouns is independent 
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of syntactic categorisation, we should find that utterances of type (b) and (c) oc- 
cur with equal frequency, as both involve the deletion of the unstressed syllable of 
an iambic foot and utterance length is held constant. The results show, however, 
that while the object -only pattern occurs in 56 -33% of utterances, the subject -only 
pattern makes up only 5 -0% of cases. A possible explanation may be that when 
the subject is omitted, the metrical structure of the utterance is reanalysed, such 
that the object pronoun forms part of a trochaic foot with the verb (PUT it + 
THERE). As a similar reanalysis is not available when the object is omitted (she 
PUT + THERE), subject omission is a more effective strategy in converting met- 
rical structure. Gerken, however, reports no significant differences in the sentence 
imitation task between the likelihood of subject pronoun omission (39 %) and object 
article omission (28 %) in utterances of the type "she KISSED the LAMB ", which 
are identical in metrical structure to sentences of type (3.37). The contradiction 
may be resolved on the assumption that metrical analysis is not independent of 
syntactic analysis. The results suggest that while children are reluctant to group 
the verb and the following article into a. metrical foot, they readily do so with the 
verb and the following object pronoun. Note, however, that syntactic constituent 
analysis does not in itself motivate the grouping of objects with the preceding verb 
in sentences like (3.37), it merely allows it. The motivation may come from either 
of two sources: the child's grammar may assign a low probability to object omis- 
sion on syntactic /semantic grounds, in which case the metrical reanalysis of object 
pronouns is simply a by- product of other processes and the metrical advantage of 
object position will only have a secondary lowering effect on omission rates; or the 
child's cognitive system may obey some processing principle which has the effect 
of imposing the trochaic foot analysis on syllable sequences whenever the metrical 
properties and the constituent analysis of the sentence allow it. 
Gerken proposes that children have available (innate or acquired) phonolog- 
ical templates, whose production requires less processing effort than the generation 
of novel phonological structures. To alleviate processing load, young children resort 
to templates in their production of utterances. One such template would be the 
trochaic foot. The omission of a weak syllable preceding the head of the metrical 
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1 60 7 10 0 29 40 3 33 102 
2a 55 2 23 4 54 26 19 53 151 
2b 63 9 37 0 86 32 27 18 213 
3a 79 9 103 7 56 18 39 15 277 
3b 75 0 176 2 51 8 61 6 363 
4 43 2 111 0 54 4 70 1 278 
Total 375 460 330 219 1384 
Mean 5 2 21 21 
Table 3.16: Proportion of unexpressed objects with obligatory transitive verbs according 
to utterance complexity 
Stage 
N % Subj +Obj 
"she put it there" 
% Obj % Subj % None 
1 18 5 56 5 33 
2 63 16 41 5 38 
3 57 54 33 2 10 
4 41 56 41 0 2 
Total 179 
Mean 33 43 3 21 
Table 3.17: Overt pronominal and omitted objects and subjects in utterances with stressed 
oblique arguments 
89 
foot allows the trochaic template to be applied and thus processing load will be 
reduced. As the author notes, however, positing an innate trochaic template is 
undesirable, as the dominance of trochaic feet is not a universal property of lan- 
guages. The alternative is that children create the template on the basis of the 
metrical properties of the target language. Children acquiring English create a 
trochaic template, she suggests, because this is the most common foot type in En- 
glish words. It is not clear, however, why children should create the template on the 
basis of their perception of isolated words but apply it in their production across 
word boundaries. If, on the other hand, the template is created on the basis of the 
child's perception of word combinations, it needs to be explained why trochaic feet 
such as the verb -object pronoun sequence are more salient for the child than iambic 
feet such as the subject pronoun -verb sequence. It does not appear to be the case 
that children have a biological difficulty perceiving foot initial weak syllables. In 
Gerken's experiments the children with a mean MLU of 2.54 successfully repeated 
pronominal subjects in 68% of utterances. 
A second problem for the processing explanation is that, as we have seen, 
economy considerations do not seem to override syntactic constraints. Subjects will 
only be omitted to alleviate processing load if they are specified as optional by the 
grammar. Factors of competence are known to surface not only in spontaneous 
production but also in a sentence imitation task. An example for this effect in 
Gerken's study is the finding that children substituted pronouns for lexical subjects 
in over 20% of trials, which suggests that the test sentences were analysed prior to 
imitation and the children's production may have been affected by syntactic factors 
in addition to metrical factors. If neither the creation nor the application of the 
trochaic template is independent of the child's grammatical competence, it is plau- 
sible that object pronouns tend to be grouped with the preceding strong syllable, 
and thus placed in a preferred metrical position, because the grammar assigns a 
low probability to the licensing of implicit objects with obligatory transitive verbs. 
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3.2.2 Classes of transitive verbs 
DISTRIBUTIONAL CLASSES 
To maintain that the child is motivated by his experience of unexpressed conceptual 
subjects in hypothesising subject optionality, it needs to be explained why unex- 
pressed conceptual objects do not lead to a similar degree of optionality in object 
mapping. I have posited three parameters that predict the extent of overgenerali- 
sation of optionality: the overall probabilities of the two alternatives as determined 
by the learner's intake of the primary linguistic data; the probability of conceptual 
structures, lexical and extra -lexical, associated with the null- argument construction; 
and the degree of indeterminacy in the process of matching semantic representa- 
tions to labelled syntactic structures and vice versa. The following sections look at 
these parameters with reference to transitivity. 
The low rate of object omission with obligatory transitive verbs suggests 
that different distributional types of bivalent verbs are distinguished by the child. 
Table 3.18 on page 93 summarises the object expression data for all transitive 
verb types. Peter's verbs fall into four distributional classes: transitive predicates 
subcategorising for an obligatory NP object; predicates subcategorising for an event 
or proposition type argument which may be syntactically realised as an object NP 
or a finite or non -finite clausal complement (want, say); ergative verbs allowing 
both causative and unaccusative mapping patterns (break, close, roll etc.); and 
predicates allowing object drop in certain pragmatic contexts (eat, drive, watch, 
catch etc.). As before, it is assumed that each transitive predicate has a single 
lexical entry, some with alternative mapping options. Homonymous verb forms are 
treated as separate lexical items, e.g., get a pen vs. get on the horsie. The figures in 
the `event', `ergative' and `optional' columns refer to the proportion of unexpressed 
THEME arguments to all clauses headed by the verbs in the respective groups. 
For ergative predicates an expressed THEME may appear pre- or post -verbally, for 
predicates subcategorising for event or proposition complements, expressed THEMES 
include non -NP complements. As Table 3.18 shows, there are large differences 
between predicates of different distributional types. The object is very infrequently 
omitted with verbs whose THEME arguments must be expressed and can only be 
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mapped as postverbal complements. THEME omission is somewhat more frequent 
with ergative predicates whose mapping options allow empty object slots. With 
these predicates utterances containing expressed actors and unexpressed themes 
(e.g., I broke), which unambiguously indicates the omission of the object function, 
occur negligibly infrequently (0 to 6% in individual files). Overt themes tend to 
appear postverbally (e.g., broke that). Finally, object drop rate with predicates 
whose THEME arguments are optionally expressed is comparable to the proportion 
of implicit objects in Hungarian child language. 
The child's grammar therefore allows unexpressed conceptual objects but 
object optionality, unlike subject optionality, is verb specific. Why should this be 
so? One possible reason may be found in the relative frequencies of verbs subcate- 
gorising for an obligatorily expressed object NP and verbs whose THEME arguments 
may be implicit under certain pragmatic conditions. The proportions of target -like 
implicit objects to all target -like utterances with the two classes of verbs are shown 
in Table 3.19 on the next page. An utterance was classed as target -like if the argu- 
ment frame conforms to the mapping patterns licensed by the predicate regardless of 
whether the pragmatic conditions of object -drop are met. The discourse pragmatics 
of the child's utterances will be discussed shortly. 
Null object frames make up 10% of target -like utterances at the first stage 
and occur with 17% of transitive verb types. In contrast, the subject is implicit 
in 67% of Peter's target -like utterances and the proportion of verb types occurring 
with null subjects is 36% (see Table 3.10 on page 74 above). Type frequencies 
were calculated cumulatively, as described previously. Although at later stages 
the probability of object -drop increases, neither token frequency nor lexical type 
frequency reaches the corresponding proportions of subject -drop. 
STRUCTURAL AND PRAGMATIC CLASSES 
The process of acquiring object mapping patterns is different from subject iden- 
tification in that the structural analysis of implicit objects involves less complex 
category labelling options. The implicit objects of optional transitive verbs occur- 
ring in the data fall into two major structural classes, which are also distinguished 

















1 102 16 0 - 48 23 20 55 241 72 84 48 
2 351 18 18 0 50 32 121 70 192 64 56 57 
3 614 7 51 2 44 28 247 51 147 60 70 44 
4 252 2 105 0 15 11 139 58 301 62 81 42 
Total 1319 174 157 527 881 291 
Mean 11 1 23 58 64 48 




TARGET -LIKE OBJECTS 
V types 
% Impl N % Impl 
1 106 10 30 17 
2a 186 24 33 18 
2b 23.E 20 39 20 
3a 371 18 51 21 
313 474 13 64 20 
4 397 21 67 21 
Total 1768 67 
Table 3.19: Proportion of target -like implicit objects to all target -like utterances with 
optional and obligatory transitive verbs and cumulative proportion of verb types occurring 
with target -like implicit objects in English 
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topic THEMES. The unspecified object subclass comprises 8 verbs in the data, which 
occur in a total of 58% of utterance tokens with optional object predicates. The 
remaining 6 verbs in the optional object class allow topic -drop. In adult grammar in 
addition to these two classes the object of a verb subcategorising for an obligatory 
object argument may be shared with co- ordinate predicates resulting in a structural 
configuration where the object is unsaturated in the local surface argument frame. 
This occurs in sentences with discontinuous VPs, as in (3.38a) or co- ordinated Vs, 
as in (3.38b). However, neither of these structures occurs in the corpus. 
(3.38) a. The pirates tossed and Hook tied the children. 
b. The pirates tossed and then tied the children. 
Indefinite THEME arguments of events denoting processes are not mapped onto the 
syntactic representation when covert (Williams 1987). To avoid violation of the 
uniform theta assignment hypothesis (Baker 1988), which requires a uniform map- 
ping between thematic structure and syntactic structure, either two lexical entries 
need to be postulated for predicates allowing unexpressed object arguments or we . 
need a mechanism that allows selection from among alternative thematic specifica- 
tions incorporated in a single entry. As was mentioned previously, the single entry 
approach is adopted here, as it has the advantage of capturing the intuition that 
the core meaning of a verb is shared by its different uses. In Pustejovsky's (1995) 
framework, multiple syntactic argument frames may be derived from a single lexical 
entry by decomposing the event denoted by predicate P into a set of temporally 
ordered subevents, each of which selects its argument specifications from the pool 
of arguments that P may subcategorise for. For each act of uttering a sentence 
with P, one and only one subevent is selected as the head of the event and it is the 
arguments specified by the head which are projected into syntactic structure. The 
events in the unspecified object alternation class can be analysed as denoting two 
partially overlapping subevents. In the lexical structure of the verb eat, for instance, 
the first subevent, el, may be conceptualised as an intransitive process of `feeding', 
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selecting only argument x from the pool; and the second, e2, as a transitive process 





ARG1 x : animate_ind 
ARG2 y : f ood 
E1 el : process 
E2 e2 : process 
RESTR Goa 
HEAD 
AGENTIVE eat_act(el, x), 
consume_act(e2i x, y) 
If el is foregrounded in conceptual structure, it is selected as the head of the event 
and its argument specifications (x) are mapped onto syntactic structure, while 
any non -selected arguments remain unexpressed. Conversely, when the transitive 
subevent e2 is foregrounded, arguments (x,y) are mapped. Whether a predicate 
allows the unspecified object alternation is then determined by its event semantics. 
Whether an implicit object is felicitous in individual utterances, i.e., the conditions 
of event -head selection, is on the other hand determined by pragmatic context. 
The THEME may be unexpressed provided that it is indefinite (Fillmore 1986, Levin 
1993): 
(3.40) A: What's Owl doing? 
B: He's reading. /He's reading Christopher's notice. 
(3.41) A: What's Owl doing with Christopher's notice? 
B: *He's reading. /He's reading it. 
Unmapped objects are also licensed by predicates whose lexical semantics speci- 
fies a default THEME argument. Levin (1993) lists two major subgroups of this 
type. Certain verbs receive reflexive or reciprocal interpretation when the THEME 
4Pustejovsky's generative mechanism is interpreted loosely in this analysis. The technical 
details, however, are irrelevant for my discussion. 
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is unexpressed (e.g., dress, wash, meet, fight); others can be used to describe some 
characteristic property of the subject argument and the implicit THEME receives 
generic interpretation (e.g., bite, sting, cut). 
The second structural class of implicit objects may occur in contexts where 
the referent of the object is salient in discourse. Unexpressed objects of this type 
are analysed by Haegeman (2000) as phonetically null operators occupying the 
left peripheral position of the clause, which is the surface position of topicalised 
arguments when overt. The option of topic -drop is not intrinsically tied to the 
semantic properties of lexical items. However, to what extent object topics are 
licensed to be implicit is a language specific property. In English object -drop seems 
to be restricted to quasi- idiomatic usage. Verbs that allow the omission of topic 
objects, do not allow the omission of arbitrary individuated THEME arguments and 
vice versa. The examples in (3.43c) are infelicitous when the understood object is 
some individual entity not recoverable from context: 
(3.42) A: There is somethings in there. 
B: Let me see eci. /Show eci me! /I can't reach eci. 
B': *Let me eat eci./ *Read eci me! 
(3.43) a. Owl's trying to read /eat /draw ... 
b. * Owl's trying to catch /throw /show. 
c. % Owl's trying to reach /see /watch. 
Since the analysis of the first structural type follows from the semantics of the verb, 
knowledge of the verb's meaning determines its mapping options. Young children's 
sensitivity to correspondences between event semantics and syntactic subcategorisa- 
tion frames has been demonstrated in a series of experiments (e.g., Naigles & Kako 
1993, Fisher et al. 1994, Naigles 1996). In particular, Naigles (1996) reports that 
two -year olds associate novel verbs presented in the two syntactic frames defining 
the unspecified object alternation with unbounded contact activity rather than with 
causative telic events. Conversely, for novel verbs presented in pairs of causative 
and unaccusative frames, the causative telic interpretation is preferred. Although 
these experiments are aimed at providing evidence for the plausibility of acquiring 
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verb meanings from syntactic cues, what they unquestionably show is that children 
can categorise events and different event categories are expected to correspond to 
distinct distributional classes. 
A predisposition of this kind, however, cannot be exploited in the acquisition 
of the restrictions on implicit subjects. Although imperatives and elliptical answers 
tend to occur with bounded or unbounded activities and elliptical questions with 
states or unbounded activities, the classification is fuzzy and there is some overlap 
between structural classes. Moreover, there do not seem to be verb -type specific 
restrictions on topic drop in non -reply declarative utterances: 
(3.44) a. Come! /Put it down! 
b. *Like that! / *Want one! 
c. Don't be afraid! /Believe me! 
(3.45) a. Like that ? /Want one? /Believe me? /Coming? 
b. ??Put(ting) it down? 
(3.46) a. Came home late. 
b. Believed every word she said. 
c. Like that. 
Children's sensitivity to lexical structure in determining mapping options is, how- 
ever, insufficient as an explanation for the infrequent occurrence of omitted objects 
with obligatory transitive verbs. As was discussed in Chapter 1, overgeneralisa- 
tion of lexical alternation rules (or mapping patterns) is a common phenomenon 
in child language. In particular, the occurrence of causativised intransitive verbs 
observed by e.g., Bowerman (1982) suggests that event structures corresponding to 
unattested syntactic frames may be created: 
(3.47) a. don't giggle me. 
b. baby fall down Daddy shirt. 
c. I disappeared it. 
What prevents the child from overgeneralising the unspecified object alternation? 
Since object omission does occasionally occur, it is in principle possible that it is 
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the result of an overgeneralisation process. We have seen, however, that the objects 
of obligatory transitive verbs are more likely to be omitted in given contexts than in 
new contexts. This tendency does not correspond to the pragmatic restrictions on 
object optionality with eat -type verbs. Provided that the child observes the prag- 
matic conditions of the latter type, it is safe to conclude that the unspecified object 
alternation is not overgeneralised. Rispoli (1995) reports results on 40 children's 
expression of the THEME argument of the verb eat. The author finds that when 
MLU reaches 2.4, which corresponds to Peter's MLU at Stage 1, children start 
distinguishing contexts where the theme is accessible (given in discourse) versus 
non -accessible (not given in discourse, non -specific). In the following analysis the 
object of the test utterance is taken to be accessible if one or more of the preced- 
ing utterances within the same episode include verbal reference to it. It is classed 
as non -accessible otherwise'. Examples for expressed accessible, omitted accessi- 
ble, expressed non -accessible, and omitted non- accessible object contexts are given 
below: 
(3.48) INV: can you give me the other ones like this? 
PET: this? 
INV: mmhm. 
PET: [... ] gonna eat them. (2;2) 
(3.49) INV: did you make that one? I thought that was Patsy's [drawing of a] 
car. 
PET: my write. (2;1) 
(3.50) INV: now what are they going to do? shall they all ride around in a circle? 
PET: yeah. 
INV: can you put them in a circle? 
PET: circle, and a circle, and a baby, this is gonna ride a cow. (2;6) 
(3.51) INV: where's the daddy? would he like to ride? 
PET: where's a daddy? ride, the daddy ride. (2;1) 
5This method is slightly less stringent than Rispoli's, who discarded the first utterances of child 
initiated episodes. The method here was relaxed for direct comparability with the results of the 
given /new distinction in subject omission and object omission with obligatory transitive verbs. 
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As Table 3.20 on page 105 shows Rispoli's findings are replicated in Peter's data 
with all verbs that the discourse rule holds for (eat, drink, play, write, draw, read, 
ride, drive). Although numbers are too low at the first stage for statistical analysis, 
the difference is highly significant (p < .001) in the remaining samples (x2 = 17.30; 
X2 = 10.86; x2 = 13.71; x2 = 18.48; X2 = 34.67). Erroneous omission of 
accessible objects occurs with non -negligible frequency at the initial stages (36- 
28 %), although this is not significantly higher than object omission with obligatory 
transitive verbs in given contexts (26 -22 %, see Table 3.15 on page 86). Unexpressed 
unspecified objects, however, are several times more likely to occur with this class 
(90 -55 %) than with the obligatory transitive class (9 -0 %). That is, while the 
probability assigned to mapping conceptual objects as an empty category is not 
specific to predicate types, intransitive subevents are not hypothesised in the lexical 
representations of obligatory transitive verbs. 
The lack of overgeneralisation could be explained on the assumption that 
whether a predicate allows an atelic process interpretation can be deduced from the 
meaning components established from extra- linguistic situational cues. The core 
meaning of punctual achievements, such as pop, for instance, conceptually excludes 
the possibility of an unbounded process interpretation. However, the syntactic con- 
trast between pairs of predicates such as eat /devour and drink /gulp demonstrates 
that overlap in core meanings does not necessarily imply shared Aktionsart type: 
(3.52) a. Dorothy ate her last biscuit quickly. 
b. Dorothy ate quickly. 
(3.53) a. Dorothy devoured her last biscuit. 
b. * Dorothy devoured. 
Some empirical evidence against the hypothesis that the child builds syntactic 
frames on the basis of verb meanings comes from Peter's usage of the verb make. 
This verb occurs as a synonym of the verbs draw and write, as well as in other uses: 
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(3.54) a. INV: what are you going to write? 
PET: a car. make a car. (2;1) 
b. INV: you're writing circle, ok. 
PET: circles. make daddy circles. (2 ;2) 
(3.55) a. make coffee Mama. (2 ;2) 
b. make the train go. (2;2) 
In utterances with the verbs draw and write 72% (77/108) of objects are implicit, 
while the object of make is omitted in only 2% (1/40) of utterances referring to writ- 
ing /drawing events and 10% (2/20) of utterances in other contexts. This suggests 
that the verb make is syntactically categorised with verbs denoting telic events, 
even though it may be used apparently synonymously with verbs that can denote 
unbounded activities. But if the occurrence versus non -occurrence of intransitive 
frames contributes to the acquisition of event structure, the argument that the low 
probability of object omission is explained by the learner's ability to categorise 
events becomes circular. The statistical properties of the child's input /intake com- 
bined with the fact that there is a relatively straightforward correspondence between 
syntactic structure and semantic structure to which children are sensitive, however, 
can account for the rapid acquisition of object mapping patterns. The details of this 
process and its comparison to the acquisition of subject projection are discussed in 
the last section. 
3.2.3 Summary 
In summary, the main findings of the analysis of Peter's transitive utterances are the 
following. The pragmatic predisposition to omit recoverable information manifests 
itself in object omission in that discourse -given objects of obligatory transitive verbs 
are more likely to be omitted than new objects. Erroneous omission of given objects 
was also observed in utterances with optional transitive verbs. The frequency of im- 
plicit given objects, however, does not approach the frequency of implicit subjects. 
It was shown that neither the least effort principle nor a metrical approach can ac- 
count for this difference. It is a fact of the child's competence that objects specified 
in conceptual representation should be mapped onto the syntactic representation. 
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The pragmatic principles governing the unspecified object alternation are 
observed by the child: non -specific THEME arguments of alternating verbs are more 
likely to be unexpressed than specific THEMES. The availability of an event struc- 
ture type where an intransitive subevent may be selected as the head, however, does 
not lead to a hypothesis that it can be freely created. The lack of overgeneralisa- 
tion does not seem to follow from principles determining possible lexical -conceptual 
structures. It can only be explained by assuming that children exploit syntax -to- 
semantics correspondences in building event structures. 
3.3 The learning process 
As there appear to be no conceptual constraints preventing the overgeneralisation 
of the unspecified object alternation and there is evidence in the data that the topic - 
drop option is overused, let us consider the possibility that not only topic -drop but 
also the unspecified object alternation may in principle be overgeneralised to some 
extent. The observed differences can then be attributed to the hypothesis that 
recovery from the latter error is effectively instantaneous. In Chapter 1 I argued 
that sensitivity to the statistical properties of lexical alternation phenomena in 
the input /intake seems to be a prerequisite to recovery from overgeneralisation on 
logical grounds. The proposed principle in (1.17) underlying the use of indirect 
negative evidence in this process is repeated here as (3.56): 
(3.56) The output construction Co of a lexical rule R is ungrammatical iff 
a. no (or negligibly few) utterances occur which are equivalent to Co; 
and 
b. the input construction Ci of R occurs with sufficient frequency. 
Since the above discussion characterised the unspecified object alternation in terms 
of alternative mapping options rather than lexical rules, the principle will need to 
be reformulated: 
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(3.57) Given two alternative subcategorisation frames C1 and C2 observed for 
predicate Pi, C2 is ungrammatical with reference to Poi iff 
a. no (or negligibly few) utterances occur which are equivalent to C2; 
and 
b. C1 occurs with sufficient frequency. 
The indirect negative evidence principle should ensure recovery from overgener- 
alisation whether we consider the creative application of syntax -to- semantics or 
semantics -to- syntax mapping principles. In the first case, the child observes that 
predicate Pi occurs with both transitive frames and intransitive frames where the 
THEME is non -specific and concludes that the event structure of the predicate must 
specify a two -place and a one -place subevent, since the projection principle would 
otherwise be violated. Should this event structure be extended to predicate Pi, the 
generalisation will be corrected if the relative frequencies of the two frames for Pi 
are sufficiently different from their relative frequencies for Pi. In the second case, 
the child may hypothesise a process event structure of the type in (3.39) for predi- 
cates Pi and Pi on the basis of extra -linguistic situational evidence. The application 
of innate linking rules will then result in both transitive and intransitive frames for 
the two predicates. If both frames are confirmed in the input for Pi, but only one 
for Pi, the lexical structure will be adjusted. 
The process of statistical generalisation and unlearning seems to account 
for differences in the acquisition of subject expression and object mapping. As was 
argued earlier, the extent of generalisation primarily depends on the type frequencies 
of the generalised construction. As the child's lexicon lists a small set of verbs that 
can denote both unbounded processes and causative events (regardless of whether 
the entries are created from situational or syntactic cues), the event structure will 
not be extensively generalised to verbs that in the child's experience either denote 
one or the other. Similarly, the set of verbs that are analysed on the basis of the 
input as allowing object topic -drop is small enough not to assign a high probability 
to implicit topic objects, even though the syntactic mechanism of topic -drop is 
available and the learner is predisposed to omitting given information. In the first 
part of this chapter I characterised subject omission in child English as the lack of 
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non -structural constraints on the occurrence of empty category subjects of various 
undifferentiated kinds. The child's tendency to omit subjects with a high probability 
was primarily attributed to the fact that target -like implicit subjects are frequent 
and occur with a large number of verb types. The domain of generalisation is not 
restricted, as the implicit subject "alternation" is not tied to any particular lexical 
semantic structure. 
The speed of recovery from overgeneralisation in part depends on token fre- 
quencies as dictated by the indirect negative evidence principle. This may in turn 
affect type frequencies. The removal of verbs from the alternating class will increase 
the type frequency of non -alternating verbs and thus reduce the likelihood of fur- 
ther generalisation. Type frequencies, however, can only be affected if the grammar 
links the alternation in syntactic structure to an alternation in lexical structure. 
A second parameter affecting error correction is then the transparency of linking 
patterns between the syntactic representation and the lexical -conceptual structure. 
The smaller the number of available structural analyses and the number of semantic 
consequences, the easier the unlearning process. 
Consider the unspecified object alternation. The child's predisposition to 
build a lexically -based grammar coincides with the lexical nature of the alternation 
in the grammar and, necessarily, with the lexical nature of the alternation in the 
input. If it is established on the basis of statistical evidence that a predicate cannot 
occur in an intransitive frame when the conceptual object is non -specific, it follows 
(given the grammar's sensitivity to syntax- semantics correspondences) that its event 
structure does not specify a one -place subevent and the predicate can be removed 
from the set of alternating verbs. The same observation for given objects, however, 
does not force the removal of the predicate from the set licensing object topic - 
drop, since the empty operator is not a lexical feature. The lexical expectations of 
the language acquisition device are in competition with the extra -lexical structural 
definitions of universal grammar. The error is therefore expected to persist up 
to the point when the evidence for lexical- specificity in the input /intake is robust 
enough to constrain the grammar. Similarly, from the observation that a predicate 
does not occur in a null- subject frame it cannot be deduced that it must have an 
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overt subject, since the structural licensing of empty category subjects is not a 
property of lexical items. Moreover, unlike in the case of object topic -drop, the 
input does not support the child's lexical expectations in fine -tuning the licensing 
conditions of UG. Even if some predicates happen to occur very frequently with 
overt subjects and only overt subjects in the input, their removal from the null - 
subject verb set is unlikely to tip the balance of type frequencies such that it might 
inhibit further generalisation. Fine -tuning can only occur once the child has formed 
some hypothesis categories of null- subject utterances in the input in terms of extra - 
lexical semantic /pragmatic features. At this point pairs of conceptual features may 
be juxtaposed and the probabilities of implicit subjects adjusted in a process similar 
to the indirect negative evidence principle in (3.57): 
(3.58) Given two alternative surface structures C1 and C2 associated with a set 
of conceptual features [ +fi,...,n], C2 is ungrammatical /infelicitous with ref- 
erence to [ -fi, +f,...,n] iff 
a. no (or negligibly few) utterances occur which are equivalent to C2; 
and 
b. C1 occurs with sufficient frequency. 
The lexically based principle of indirect negative evidence can in fact be viewed 
as shorthand for that particular instantiation of the more general feature -based 
principle in (3.58) where the sets of features define lexical items. What makes 
the lexical process simpler is that it does not require full featural analysis. The 
assumption that any two lexical items contrast in some aspect of their meanings 
(see the discussion in Chapter 1) is a sufficient condition for the process of learning 
from the statistical properties of the input. If the hypothesis of lexical specificity 
is then reinforced, no further feature analysis is needed. If it is not reinforced, 
however, the restricting of the overgeneral hypothesis will be delayed by the large 









1 9 33 7 86 16 
2a 14 28 30 90 44 
213 23 36 26 85 49 
3a 21 5 27 55 48 
3I) 29 10 33 64 62 
4 32 6 56 71 88 
Total 128 179 307 
Mean 20 75 
Table 3.20: Rate of object -drop in accessible and non -accessible contexts with the verbs 
eat, drink, write, draw, play, read, ride, drive 
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Mapping Oblique Arguments 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 The underlying structure of oblique NPs 
This chapter extends the statistical learning hypothesis by examining a phenomenon 
in child language where the alternation is not between the overt versus covert ex- 
pression of arguments but, it will be proposed, between alternative patterns of 
argument mapping. The phenomenon in question is children's oblique NP com- 
plements, which are required to be mapped as prepositional objects in the adult 
grammar'. These constituents in child English have previously been analysed as in- 
complete - with the prepositions being omitted for reasons to do with performance 
factors or inoperative syntactic principles. Under this view the child's constructions 
with oblique NP complements may be assigned the structure in (4.1a), where the 
argument is projected onto an empty- headed prepositional phrase; or the structure 
in (4.1b), where the argument is a caseless lexical NP adjoined to the VP: 
(4.1) I gonna write two pens. 
a. [vP write [pp 0 [DP two pens]]] 
b. [vP [vP write] [NP two pens]] 
In either case, the child's output is taken to violate principles of the mature grammar 
and some problem- specific psycholinguistic or syntactic maturational schedule needs 
to be invoked to account for recovery from the error. 
'Unless stated otherwise, in the following discussion the term NP is used in the pretheoretical 
sense referring both to the lexical category NP and the functional category DP of modern syntactic 
theory. The term DP is reserved for cases where the distinction is relevant. 
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Children's oblique NPs may alternatively be analysed as thematically oblique 
arguments mapped onto the object function in syntactic structure, as illustrated in 
(4.2). 
(4.2) [vp write [DP two pens]] 
In this analysis the construction is structurally well- formed and the error lies in the 
inaccurate or overgeneral semantic representation of the predication or some aspect 
of the mapping process. In this particular example the problem may be that the 
verb write is categorised as being able to directly assign an INSTRUMENT thematic 
role to its complement. The aim of this chapter is to show that the latter approach 
provides a better account of the data; and allows the phenomenon to be placed in 
the class of errors that are corrigible by a mechanism based on the indirect negative 
evidence principles outlined in the previous chapters. 
.4.1.2 Summary of the data 
The term oblique argument is interpreted in its broadest sense in the study. Any 
entity identifying a participant in the event which requires oblique case marking 
or receives its thematic role from a preposition is included in the analysis, whether 
obligatory or not and whether the selection of its case /preposition is uniquely gov- 
erned by the verb or not. True adjuncts, which locate the event in time or space or 
specify the manner of the action, are not analysed. 
The following is a brief description of the general principles of the Hungarian 
case system. Details and idiosyncrasies will be discussed in the relevant sections of 
the chapter. Hungarian marks the 0 -roles of arguments by overt case morphology. 
There are over 20 distinct cases. Nominative, the case assigned to subjects (with a 
few exceptions), receives zero -marking. With the exception of demonstratives, de- 
terminers and attributive adjectives do not agree with the case of the noun. Nominal 
pro -form adjectives inflect for case similarly to nouns. Cases have default semantic 
content and predicates select for cases that correspond to their 0- requirements if 
these are available, as in (4.3b -d). When a thematic role is not expressed by any 
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available case, the predicate determines case selection, often arbitrarily, and its the- 
matic specifications override the canonical sense of the case. In (4.3e), for instance, 
the predicate proud selects for a locative case to mark its THEME argument. 
(4.3) a. A sárkány elaludt. 
the dragon slept 
The dragon fell asleep. 
b. A királylány elrabolta a sárkány -t. 
the princess kidnapped the dragon -Acc 
The princess kidnapped the dragon. 
c. A királyfi adott a sárkány -nak egy varázspálcá -t. 
the prince gave the dragon -DAT a magic.wand -Acc 
The prince gave the dragon a magic wand. 
d. A sárkány béká -vá váltortatta a királylány -t a varázspálcá -val. 
the dragon frog -REs turned the princess -Acc the magic.wand -INsTR 
The dragon turned the princess into a frog with the magic wand. 
e. A sárkány nagyon büszke volt magá -ra. 
the dragon very proud was himself -GOAL 
The dragon was very proud of himself. 
Table 4.1 on page 111 summarises the data on the marking of oblique arguments 
in English and Hungarian. A notable feature of the table is that the likelihood of 
preposition expression in English exhibits a U- shaped learning curve. At Stage 1 
21% of prepositions are omitted; the error rate increases to 55% at Stage 2 and 
subsequently decreases to 25% and 9% at Stages 3 and 4 respectively. Errors in 
the selection of prepositions are negligibly rare (2 -0 %). In the Hungarian data the 
number of oblique arguments is unfortunately small. Errors occur in up to 38% of 
utterances in any one sample and may involve the omission of the case marker (see 
(4.4a)) or the substitution of the accusative (4.4b) or an inappropriate oblique case 
(4.4c) : 
(4.4) a. *elveszi a homok. (homok -ot) (Zoli 1;10) 
away.takes the sand (sand -Acc 
She's taking the sand away. 
108 
b. *vágni bel6le o11ó -t. (o11ó -val) (Balázs 2;3) 
cut from.it scissors -ACC (scissors- INSTR) 
Cut out of it with scissors. 
c. *kell még az iskolá -ba tanulni. (iskolá -ban) (Zoli 2;0) 
must still the school -coAL study (school -Loc) 
We must still study at school. 
None of the cases appears to have default status in the children's grammar. 
4.2 Preposition omission 
4.2.1 Perceptual salience 
As with any seemingly incomplete constructions, one approach to oblique NPs in 
English child language is to look for a reason why children might drop prepositions 
in their production. One explanation to consider concerns the perceptual properties 
of function words. In terms of the phonological processes affecting lexical items in 
connected speech, prepositions pattern with function morphemes in that in non - 
focused non -phrase -final position they tend to be unstressed and often undergo 
vowel reduction, in some cases to the extent of desyllabification (Selkirk 1996). 
Although evidence suggests that infants can perceive weak syllables, Gleitman & 
Wanner (1982) find that children do have difficulties with highly reduced phonetic 
material. Children's oblique NPs may then be categorised as performance errors, 
which may in principle be the result of their difficulty perceiving phonologically 
reduced morphemes or could perhaps be attributed to production difficulties. In 
either case we should find that prepositions which are highly prone to reduction in 
connected speech (of, for, on, etc.) are more likely to be absent from the child's 
speech than prepositions that tend to preserve their strong forms (with, off, down, 
etc.). Furthermore, an abrupt change in the likelihood of prepositional marking 
is expected in the child's performance at the point when the child can integrate 
prepositions into his phonological system. 
This is not what we find in the data, however. Table 4.2 on page 111 shows 
the omission rates for individual prepositions in the English corpus. The 'Other' 
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category includes very infrequent prepositions (3 tokens or less in the corpus), er- 
roneous prepositions and those cases where it was not clear from the context which 
preposition was intended. With the exception of of, which is invariably omitted 
at the first five stages (3 occurrences in total) and invariably expressed at the last 
stage (3 occurrences), omission rates for individual prepositions vary seemingly un- 
predictably from sample to sample. The phonologically strong prepositions, with 
and off, are no less likely to be omitted than phonologically weak prepositions. 
The Hungarian data similarly suggest that case marking errors cannot be 
fully explained by phonological factors. Oblique case omission is no more frequent 
than case substitution errors; none occur in Balázs's samples. In Zoli's data 3 out of 
the 8 nominative oblique arguments are the EXPERENCER arguments of verbs that 
subcategorise for dative -marked EXPERIENCER subjects. The child's utterances are 
listed in (4.5) with the targets given after each erroneous utterance. (Note that 
the first of these does not in fact involve the omission of a case marker suffix as 
personal pronouns are not inflected by suffixing case markers to the nominative 
form.) Dative subjects will be discussed in more detail at a later point in this 
chapter. 
(4.5) a. i. *én is kell. (1;10) 
I.NOM too need 
ii. Nekem is kell. 
I.DAT too need 
I need one too. 
b. i. *Barna nem kell. (1;10) 
Brian.NOM not need 
ii. Barná -nak nem kell. 
Brian -DAT not need 
Brian doesn't need one. 
c. i. *nem fáj Andika. (2;0) 
not hurt Andika.NOM 
ii. Nem fáj Andiká -nak. 
not hurt Andika -DAT 










Peter Zoli Balázs 
N %NP %Err N %0 %Acc %Othr N %0 %Acc %Othr 
21 0 17 12 0 
55 1 31 10 10 
25 2 28 11 0 
9 1 45 0 2 
6 13 0 23 15 
3 8 0 0 0 
11 7 0 14 14 
7 21 0 0 0 
121 49 
27 1 8 3 7 0 9 7 
Table 4.1: Case /preposition omission rate and proportion of erroneous case /preposition 
selection for oblique arguments in English and Hungarian. The morphemes of the com- 
posite preposition out of are counted separately. The column heading ' %0' stands for the 
proportion of zero -marked nominative case. 
Stage OMITTED /EXPRESSED 
Of With For Off On To 
PREPOSITIONS 
In At Other Total 
1 - 3/0 
2a 1/0 4/1 
2b - 1/2 
3a 2/0 16/4 
3b - 10/9 
4 0/3 7/27 





















































Table 4.2: Number of omitted and expressed prepositions. 
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The remaining 5 omission errors involve various locative cases, all of which also 
occur overtly expressed. 
Further evidence against the hypothesis that, at least initially, only process- 
ing factors shape children's oblique complements comes from preposition insertion 
errors and the U- shaped learning curve. Although preposition insertion errors are 
rare in the data, the fact that they do occur suggests that prepositions are observed 
and form part of the child's system of grammar: 
(4.6) a. look at in there. (2;0) 
b. look at down there. (2;0) 
c. I talk to bye -bye. (2;4) 
A processing explanation also fails to account for the fact that preposition omission 
rate is considerably lower at the first stage of Peter's data (21 %) than at the second 
stage (55 %) (see Table 4.1 on the page before above). Admittedly, the U- shaped 
curve of the data needs some qualifications. The low preposition omission rate at 
the first stage is due to the high proportion of the "slotted" frame [look at X] (41 
out of 58 oblique arguments). The preposition at is never omitted from this frame 
and the X slot may be filled by an adverb (see (4.6a) and (b) above). It could be the 
case that the string lookat is an unanalysed whole, possibly created by the partial 
segmentation of the frequently occurring utterance Look at that!. Looking at all the 
frames that the verb look occurs in, however, does not support this explanation. 
There are several utterances at this stage with look followed by a bare adverb (Look 
there!) or in utterance final position (Look!), while utterances where the string look 
at is not followed by an argument or adjunct do not occur. This indicates that 
the prepositional frame does not originate in a segmentation error resulting in the 
lexical entry lookat but in the child's grammar requiring the argument of look to 
be embedded in a prepositional phrase. As performance factors do not seem to 
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override this requirement, we may conclude that where oblique NPs occur, it is the 
child's grammar that licenses theme. 
4.2.2 The Case filter 
An alternative explanation for preposition omission and lack of case contrasts is 
provided by Radford's (1990) maturational theory, arguing that the initial unavail- 
ability of the functional modules of Universal Grammar disables abstract Case 
marking. In more recent work Radford (1997) adopts the Minimalist Program 
(Chomsky 1995) and reformulates the proposal as the unavailability of the mech- 
anisms required for the checking of uninterpretable features, i.e., purely syntactic 
features which are invisible to the semantic component of the grammar. A similar 
conclusion is reached by Ouhalla (1992) based on a study of normal language de- 
velopment and agrammatism revealing that it is formal grammatical features which 
are affected in both cases. 
Briefly, the theory of Case states that in order to make an argument chain 
visible for 0- marking, the argument must be assigned abstract Case at some po- 
sition in the chain (Aoun 1986). Successful derivation then requires the Case of 
the argument to be checked against the Case features specified by the predicate 
(Chomsky 1995). Case is assigned under certain configurational conditions by [ -N] 
categories (V and P), but cannot be assigned by [ +N] categories (N or A). The 
complements of nouns and adjectives will therefore be Case -marked by a prepo- 
sition. Prepositions in English may have not only purely Case marking functions 
but also predicative functions. Predicative prepositions, which have the ability 
to assign their own thematic roles, are taken to be conceptually selected during 
derivation and are interpreted by the semantic component. If preposition omission 
is indeed the manifestation of an incomplete syntactic component, it is only the 
purely Case -marker class of prepositions, then, that are expected to be absent in 
child English. 
2Helen Goodluck notes that lookat could in fact be an entry in the child's lexicon subcate- 
gorising for an obligatory complement. Since we also find the verb without a preposition, we 
would either need to assume that the two entries look and lookat are unrelated or treat lookat as 
a morphologically complex form marked for transitivity. The latter analysis is not substantially 
different from the prepositional analysis suggested in the main text 
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The classification of English prepositions is far from straightforward. At 
least four prepositional functions may be distinguished at different points on the 
scale from structural to contentive. The border dividing the argument marking 
class from the predicative class is drawn at different points by different authors 
mainly on the basis of theory internal arguments. As these are of no concern for 
the purposes of this study, the following classification is based on distributional and 
lexico- semantic distinctions and no attempt will be made to class borderline cases 
with either argument markers or predicates. 
Class 1 At one end of the scale we find purely syntactic (uses of) prepositions 
which carry no semantic content and are required by the grammar to satisfy Case 
marking constraints. Schütze (2001) analyses these as heading an extended K(ase) 
projection of DPs and puts the preposition of and, based on discussion by Tremblay 
(1996), THEME- marking uses of with (as in (4.7)) in this class. 
(4.7) a. Hagrid presented Harry with an owl. 
b. Neville filled his cauldron with quills. 
Class 2 Schütze (2001) argues for a second class of semantically empty 
prepositions, which has as its only member the preposition with in instrumental, 
comitative and absolute uses: 
(4.8) a. Stromboli split the puppet with an axe. 
b. The fox celebrated in the bar with the cat. 
c. Pinocchio left for school with an apple in his hand. 
Similarly to Case markers, these uses of with do not seem to assign O -roles to their 
complements. The axe in (4.8a) is in turn the affected and the actor entity in a 
chain of causative events (cf. Jackendoff 1990, Van Valin & Polla 1997); The cat 
in (4.8b) shares its O -role with the fox; and the absolute in (4.8c) is an adjunct 
which may be paraphrased as a bare DP. Schütze argues that these uses should 
be structurally distinguished from Case marking uses, as the former, but not the 
latter, may be negated by substituting without for with. Accordingly, with in (4.8) 
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heads a PP projection but, similarly to K and unlike contentful Ps, it is required 
by formal (as opposed to thematic) principles of grammar. 
Class 3 The next class of prepositions are those which are uniquely se- 
lected for by the predicate's thematic specifications (cf. Van Valin & Polla 1997) 
or through, often idiosyncratic, lexical selection (cf. Sag & Wasow 1999). We 
can include in this class the complements of relational predicates subcategorising 
for possessive GOAL or SOURCE arguments (as in (4.9)) and the complements of 
prepositional verbs (as in (4.10)). 
(4.9) a. The White Knight gave a bow and arrow to Mog. 
b. Mog took the bow and arrow from the White Knight. 
c. The astronauts sold a strawberry drink to Meg. 
d. Meg bought a strawberry drink from the astronauts. 
(4.10) a. Meg and Mog could rely on the Sherpa's expertise. 
b. Meg resorted to a spell. 
c. The yak looked at the yeti and fled in panic. 
In these cases the prepositions seem to have no other function but to mediate the 
9- requirements of the predicates. That is, they are required by thematic principles 
but do not assign independent O- roles. 
Class 4 Finally, clearly predicative uses of prepositions are those where 
the predicate subcategorises for a thematically broadly specified oblique argument 
whose narrow specifications are supplied by the preposition (as in (4.11)); and 
those where the PP, in Pustejovsky's (1995) terms, introduces a subevent and its 
arguments into the event structure of the predicate, thus turning an activity into 
an accomplishment (as in (4.12)), or introduces an adjunct into the predication (as 
in (4.13)): 
(4.11) a. The winged monkeys put the Lion in a cage. 
b. Dorothy poured the bucket of water over the Witch of the West. 
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(4.12) a. The raft floated to the river bank. 
b. The Woodman and the Scarecrow carried Dorothy out of the poppy 
field. 
(4.13) a. The carpenter made a tin leg for the Woodman. 
b. The house cut the Witch of the East into pieces. 
Preposition omission rates in the four classes of oblique arguments /adjuncts 
in Peter's data are shown in Table 4.3 on page 119. The morphemes of the only 
attested composite preposition, out of, as in (4.12), are counted separately, out 
being classed as a predicative preposition (that assigns a O -role but cannot assign 
Case in this use) and of being classed as a Case marker. (I will return to this 
problem shortly.) As predicted by the hypothesis that the child's grammar lacks 
Case marking constraints, prepositions in uses towards the Case marker end of the 
scale are frequently omitted. However, at the first three stages of the studied period 
Class 4 predicative prepositions are similarly likely to be omitted (55 in 92 in Class 4; 
and 9 in 12 in Classes 1 and 2). In the second half of the data Case markers continue 
to be dropped (35 in 79), while the likelihood of omitting predicative prepositions 
is significantly decreased (14 in 189). Preposition omission rate is lowest in the 
indeterminate Class 3 (9 in 99 in total). 
One approach to account for the findings is to contend that Class 1 and 
Class 2 prepositions are omitted because of the unavailability of Case checking 
mechanisms and look for some other explanation for the omission of predicative 
prepositions. As the remaining sections of the chapter will show, however, that ex- 
planation seems to account for preposition omission in all classes with the exception 
of the few errors of of-omission. I will deal with these first. 
All three instances of Case marker omission, listed in (4.14), occur in PPs 
headed by the preposition out. No utterances occur with the complement of out 
marked by of at these stages. (Target -like utterances in Class 1 are given in (4.15)). 
This pattern is fully compatible not only with the maturational hypothesis but also 
with the possibility that the child has simply not marked this sense of out as one 
that cannot assign Case. That is, the errors in Class 1 may be one of categorisation 
rather than an indication of a deficit in syntactic competence. 
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(4.14) a. smoke is come out chimneys. (2;1) 
b. get out the way. (2;3) (twice) 
(4.15) a. what a did with it? (2;3) 
b. I'm not gonna let go with it. (2;6) 
c. I didn't do it let go of it. (2;6) 
d. I let go of it. (2;6) (twice) 
Radford's (1990) original hypothesis of course concerns of-omission within noun 
phrases as well. The explanation based on lack of Case feature checking mechanisms, 
however, does not seem to apply to this phenomenon. As only verb argument 
structures are analysed in the present study, the following comments are based 
on empirical evidence given by Radford. Radford observes of-omission in noun 
phrases headed by unit nouns, as in (4.16a), and genitive constructions (4.16b) but 
no examples are given for of- omission in constructions headed by deverbal nouns, 
i.e., nouns derived from verbs, as in (4.16c): 
(4.16) a. a cup of tea 
b. the wheel of the car 
c. the destruction of the city 
It is only in deverbal noun constructions, however, where the head assigns a 61-role 
to its complement, which therefore needs to be Case -marked by a preposition given 
that nouns cannot assign Case. The prepositional phrase in (4.16b) seems to be 
an expression of inherent genitive case denoting a relation of possession and the 
noun tea appears to be a modifier rather than a complement of the head unit noun. 
(The sentence cannot be paraphrased as *a /some tea's cup, for instance.) Crucially, 
neither NP receives a O -role from the head. The requirement to mark possessors 
and the modifiers of unit nouns does not follow from abstract Case marking prin- 
ciples. The omission of of in child English therefore does not provide evidence for 
the hypothesis that preposition omission is explained by the unavailability of Case 
checking mechanisms. 
117 
4.3 Oblique NPs as objects 
4.3.1 Object -like properties 
The alternative to analysing children's oblique NPs as incomplete constituents is 
to contend that these oblique arguments are mapped onto the object function in 
structurally well- formed surface configurations. The occurrence of accusative substi- 
tution errors in Hungarian child language supports the plausibility of this analysis. 
That the accusative is indeed the default case to mark objects but not the default 
case to mark non -object arguments in the Hungarian data is demonstrated by the 
high proportion of accusative -marked objects (64 -90% for Zoli, 81 -96% for Balázs) 
relative to the proportion of accusative -marked subjects (0 -2% for both children) 
and oblique arguments (0 -10% for Zoli, 0 -23% for Balázs). Objects and subjects 
are shown in Table 4.4 on the next page; see Table 4.1 on page 111 above for oblique 
arguments. 
These results suggest that while the three grammatical functions are distin- 
guished by the children, some property of the early grammar allows certain oblique 
arguments to be categorised as objects. Before discussing the nature of this prop- 
erty, the following paragraphs look at the English data to find evidence for the 
hypothesis that oblique NPs are arguments mapped onto the object function. 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, Peter distinguishes transitive events 
from intransitive events very early on. I also argued, citing experimental evidence 
and discussing Peter's use of the verb make, that the child must to some extent 
rely on distributional evidence in constructing event structures. If oblique NPs are 
indeed analysed as objects by the child's grammar, we should find that they are 
significantly more likely to occur with predicates that are listed in the learner's 
lexicon as transitive, with the following refinements. The simple grouping of verbs 
into transitive and intransitive disregards the fact that a verb may occur with both 
an object and an oblique complement. If the object argument is expressed, the 
grammar is forced to create a new slot for the second complement. Provided that 
the learner is familiar with the mechanism of prepositional marking (which we can 





% NP N 
OBLIQUE ARGUMENTS 
Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
% NP N % NP N % NP 
Total N 
1 0 - 3 100 42 2 13 61 58 
2a 1 100 5 80 5 20 31 48 42 
2b O - 3 33 7 14 48 67 58 
3a 3 67 19 84 21 28 47 8 90 
31D O - 20 50 11 0 46 9 77 
4 4 0 33 21 13 0 96 6 146 
Total 8 83 99 281 471 
Mean 56 61 11 33 









% Acc N 
Balázs 
OBJ 
% Acc N 
SUBJ 
% Acc 
1 67 64 93 2 44 81 46 2 
2 69 90 58 2 24 92 22 0 
3 59 89 68 2 39 95 21 0 
4 114 85 78 0 47 96 37 0 
Total 309 297 154 126 
Mean 82 1 91 0 
Table 4.4: Accusative -marked objects and subjects in Hungarian 
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known to be ditransitive. That is, oblique arguments of transitive verbs should be 
be less likely to be mapped as NPs if they appear in combination with an object NP 
than if they are the only complement of the verb. Second arguments of ditransitive 
verbs that occur in the double object construction form a separate class, regardless 
of thematic role, since for these verbs the child has evidence for the [V NP NP] 
frame. In this environment preposition omission following the object NP does not 
provide counter -evidence for the distributional hypothesis. 
Table 4.5 on page 125 compares the frequencies of oblique NP complements 
with the different distributional classes of verbs. Oblique arguments of ditransitive 
verbs in utterances lacking overt objects are grouped with monotransitive verbs. 
The verb go is classed on its own as it appears with the complement home, which 
also occurs as a noun following a determiner and as a predicative noun (as in the 
examples in (4.17)). In distributional terms therefore it is unclear whether home 
should be considered as an object NP in the data. 
(4.17) a. man's home. (2;0) 
b. mama's home. (2;1) 
c. my a home. (2;1) 
d. this is home. (2;1) 
Examples for the verb types in Table 4.5 are given in (4.18): a) go, b) 
intransitive verb, c) transitive verb with expressed object, d) transitive verb with 
no expressed object, e) ditransitive verb. 
(4.18) a. it goes on lips. (2;1) 
b. car belong in a box. (2;0) 
c. put it in hair please. (2;1) 
d. write on tape. (2;0) 
e. take coffee to Mama. (2;1) 
The results show that the distributional hypothesis seems to be correct. The oblique 
arguments of intransitive verbs are mapped as NPs in 30 -0% of utterances, while 
the corresponding proportion for transitive predicates with no expressed object 
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complements is 78 -33 %. A X2 test comparing the frequency of preposition omission 
in the two conditions gives significant results at each stage (x2 = 32.55, p < .001; 
X2 = 4.53, p < .05 (expected frequency is less than 5 in two cells); X2 = 6.55, p < .05; 
X2 = 14.33, p < .001; X2 = 6.04, p < .05; X2 = 20.28, p < .001). Although numbers 
are too low for statistical analysis in the expressed object and the ditransitive verb 
conditions, differences in the likelihood of preposition omission are observed in the 
expected direction: the preposition is on the whole more likely to be absent in second 
argument position with ditransitive verbs (78 -0 %) than with monotransitive verbs 
(33 -0 %). We also see that the verb go patterns with null- object transitive verbs in 
the first three files (67 -37 %) and with intransitive verbs in the remaining files (15- 
3 %). This result is expected on the assumption that home is initially categorised as 
a NP complement and later reanalysed as an adverb, although, as will be discussed 
shortly, this process itself needs an explanation. 
The observed differences between distributional types of predicates strongly 
suggest that the analysis of the child's oblique NPs as syntactic objects is along 
the right lines. The question that now needs to be asked is what property of the 
grammar licenses mapping patterns that deviate from the target. The following 
sections examine three, not necessarily mutually exclusive, suggestions: 
(4.19) The error lies in 
a. inaccurate and /or underspecified semantic representations of events 
or the misalignment of semantics to syntax correspondence rules; 
b. the generalisation of a statistically dominant distributional pattern 
overriding semantic distinctions; 
c. a delay in the acquisition of restrictions on mapping pattern alterna- 
tions. 
4.3.2 Emergent categories 
It could be the case that the child encodes certain semantic properties as objects 
and mistakes occur either because the child's hypothesis linking rules do not corre- 
spond to the linking rules of the target language or because the learner's semantic 
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representation of elements of the event is inaccurate. Proposals for children's gram - 
maticised semantic categories have been put forward by the cognitivist approach to 
language acquisition. Slobin (1985a) argues that children are born with a prestruc- 
tured species- universal semantic space, which determines the set of meanings they 
may assign to linguistic expressions. Evidence for this hypothesis is provided by 
conceptually motivated linguistic categorisation in child language which fails to cor- 
respond to the categories of the exposure language. Clark (2001) reviews empirical 
findings demonstrating the occurrence of what she calls emergent categories, which 
include shape- biased object word overextensions in English closely resembling pat- 
terns observed in languages with noun classifier systems (Clark 1977); the overuse 
of the preposition from to mark spatial or causal SOURCE arguments (Clark & Car- 
penter 1989); the differential case marking of subject pronouns reflecting the degree 
of agency attributed to the actor (Budwig 1989); and restricting the accusative 
marker in overt case languages to objects of verbs that specify direct physical ma- 
nipulation (Slobin 1985a). Emergent categories are described as covert categories, 
which reflect some underlying conceptual similarities perceived by children and thus 
offer evidence for the conceptual representations that universally underlie linguistic 
categories and that may have linguistic consequences. At present it is an open ques- 
tion what these conceptual categories may be and why some candidate categories 
surface in children's language while others do not. The cognitivist approach there- 
fore, rather than making precise predictions about child language, aims to identify 
emergent categories by investigating the semantic features of children's errors. 
The second version of the account based on the conceptual- semantic proper- 
ties of linguistic entities in the predication is the view that the semantics -to- syntax 
correspondence rules are target -like even in early child grammars (they may be 
innate or acquired early) but errors occur if the child's semantic analysis of the 
predicate or argument is inaccurate or incomplete (see e.g., Pinker 1984, 1989; 
Levy et al. 1988, Bowerman 1989, Bowerman & Choi 2001, Braine & Brooks 1995). 
This suggestion has been put forward as an explanation for children's overappli- 
cation of lexical alternation rules, some of which were briefly discussed in Chapter 
1. Pinker (1989), for instance, argues that the two argument frame patterns of 
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alternating predicates are best analysed as being mapped from distinct concep- 
tual structures by applying the relevant linking rules taken from the universal set. 
Pinker further proposes that the alternative conceptual structures may be derived 
by lexico- semantic transformation rules. An inaccurate conceptual structure may 
lead to the application of inappropriate lexical rules and, consequently, to erro- 
neous argument frames. If the process is based on innate or acquired prototypical 
semantics -to- syntax correspondence rules and is independent of the child's expe- 
rience of distributional variation, errors may of course occur without the step of 
conceptual structure conversion. 
Applying the two proposals to the oblique NP problem, it could be the case, 
then, that the child's choice of mapping pattern reflects real or presumed semantic 
distinctions which are grammaticised by his early linguistic system. Without a 
thorough semantic analysis of each oblique argument, it is of course impossible 
to determine whether such emergent categories or event misconstruals contribute 
to the children's mapping errors. What the following discussion aims to establish 
is whether semantic (mis- )categorisation could reasonably be the only source of 
oblique NP errors. 
DATIVE SUBJECTS IN HUNGARIAN 
Before discussing oblique objects let me return to Hungarian dative subjects, which 
seem to provide an example for the grammaticisation of a semantic category in Zoli's 
data. Three types of subject case errors occur in Zoli's samples: (a) the occasional 
substitution of accusative for nominative (see Table 4.4 on page 119 above); (b) the 
substitution of nominative for dative with the impersonal ExPERIENCER- subject 
verbs kell (need) and fáj (hurt); and (c) the substitution of dative for nominative, 
which is restricted to the subject of the regular verb kér (want). The nominative 
substitution errors shown in (4.5) above are repeated here as (4.20) and some ex- 
amples with kér are given in (4.21) with the targets given after each of the child's 
utterances: 
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(4.20) a. i. *én is kell. (1;10) 
I.NOM too need 
ii. Nekem is kell. 
I.DAT too need 
I need one too. 
b. i. *Barna nem kell. (1;10) 
Brian.NOM not need 
ii. Barná -nak nem kell. 
Brian -DAT not need 
Brian doesn't need one. 
c. i. *nem fáj Andika. (2;0) 
not hurt Andika.NOM 
ii. Nem fáj Andiká -nak. 
not hurt Andika -DAT 
It doesn't hurt Andika. 
(4.21) a. i. *most nekem kér -ek. (2;2) 
now I.DAT want -1SG 
ii. Most 'én kér -ek. 
now I.NOM want -1SG 
I want one now. 
b. i. *nekem is kér -ek. (2;2) 
I.DAT too want -1SG 
ii. En is kér -ek 
I.NOM too want -1SG 
I want one too. 
Although the number of relevant utterances is unfortunately small, the pattern that 
emerges from the data is that the EXPERIENCER arguments of the three verbs tend 
to be nominative at the first three stages (which is appropriate for kér and an error 
for kell and fáj) and dative at the last stage (which is appropriate for kell and fáj 
and an error for kér). The figures are shown in Table 4.6 on the next page. 
The child's early errors of nominative EXPERIENCERS cannot be attributed 
to difficulties with dative -marking in general, since the dative consistently marks 










Exp Obj Null Obj 
N %NP N %NP 
Ditr V 
N % NP 
Tot N 
1 6 67 43 2 0 9 78 0 - 58 
2a 9 55 6 17 5 0 18 67 3 67 41 
2b 8 37 10 30 4 0 22 77 14 78 58 
3a 25 8 29 17 3 33 25 68 6 17 88 
3b 13 15 14 0 9 0 30 33 11 18 77 
4 30 3 44 0 27 0 31 39 14 0 146 
Tot 91 146 48 137 48 469 
Mean 31 13 19 60 36 
Table 4.5: Preposition omission rate in oblique arguments with the verb go; other intran- 
sitive verbs; transitive verbs with expressed and unexpressed objects; and ditransitive 
verbs. The absence of of from the composite preposition out of is disregarded. 








1 2 0 0 - 0 
2 2 0 3 33 0 
3 0 0 - 1 0 
4 14 64 3 100 1 100 
Table 4.6: Dative subjects with the verbs kér (want), kell (need) and fdj (hurt) 
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(4.22) a. visszaadta Zoliká -nak. (1;8) 
gave.back Zolika -DAT. 
She gave it back to Zolika. 
b. csinálok neked. (1;10) 
I.make you.DAT 
I'll make you one. 
c. hozd neki csak sört. (1;10) 
bring he.DAT just beer 
Just bring him beer. 
This suggests that the child's first hypothesis is that subjects receive nominative 
case. At some later point exceptional dative subjects are identified and the pattern 
is extended to the regular verb kér but not to any other verb. 
A semantic explanation can be built on the observation that the EXPERI- 
ENCER arguments of both the verb kér and the impersonal verb kell are intended 
recipients. The prototypical case assigned to recipients is dative in Hungarian. Da- 
tive marked indirect objects first appear at Stage 1 with the verb ad (give) as shown 
in (4.22a) above, and become frequent at Stage 4, where they occur with seven verb 
types and make up 31% of all oblique arguments. It is a reasonable assumption 
that the child identifies the cognitive category RECIPIENT and associates it with 
the syntactic device of dative case on the basis of evidence from verbs of giving. 
As the argument pattern of kell is acquired, the category is extended to `actual or 
intended recipients'. The semantic features of this concept can now be matched 
against the semantic structure of kér and they are found to be compatible. As a 
result, the child's hypothesis linking rule can be applied. 
THE SEMANTICS OF OBLIQUE OBJECTS 
The Hungarian children's utterances with accusative substitution errors are listed 
in (4.23). The sentences in (f) and (h) occur twice within the same sample. The 
target cases are given in brackets following each utterance. 
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(4.23) a. *verekedem a Moncsi -t. (Moncsi -val) (Zoli 1;10) 
I.fight the Moncsi -ACC (Moncsi -INSTR) 
I'm having a fight with Moncsi. 
b. *homok -ot ülünk. (homok -ba) (Zoli 1;10) 
sand -ACC we.sit (sand -GOAL) 
We're sitting in the sand. 
c. *nem félsz a halacská -t. (halacská -tó1) (Zoli 1;10) 
not you.fear the fishy -Acc (fishy -SOURCE) 
You're not afraid of the fishy. 
d. *játszunk a halacská -t. (halacská -val) (Zoli 2;2) 
we.play the fishy -Acc (fishy -INSTR) 
We're playing with the fishy. 
e. *vágni belöle o11ó -t. (ol1ó -val) (Balázs 2;3) 
cut from.it scissors -ACC (scissors -INSTR) 
Cut out of it with scissors. 
f. *nagy -ot felfújni. (nagy -ra) (Balázs 2;3) 
big -Acc blow.up (big -GOAL) 
Blow it up big. 
*most kezdjük a pöttyös -et. (pöttyös -sel) (Balázs 2;7) 
now let's.start the spotted -ACC (spotted -INSTR) 
Now let's start with the spotted one. 
h. * ez -t sem táncoltuk. (er -re) (Balázs 2;9) 
this -Acc neither we.danced (this -GOAL) 
We haven't danced to this either. 
g. 
With the exception of (4.23b) and (e), the erroneous utterances involve conceptual 
structures where the arguments marked by the accusative by the children could be 
mapped as direct objects in the adult grammar in a slightly different structural or 
referential pattern. They do not constitute a semantic class, however. The verb in 
(4.23a) is derived from the verb ver (beat), which subcategorises for an accusative - 
marked object complement. Fél (fear) from example (c) may take an accusative 
THEME in certain quasi- idiomatic collocations, such as: 
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(4.24) Féli az isten -t. 
fears the god -Acc 
He fears god. 
Játszik (play) in (4.23d) takes accusative GAME or MUSIC arguments, although TOYS 
must be marked for instrumental case. Similarly in (h) the child maps an argument 
referring to MUSIC as the direct object of the verb táncol (dance), while this option 
is only available for DANCE arguments in the adult grammar. In (f) the adjective 
nagy (big) is a modifier of the implicit object of the utterance. Finally, pöttyös 
(spotted one) in (g) refers to the object of the event which is the implicit argument 
of the verb kezd (start). These examples are compatible with the hypothesis that 
the errors originate in inaccurate event- representations. In most cases, however, 
it is not the semantic structure of the predicate in isolation but that of the entire 
clause that seems to influence the children's selection of case. In (c), (d) and (h) the 
category of the argument determines its relation to the predicate and, consequently, 
the selection of case. (Games and music are created by the act of playing and a 
dance is created by the act of dancing. Toys, on the other hand, exist independently 
of the act of playing and music exists independently of the act of dancing.) In (f) and 
(g) the accusative case seems to point to an unexpressed element in the conceptual 
structure of the clause. In none of these utterances are the errors accounted for 
by the assumption that the child hypothesises inaccurate or overgeneral meaning 
components. To maintain that the problem is with semantic representations and 
not with mapping rules, we would need to conclude that the error lay in building 
inaccurate semantic structures of events out of appropriate meaning components. 
But that conclusion seems indefensible. 
The alternative hypothesis, that the children encode meaning distinctions 
which are not grammatically relevant in the target language, similarly fails to pro- 
vide a unified account of the accusative substitution errors. Although for some 
of the utterances in (4.23) an analysis in terms of the misalignment of semantic 
categories and syntactic categories may provide a reasonable explanation, this is 
based on the grouping of argument types of individual predicates rather than on 
the formation of predicate -general emergent categories. For each of the predicates 
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in (c), (d), (h) and possibly (g) it could be argued that direct object arguments 
form a semantic or functional class with oblique arguments. The error could then 
be attributed to the underspecification of the predicate's argument structure, i.e., 
the semantic categories that the child's grammar links with the object function of 
individual predicates are broader than the semantic categories of the adult gram- 
mar. Similar errors can also be found in the English data. The English verb play, 
as its closest Hungarian equivalent, specifies different mapping patterns dependent 
on the semantic properties of its complements. Arguments denoting games or music 
are mapped as direct objects while expressions referring to toys are marked by the 
preposition with. The requirement to mark toy arguments frequently fails to be 
observed by Peter (in 29 out of 51 utterances in total): 
(4.25) a. let's play this barrel. (2 ;3) 
b. play the this car. (2;4) 
c. no play the blocks now. (2;4) 
As was mentioned earlier, the argument structure alternation does not appear to 
be accidental: the result of an event of creation is encoded as a direct object, while 
a pre- existing participant is encoded as an INSTRUMENT3. The contrast, however, 
is not necessarily reflected in argument structure, as demonstrated by bake -type 
verbs, where both the newly created entity and the pre- existing entity are mapped 
as objects: 
(4.26) a. Mrs Dursley baked a chocolate cake for Dudley. 
b. Mrs Dursley baked an old potato for Harry. 
The distinction is further blurred by the fact that some argument expressions may 
appear in either complement frame (as in play lego and play with lego). In this case 
the interpretation of the utterance is determined by syntactic structure rather than 
by the denotation of the complement expression in isolation and it is unlikely that 
the correct conceptual structure could be construed relying on situational cues alone. 
3The generalisation is not entirely accurate as in English musical instruments are also encoded 
as direct objects even though they are not themselves created by the playing act. 
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For this particular verb, it seems plausible that the categorisation of argument types 
presents difficulties. 
The hypothesis that the child's object and oblique NP arguments form a se- 
mantic category, however, cannot be maintained when we consider other frequently 
occurring predicates. In some cases the class of arguments that appear as NPs is 
simply too diverse to be reasonably considered a semantic category. The fact that 
errors in the selection of prepositions, when expressed, are negligibly rare demon- 
strates that it is not the case that the child is unable to distinguish thematic roles. 
The verb write, for instance, occurs with three types of oblique complements or ad- 
juncts which may be mapped as object NPs by the child (11 out of 14 INSTRUMENTS 
as in (4.27a,ó); 20 out of 29 GOALS as in (4.27c,d); and all 9 locative adjuncts as 
in (4.27e) where the magazine is to support the piece of paper the child is writing 
on): 
(4.27) a. write pencil. (2;0) 
b. I gonna write two pens. (2;6) 
c. write paper. (2;1) 
d. I'm writing tape. (2;2) 
e. I writing magazine. (2;2) 
A second kind of evidence against the hypothesis that mapping is solely determined 
by semantic factors is provided by utterance pairs where the same argument surfaces 
as an object in one utterance and as an appropriately marked oblique complement 
in the other. These examples suggest that even if children do grammaticise certain 
semantic categories, their rules are at best probabilistic. In the Hungarian data 
five of the eight utterance types in (4.23) also occur with target -like case marking. 
Some examples from the English data are given below. Each of the utterance sets 
occurs within a single episode: 
(4.28) a. go to zoo tomorrow. (2;1) 
b. go zoo tomorrow. (2;1) 
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(4.29) a. [the barrels] fell off the train. (2;2) 
b. barrels fell the train. (2;2) 
c. barrels fell the down the train. (2;2) 
(4.30) a. put it in hair please. [the barrette] (2;1) 
b. put my hair. [the barrette] (2;1) 
(4.31) a. no play the blocks now. (2;4) 
b. no play with the blocks. (2;4) 
(4.32) a. I gonna write two pens. (2;6) 
b. don't write with two pens. (2;6) 
4.3.3 Frequency effects 
A second possible factor motivating the mapping of oblique arguments onto the 
object function may be a simple effect of frequency. It may he the case that the 
statistically preponderant pattern in the input /intake prevails in the child's creative 
mapping choices. Immediate effects of this kind, where a pattern stored in short 
term memory is extended to a following utterance (termed "discourse analogy" by 
MacWhinney (1985)), have previously been noted in the literature. A candidate 
example from the data is shown below, where the structure of the erroneous utter- 
ance get some store matches the structure of the target -like verb phrase get some 
gum uttered three times in the child's previous turn: 
(4.33) PETER: I'm get some gum. I'm gon get some gum. I'm gon get some 
gum, Daddy. 
FATHER: I don't think we have any more gum, sweetie. 
PETER: right there, Daddy. get some store, Daddy. (2;4) 
This hypothesis predicts that at the beginning of the oblique NP stage target - 
like transitive frames with predicates subcategorising for oblique arguments dom- 
inate the child's frame types and that over time a correlation can be observed 
between the frequency of transitive frames and the frequency of oblique NPs. The 
frequencies are shown in Table 4.7 on page 133. Those verbs are included in the 
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table which occur at least once with a PP complement or a PP target complement 
which is realised as an NP, both transitive and intransitive. The first data column 
shows the summed number of target -like object NP and oblique PP complements. 
The second data column gives the percentage of object NPs. The third and fourth 
data columns show the same information cumulatively for verb types. As expected, 
with the exception of Stage 1, object complements are highly frequent with these 
verbs (15% at Stage 1, 86 -66% at subsequent stages). We also find a high pro- 
portion of transitive verb types within the set of verbs that occur with oblique 
arguments (28% at Stage 1, 42 -68% at subsequent stages). 
Frame frequencies also seem to account for the relatively low probability of 
accusative -marked oblique arguments in Hungarian child language. As shown in 
Table 4.8 on the next page, although target -like objects occur with a large number 
of verb types (around 40% for Zoli and 30% for Balázs), their token frequencies 
tend to be lower than the token frequencies of oblique- marked arguments. This is 
not unexpected since objects are licensed to be dropped in Hungarian. 
An explanation based on frequency effects alone, however, immediately raises 
a number of problems. First, if the transitive frame needs to be statistically domi- 
nant for overgeneralisation, why do oblique NPs occur at all with intransitive verbs 
and why are they frequent with transitive verbs at the first stage of Peter's data, 
where the number of PPs exceeds by far the number of objects? Second, no corre- 
lation can be observed between the frequency of oblique NPs and the frequency of 
transitive frames: over 90% of Peter's oblique arguments are mapped appropriately 
at the end of the studied period, even though the proportion of transitive frames 
remains high. 
One explanation to consider is that it is not overall frame frequencies that 
influence the child's mapping choices but the frequencies of argument mapping pat- 
terns of individual verbs as observed by the learner. To investigate this hypothesis, 
the verbs most frequently occurring with oblique arguments in the English corpus, 
go, play and write, will now be examined individually. Figure 4.1 on page 135 
compares learning curves for the three verbs. Actual numbers will be given in 





PPS AND OBJECT NPs 
Verb Types 
% Obj Obj +PP % Obj 
1 54 15 7 28 
2a 93 77 12 42 
2b 168 86 17 53 
3a 262 76 23 61 
3b 306 79 28 68 
4 397 66 42 62 
Total 1280 42 
Mean 66 
Table 4.7: Proportion of object NPs to target -like object NP and oblique PP arguments 
with oblique verbs; and cumulative proportion of transitive -oblique verb types to all 
oblique verb types. 
Stage ACCUSATIVE OBJECTS AND OBLIQUE COMPLEMENTS 
Tokens 
Acc +Obl %Acc 
Zoli 
V Types 
Acc +Obl %Acc 
Balázs 
Tokens V types 
Acc +Obl %Acc Acc +Obl %Acc 
1 29 41 8 37 17 23 7 28 
2 65 52 19 42 11 27 12 33 
3 54 48 27 41 22 68 17 35 
4 125 64 36 44 31 32 22 32 
Total 273 36 81 22 
Mean 51 37 
Table 4.8: Proportion of accusative marked object NPs to target -like object and oblique 
arguments with oblique verbs; and cumulative proportion of transitive -oblique verb types 
to all oblique verb types. 
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rate, which is calculated across all oblique argument types regardless of thematic 
role for each individual stage; and an indication of transitivity, which is calculated 
cumulatively at Stagen as the proportion of target -like transitive utterances to all 
utterances with expressed object or oblique arguments occurring up to and includ- 
ing Stager,. (The phrase home is counted as the object of go): 
ENPi 
(4.34) Transit: i =1 n 
>,NPi + *NPi +PPi 
i=1 
Prep Om: * 
*NPn 
NPn + PPn 
The rationale for the method of calculating the transitivity curve is the assump- 
tion that previous usage of argument frames gradually strengthens the grammar's 
confidence level for those frames, as was discussed in the previous chapter. 
Initially, the likelihood of preposition omission is fairly high (50% or more) 
with all three verbs. At later stages, however, the preposition omission curves differ 
greatly. While the oblique arguments of go are mapped as NPs in only 8% of 
utterances at Stage 3a, preposition omission with play and write remains at a high 
level. The arguments of play appear to be appropriately categorised by the end of 
the studied period (8% error rate) but oblique NPs with write continue to occur 
(62 %). To follow the development of this verb, the graph shows data from the next 
two files in the CHILDES corpus, recorded one and two months after Stage 4. Over 
this period preposition omission rate suddenly decreases and at the latter session 
Peter consistently maps the oblique arguments of write as PPs. 
The transitivity curves of the three verbs also show different patterns. For 
go, the complement phrase home is most frequent at the first stage (65 %) and its 
proportion gradually decreases thereafter in parallel with the preposition omission 
curved. Target -like object complements are less frequent with play and write and 
their frequency of occurrence does not appear to be a good predictor of preposition 
omission rate. 
4Note that the association between the two curves is not a valid correlation in the statistical 
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Figure 4.1: Association between frequency of transitive use and preposition omission with 
the verbs go, play and write 
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THE VERB go 
As we have seen previously (Table 4.5 on page 125), the GOAL arguments of the 
verb go tend to be mapped as bare NPs at the first three stages and as prepo- 
sitional complements at subsequent stages. I have suggested that this pattern is 
compatible with the hypothesis that the error originates in the miscategorisation of 
the argument home as an object NP, which is later reanalysed as an adverb. This 
explanation can now be revised. There are two kinds of evidence that can trigger 
reanalysis. One is sentences where the word home is embedded in a PP, as in (4.35), 
indicating that the distributional properties of the phrase [Det home] are different 
from the distributional properties of [home]. Evidence for the child's awareness of 
the distinction appears at the last stage, where the [Det home] phrase first occurs 
embedded in a GOAL denoting PP: 
(4.35) I wanna go to your home. (2;6) 
The other kind of evidence may come from the observation that verbs of motion 
may be followed by more than one class of GOAL expressions. One class, including 
the words home, there, here, may or may not be embedded in a prepositional 
phrase while another class is predominantly mapped as a PP. `Predominantly' in 
this context means that the proportion of non -PP mappings to PP mappings of 
class B expressions is negligible compared to the corresponding proportion observed 
with class A expressions. Both ways of arriving at the re- categorisation of the 
argument home, however, hinge on the assumption that the child notes nominal 
GOAL arguments being projected in PPs. The reanalysis is therefore more likely 
to be the result rather than the cause of the confirmation of the [go PPGOAL] 
mapping pattern in the lexicon. Let us now consider frequency. An exhaustive 
count of complement types with the verb go is given in Table 4.9 on page 138. 
The last column of the table shows the cumulative type frequency of non -adverb 
GOAL complements regardless of phrase type. As we can see, not only the token 
frequency but also the type frequency of GOAL arguments sharply increases over 
time. The greatest increase in type frequency occurs at Stage 3a, where 14 new 
GOAL arguments appear relative to the previous stage. By this time a total of 
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27 noun types have occurred as destinations, indicating that the argument slot 
is sufficiently generalised. It is also at this stage that preposition omission rate 
suddenly drops from 37% to 8 %. 
If we maintain that the word home is initially categorised as an NP, the 
early acquisition of the phrase go home may in this case result in the creation of a 
default [V NP] argument frame in the lexical entry of the verb. As the child later 
acquires PP complements and their probability increases relative to the probability 
of the presumed transitive frame, the default frame will be abandoned and home 
will be marked as an exception and eventually re- categorised as an adverb. If this 
is correct, the correlation between the frequency of the complement home and the 
frequency of NP GOAL complements shown in Figure 4.1 on page 135 is expected. 
THE VERB play 
The argument frames of the verb play pose a slightly different learning problem in 
that both the transitive and the prepositional frames may occur with an unlimited 
number of argument lexeme types and it is the conceptual structure of the utterance 
rather than the word class of the complement that determines mapping pattern 
selection. 
The actual token and type frequencies of Peter's argument frames are given 
in Table 4.10 on the following page. Interestingly, the child's first word combina- 
tions with the verb play fit the [V NP] frame even though the internal arguments 
denote toys (toys and pencils). At the next stage the word toys is mapped as an 
object NP on one occasion and as a PP on another occasion. At Stage 3a game 
and music arguments suddenly appear with high token and type frequencies and 
the proportion of oblique NPs is well above the overall rate of preposition omission 
at this stage. In the next sample new noun types appear in both the game /music 
and the toy categories, the token frequency of target -like object arguments is signif- 
icantly reduced and we find a decrease in error rate. At the last stage toy denoting 
nouns previously mapped as objects are projected in PPs while game /music ar- 
guments continue to be expressed in transitive frames. It is safe to assume that 
the mapping options are fully specified at this stage. The single error occurs with 




Number of Complements /Adjuncts 
*NP PP Adv VP None Tot 
Lex Types 
GOAL 
1 11 4 2 22 0 5 44 3 
2a 14 5 4 57 0 11 91 7 
2b 12 3 5 30 1 8 59 13 
3a 2 2 23 40 14 2 83 27 
3b 3 2 11 26 10 7 59 30 
4 0 1 29 8 3 13 54 38 
Table 4.9: Number of occurrences of complement frames with the verb go and cumulative 




Number of Complements /Adjuncts 
INSTR COMIT 0 





1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 - 1 
2a 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 - 2 - 
2b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 2 
3a 17 15 4 0 1 5 42 7 11 1 
3b 3 10 8 0 2 0 23 9 14 2 
4 3 1 9 0 2 1 16 11 17 3 
Table 4.10: Number of occurrences of complement frames with the verb play and cumula- 
tive number of lexeme types occurring as objects, INSTRUMENTS and comitative adjuncts 
138 
(disambiguated by the presence of the determiner) and which in fact follows a false 
start, as in (4.36): 
(4.36) I play foot // my football. (2;6) 
THE VERB write 
The verb write occurs with four types of oblique roles: INSTRUMENTS, GOALS, 
LOCATIONS and comitative adjuncts. As shown in Table 4.11 on the next page, 
preposition omission occurs with all four types. The object argument is unexpressed 
in all of the erroneous utterances. 
Similarly to the pattern observed with the verb play, the occurrence of oblique 
NPs at the initial stage cannot be attributed to frequency -based psycholinguistic 
factors, since target -like object arguments are infrequent. At later stages, although 
there is no sudden rise in the relative token frequency of objects, their type frequency 
increases at a significantly greater rate than that of any of the oblique arguments. 
We can also see that this increase continues throughout the studied period, yet the 
error rate in oblique argument mapping is reduced to an insignificant level by the 
final stage. 
In summary, the examination of the three verbs confirms the results of the 
overall frequency analysis: the statistical dominance of the target -like transitive 
frame at the early stages is not a necessary condition for the overapplication of 
the transitive mapping pattern; and recovery from the error is not dependent on a 
reduction in the frequency of object NPs. The first observation suggests that there 
must be some principle of the grammar that licenses oblique NPs as a default, 
which may then be reinforced by the occurrence of transitive frames in the input. 
The second problem points to the conclusion that there must be a learning process 
involved that leads to the correct specification of subcategorisation frames without 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3.4 The grammar of oblique NPs 
THE ECONOMY PRINCIPLE 
A plausible factor encouraging the mapping of internal arguments onto the object 
function in preference to prepositional marking is an economy principle of some 
kind. The object construction may require less processing effort, since direct O -role 
assignment by the verb in Pesetsky's (1995) terms involves a simpler derivation 
than the projection of a preposition whose 0- selection properties must match those 
of the verb. The reason for the reduced probability of accusative -marked oblique 
arguments in Hungarian may then lie in the fact that in that language mapping 
arguments onto the object function is not derivationally simpler than mapping 
arguments as oblique complements, as both types of argument receive inherent 
case. In the previous chapter I argued, however, that economy principles do not 
override factors of competence. That is, simplicity is not a sufficient condition for 
oblique arguments to be mapped as objects - the simpler mapping pattern must be 
a grammatical option which is assigned an above -zero probability by the learner's 
linguistic system. 
LEXICAL ALTERNATIONS 
The fact that arguments embedded in highly similar conceptual structures may be 
mapped by the child's grammar in different ways suggests that the mapping of argu- 
ments onto object versus oblique functions are treated as underspecified alternative 
linking patterns. The phenomenon of `preposition omission' appears to resemble 
lexical alternation errors even though the child's alternations may have no seman- 
tically related adult analogues. We have also seen that the mapping patterns may 
be semantically underspecified to such an extent that it seems as though the child's 
grammar allows any oblique argument to be mapped onto the object function. The 
question is what principle of the learner's competence may have this effect if it is 
not the case that the child encodes semantic distinctions by applying alternative 
linking rules and the child's semantic representations are accurate. 
Let us consider a generalised version of the linking theory view of lexical 
alternations advocated by Pustejovsky (1995) in his analysis of polysemy in general 
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and by Pinker (1989) and Pesetsky (1995) in their analysis of the dative and loca- 
tive alternations in particular. As was discussed in Chapter 1, Pinker and Pesetsky 
propose that the availability of the two mapping options of the dative and locative 
constructions directly follow from the semantic specifications of the predicate. Pe- 
setsky describes this property as the predicate's ability to 0- select THEME and GOAL 
arguments either directly or mediated by an overt or zero preposition. He further 
suggests that the lexico- semantic licensing conditions of the mediating prepositions 
are part of UG, just as Pinker's linking rules, and what the child has to learn is the 
semantics of individual predicates. 
In Chapter 1 I argued that reducing the availability of mapping options to 
differences in lexical meaning components does not solve the logical problem of 
language acquisition, since there remains the problem of constraining an overgen- 
eral hypothesis meaning. Now a second objection can be raised: the fact that 
argument structure errors are ubiquitous in child language and are not necessar- 
ily accompanied by semantic confusion on the one hand, and the obsèrvation that 
lexical alternation is a highly common and varied phenomenon in language on the 
other hand make the suggestion implausible that the semantic licensing conditions 
of each use of each mediating preposition are built into the grammar. The follow- 
ing sentence pairs illustrate just a few of the less commonly discussed alternations 
where a 0-role may be assigned both directly and through a preposition with some 
predicates but not with others: 
(4.37) a. Ron hit the dashboard with the magic wand. 
b. Ron hit the magic wand against the dashboard. 
c. Ron swiped the dashboard with the magic wand. 
d. *Ron swiped the magic wand against the dashboard. 
(4.38) a. Peter fought with the pirates. 
b. Peter fought the pirates. 
c. Peter argued with the pirates. 
d. * Peter argued the pirates. 
142 
(4.39) a. The party roamed in the woods /sailed around the lake. 
b. The party roamed the woods /sailed the lake. 
c. The boat floated in the lake. 
d. *The boat floated the lake. 
(4.40) a. Owl wiped the egg shells off the brontosaurus /from his eyes. 
b. Owl wiped the brontosaurus /his eyes. 
c. Owl took the egg shells off the brontosaurus. 
d. ! Owl took the brontosaurus. 
(4.41) a. Oz made a brain for the Scarecrow. 
b. Oz made the Scarecrow a brain. 
c. Oz fabricated a brain for the Scarecrow. 
d. * Oz fabricated the Scarecrow a brain. 
Oblique NP errors can be explained, however, if we allow the availability of the two 
types of 0- selection process to be a default property of the grammar and the lexical 
and /or thematic selectional principles of the two mapping patterns to be acquired. 
Let us assume that language has a flexible and general mechanism of mapping pat- 
tern selection that allows distinctions in the conceptualisations of lexical meaning 
to be reflected in syntactic structure. These distinctions may be represented in the 
grammar as sets of entailments in the sense of Dowty (1991), as structured concep- 
tual primitives (Jackendoff 1990) or as qualia structures in event representations 
(Pustejovsky 1995). The mechanism of mapping pattern selection may be realised 
in the form of direct versus mediated 0- selection (Pesetsky 1995), or, perhaps, by a 
process of head selection in event structure in Pustejovsky's sense, where subevents 
may specify distinct argument structures, only one of which, that of the head, is 
mapped onto syntactic structure in any one derivation. The details of this mecha- 
nism will not be discussed here, while acknowledging that the problem is far from 
trivial. 
Under the view proposed above children's oblique arguments may be mapped 
onto the object function not because the child's grammar associates certain semantic 
features with objects but because the general syntactic mechanism of mapping 
alternations is made available by UG and the precise conditions of the linking 
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options are at this stage undetermined. However, if mapping pattern alternations 
are unconstrained in the child's grammar, we expect NP and PP complements to 
occur essentially at random. This does not seem to be correct. Although there 
are a few examples of preposition insertion errors (shown in 4.6 on page 112), 
these are restricted to intransitive prepositional verbs. There are no occurrences 
of objects erroneously embedded in PPs. One explanation to consider is that the 
innate principle of object /prepositional complement alternation is unidirectional: 
(4.42) Prepositional complements may alternatively be mapped as direct objects 
to encode distinctions in conceptual structure. 
This formulation suggests that the prepositional mapping pattern is basic and 
the alternative option, when licensed, is marked. There seems to be no evidence 
for this claim, however. In certain alternation phenomena, such as the conative for 
instance, it is in fact the transitive structure that is intuitively basic or prototypical: 
(4.43) a. Neville hit Malfoy. 
b. Neville hit at Malfoy. 
A more plausible explanation is provided by the economy principle mentioned ear- 
lier. Since the generation of the transitive construction requires less processing 
effort, it is a reasonable conjecture that this option will be overused as long as it is 
in free variation with the alternative according to the current state of the grammar. 
If this is correct, however, it is no longer clear why oblique NPs should be 
less likely to occur with intransitive verbs than with transitive verbs. If the innate 
principle of mapping alternation is a predicate- general rule of permissible mapping 
patterns, the oblique arguments of all predicates should be affected as a default 
hypothesis. As oblique NPs do occasionally occur with intransitive verbs, we can 
assume that although the initial state of the grammar does not distinguish predicate 
types, the learning process does, ensuring relatively quick recovery from the error 
for predicates that do not appear with object arguments in the input. The next 
paragraphs look at the nature of this learning mechanism. 
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4.3.5 The learning process 
Returning to the earlier discussion of frame frequency effects, obviously, the hy- 
pothetical causal correlation between the frequency of target -like transitive frames 
and the error rate can produce progression only if the target -like transitive frame is 
used less and less frequently relative to the target -like prepositional frame over time. 
This scenario is only plausible, without having to make unreasonable assumptions 
about the input, for predicates that may take a restricted number of NP comple- 
ment types, which are acquired early, but are predominantly prepositional. In this 
case target -like performance may be achieved without sub -lexical featural analysis, 
by marking the few NP complement types as exceptional. As was discussed above, 
Peter's acquisition of the argument structure of the verb go fits well this pattern. 
To attain adult competence, however, the learner needs to establish which of the 
semantic differences between argument types are syntactically relevant. 
If the analysis of early oblique NPs as an option in underspecified argument 
structure alternations is correct, the learning process can involve the mechanism 
of pairwise comparison detailed in the last section of the previous chapter. As a 
first step the child acquires a set of predicates which are specified in the lexicon as 
subcategorising for optional or obligatory oblique arguments. The lexical structures 
of these predicates may be acquired on the basis of syntactic evidence in the input 
or on the basis of situational cues, as proposed by Pinker (1989), for instance. The 
learner's grammar licenses alternations in mapping patterns. Economy principles 
dictate that the simpler mapping pattern is applied provided that this is not in 
conflict with other rules of the grammar. If, as I suggested, the grammar also spec- 
ifies that alternative mapping patterns encode some (as yet unknown) differences 
in conceptual structure, the child should be predisposed to contrasting the set of 
properties that are associated with PPs with the set of properties that are associ- 
ated with object NPs. It must be emphasised that, unlike in Pinker's theory, this 
stage of the learning process is not directed at refining semantic representations 
(they may not need refining) but at marking existing features of conceptual struc- 
ture as cues to one or the other mapping pattern. For this reason, at this stage 
positive and negative syntactic information in the input is crucial. It seems to be 
145 
a reasonable conjecture that to what extent and in which environments simplicity 
considerations are overridden during the course of development will be determined 
by the amount of available evidence and the transparency of the feature contrasts. 
Assuming that lexical contrasts are identified more easily than extra- or sub -lexical 
contrasts as discussed in the previous chapter, intransitive predicates, which do not 
occur with object complements in the primary linguistic data, will be the first to be 
removed from the set of predicates that, as a default hypothesis, allow the argument 
structure alternation. 
Where object arguments are observed in the input, for the successful marking 
of semantic features as relevant for mapping pattern selection the child must have 
experience of a sufficient number of argument types in both the [V PP] frame and 
the [V NP] frame. In this case, the large number of object arguments, which initially 
reinforce the child's default hypothesis, should subsequently assist the learning pro- 
cess, which is what we find comparing the learning curves of the verbs play and 
write. 
The learning mechanism allows feature contrasts (i.e., PP- features vs. NP- 
features) to be established for the argument types of individual predicates or for 
generalised configurations of conceptual structure. The latter type of process may 
lead to argument structure errors which typically occur at later developmental 
stages, such as dative subjects in Hungarian and the overgeneralisation of lexi- 
cal alternation of the kind discussed in Chapter 1. Thus, the overapplication of 
the locative alternation, for instance, may not be the consequence of underspecified 
semantic representations construed for individual predicates but the consequence 
of overgeneral mapping rules, such as a rule licensing the alternation for all verbs 
of non -possessional transfer. Recovery from the overgeneralisation can then involve 
further pairwise statistical learning from the occurrence or non -occurrence of ex- 
pected argument structures. As we have seen, this allows not only the extraction of 
any semantic regularities characteristic of syntactic types but also the direct mark- 




The questions asked at the beginning of the study were, Why do certain errors occur 
while other apparently similar ones do not? And what learning mechanisms allow 
the learner to progress from a broader to a narrower grammar? The answer that 
emerges from the detailed examination of two wide -ranging and arguably indepen- 
dent characteristics of early child English is that the two puzzles share a common 
solution, statistical learning. 
The observed patterns of erroneous implicit arguments and oblique NP com- 
plements in English child language share a number of features: 
(5.1) The state of the grammar at the initial stage of the studied period: 
a. The errors do not constitute violations of Universal Grammar, both 
implicit arguments and the -mapping of canonical oblique O -roles onto 
the object function result in permissible syntactic configurations. 
b. The precise licensing conditions of implicit arguments and oblique 
NPs lie beyond the constraint system of UG. The child's utterances 
are ungrammatical in that they fail to conform to pragmatic, seman- 
tic and /or lexical conventions that determine the mapping process 
in the mature grammar. 
c. The errors seem to indicate that it is these conventions of mapping 
rather than the child's semantic representations which are underde- 
termined. 
d. For each of the two error types a related construction (object map- 
ping and intransitive prepositional constructions) has been observed 
which appears virtually error -free in the child's output. 
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e. The study fails to confirm previous suggestions or to identify new 
explanations based on the properties of UG that could account for 
differences in these pairs of error patterns. 
(5.2) The course of development: 
a. The child's hypotheses are probabilistic in that the erroneous and 
the target -like constructions occur side by side and no criterion has 
been found that can unfailingly predict the selection of one or the 
other alternative in individual utterances. 
b. There are, however, statistical differences between environments in 
the frequency of each type of error relative to the frequency of the 
target -like alternative. 
c. These differences cannot fully be attributed to some a priori prop- 
erty of the child's grammar, although considerations of derivational 
simplicity have an observable effect. 
d. Surface syntactic structures corresponding to the child's erroneous 
utterances (i.e., null- subject frames and transitive frames) occur with 
non -negligible token and type frequencies in the child's target -like 
output. Variations in these frequencies can to a significant extent 
predict statistical variations in error patterns, suggesting that those 
are a product of the learning process. 
On the basis of the above findings I have suggested that the learning process 
may be defined as a simple statistical pairwise feature -comparison algorithm. The 
motivation behind revising hypothesis rules in the absence of an increase in parsing 
power is provided by the learner's predisposition to match "expected" form /meaning 
pairings against attested form /meaning objects given the constraint system of the 
innate language acquisition programme, including a predisposition to search for 
semantic /pragmatic contrasts in the face of formal contrasts. 
I have further proposed that the negligibly low frequency of occurrence of 
certain error types (i.e., object omission and preposition omission with intransitive 
verbs) at the initial stage of the studied period is best analysed as an instance of 
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statistical variation of the kind mentioned above rather than as evidence for differ- 
ential accessibility to aspects of UG. The approach outlined in the study therefore 
dispenses with problem- specific rules of limited applicability in favour of a generic 
language acquisition mechanism working towards a solution both to the theoretical 
problem of narrowing an overgeneral grammar and to the empirical puzzle of islands 
of error -prone versus error -free linguistic behaviour in early child language. 
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